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Abstract: Sharyn Maxwell, Contextualising the Coordination of Care in NHS 
Trusts: An Organisational Perspective, PhD Dissertation, Durham University, 
November 2007 
This thesis has two principal aims. The first is to understand why change oriented towards 
improving the coordination of care for long term users of healthcare (and related) services is 
so difficult to achieve. The second is to identify possibilities for how these difficulties may be 
overcome. 
During the three-year period 2002-2004, two NHS Trusts instituted a particular means for 
coordinating care, integrated care pathways (ICPs), as 'the way that clinical work is done 
here'. These change efforts were instigated as part of a collaborative NHS modernisation 
project. Despite similarities between the Trusts and their change programmes, the 
organisational outcomes from the modernisation project differed. This thesis identifies factors 
that contributed to these differing outcomes. 
The research was framed within an organisational perspective drawing upon recent 
organisational theory and a relevant research approach; interpretative structuralism. This 
approach used a variety of research techniques (historical analysis, document review, 
surveys and interviewing) to examine the social contexts underpinning prevailing thinking 
within the NHS about how clinical work should be organised and managed. 
The results showed that many factors in the wider context of the NHS and the local clinical 
'shop floor' operate to fragment thinking about how care should be organised. In one Trust 
several factors contributed to its greater success in implementing ICPs. These included (i) 
coherence and congruence amongst the senior management in conceptualising and 
pursuing more product oriented approaches to clinical management, (ii) clinically led 
services and devolution of authority, (iii) a willingness of all staff (including senior 
management and clinicians) to be self critical and thoughtful in making suggestions for 
improving clinical performance, and (iv) an ability by senior management to interweave five 
key themes in clinical service provision throughout the organisation. These themes were 
patient experience, service redesign, financial balance, the inter-relationship between these 
three, and integrated governance of the resulting organisational processes and outcomes. 
The results also showed that local contextual factors such as the character of the local 
electorate and the style and expected longevity of the senior leadership can undermine 
success in achieving agreed goals for coordinating and managing care. 
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Chapter One 
Rationale 
The Research Question 
This research aims to provide insight into the questions: What prevents service 
providers from structuring their services in a more 'organised yet flexible' way? More 
specifically, what prevents integrative innovations in care organisation and 
management such as integrated care pathways from being implemented effectively? 
And, consequent upon that, how might these impediments be overcome? 
Why Integrated Care Pathway (ICP) Implementation? 
My research interest and commitment to exploring these questions grew out of 
personal experience of the apparent disorganisation of care over many years as a care 
giver and patient advocate. ICPs offer a way to organise care in a more efficient, 
effective and transparent manner, yet experience has shown that they are not as 
widely used as they might be and their successful implementation is not guaranteed. 
My Story 
I am the mother of a nineteen year old son with Down's Syndrome who also has 
severe-profound speech dyspraxia and, until puberty, a hearing problem and a sleep 
disorder. When my son was born I joined my local Down Syndrome Association (DSA) 
(in New South Wales, Australia) in order to obtain support for my family in 
understanding and managing what my son's disability would mean for family life and for 
the future. The DSA proved invaluable in helping me to negotiate the complexities of 
health, educational and social care provision. 
Even so, the 'postcode lottery' in availability of services, the differing criteria for 
accessing services, the lack of communication and shared knowledge between health 
professionals and between health and educational specialists, and the constant 
requirements for me to meet yet more specialists and therapists, meant I struggled to 
access services in a coherent and helpful way. When I did succeed in accessing 
services, I spent much of my time repeating history and needs I had already told every 
other professional my son and family had encountered along the way. The frustrations 
from feeling 'all at sea' without direction regarding the availability of services, the 
logistical difficulties involved in accessing services once they had been 'discovered', 
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the seeming futility of the extensive 'filling in' of forms, and the weariness and 
exasperation in repeated retelling of the same old story over and over again became 
particularly acute when I had my second child. As a baby, there was the difficulty of 
being unable to develop sleep and other routines with her, due to the need to 
constantly interrupt these to take my son somewhere for his treatment and 
assessment. As a toddler, there was the difficulty of trying to attend simultaneously to 
the exploratory and/or attention seeking behaviour of a two-three year old whilst having 
a detailed discussion with a health professional about my son's needs. As a school 
aged child, who was both athletic and subsequently assessed as 'intellectually 
advanced', there was the ongoing and seemingly unwinnable battle to grow and keep a 
close family with two children who, physically and intellectually, lived at opposite ends 
of the spectrum. Why, I fumed, could health professionals not coordinate services 
better, communicate more effectively amongst themselves and between services, and 
plan how streams of care could be delivered to people and families with well known 
and relatively consistent sets of needs? It was not as if people with learning disabilities 
in general and Down's Syndrome in particular were unknown entities, whose needs 
were unknown and whose requirements could not be anticipated and planned in 
advance. Surely better organisation would reduce the stress upon families from the 
existing disorganisation between services? 
My work as a volunteer family support worker and patient advocate on the DSA's 
behalf and as a clergy wife led me to extensive involvement with other families with 
similar problems. I realised that many of these families struggled with a combination of 
disability, mental health and other problems. It seemed that the stress of dealing with 
combined intellectual and physical disability often resulted in parents of these children 
developing some form of mental illness especially, though not solely, depression, 
anxiety and/or phobias. The mental health problems I encountered through my role as 
clergy wife were usually more severe than those I encountered in my work with the 
DSA; nonetheless there was a considerable commonality in the experiences and needs 
of families. Often the burdens of the first person's mental illness would trigger (or be 
associated with) mental illness in another family member. It was not unusual, for 
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example, to encounter a family with a son who was schizophrenic, a mother who was 
depressed or highly anxious and a father at his wits' end. 
Thus there were many similarities in my experiences in my twin roles and in my own 
personal existence. The problem was, and is, widespread though perhaps not widely 
recognised. Families with complex circumstances commonly endure fragmented, 'silo'-
type service provision. The problem is not that the individual services offered to each 
family member were/are poor, indeed despite waiting lists, services are often excellent 
once accessed. It was/is that the services are offered in isolation from, and even in 
ignorance of, other relevant services and from the families' wider needs. 
One situation I commonly encountered is the 'be present or be relegated' scenario. In 
this scenario, care service 'x' would arrange an appointment for a relevant family 
member at a particular locality at a particular time. There would be one 'grace' re-
arrangement of the appointment i.e. if there was a reason why that appointment could 
not be made, another appointment would be made. If that next appointment was not 
kept, for whatever reason, the patient/client would go to the end of the queue. In one 
example that caused particular vexation for me, a mother with agoraphobia was asked 
to take her disabled son to a facility nine kilometres distant for speech therapy. The 
child had been on the waiting list for nearly a year. The mother had two pre-school age 
children in addition to the disabled son. Though geographically not far, the facility was 
not easily accessible by public transport; it would require several changes of buses to 
get there. It was never going to be easy to get the child there - most days the mother 
could not even get out of her house, let alone make a trip of this complexity with this 
many children. When the speech therapy centre was contacted to ask if the therapist 
could come to the child instead, the response was a firm 'no'. The rationale for the 
parents coming to the centre, it was explained, was that this allowed the therapists 
(who were short-staffed) to maximise the number of clients they could see in a day. 
This practice prevented the loss of significant therapy time through unnecessary 
travelling (from the perspective of the service provider). This was an understandable 
and, from a service efficiency perspective, sound response but it did not take account 
of the family's situation. 
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The mother did not manage to make the first appointment. For the next appointment, 
we were highly organised. Transport was arranged to the centre, the mother was 
coached and encouraged in how to deal with the (to her) traumatic experience of going 
so far outside her home. Child minders were arranged for the younger children. The 
father had arranged to call his wife from work and talk her through the journey if she 
found the travel tough going. However two days before the appointment, the son broke 
out with chicken pox and was not able to attend. Despite our intensive efforts and 
repeated requests for consideration for another appointment in a few weeks, the family 
lost their place in the queue and had to start the waiting list process over again. The 
mother in particular was greatly demoralised at the outcome. Though this experience 
occurred in Australia, it is similar to the anecdotal experiences of families I met when I 
moved to the UK. 
Another frequently encountered situation was the failure to get rapid access to mental 
health care when required. Despite obvious indications that all was not well with 
someone with diagnosed mental illness, it was often exceedingly difficult to get a health 
professional to intervene. This was true even when the person had been hospitalised 
more than once previously. Regardless of how much pressure the family member with 
the mental health problem placed upon their family (usually through refusing to take 
their medication), people with poor mental health were deemed to be better off in the 
community. In addition, the patient's right to privacy was deemed paramount over the 
needs of the family to prevent or manage the dysfunction and chaos caused by the 
family member's refusal to self-medicate. In the longer term, the result was usually 
even more dysfunction and mental illness in the family and increased need for social 
welfare. 
Feeling under-equipped to help individuals and families deal with the emotions, 
discouragements and despair that such intractable circumstances generate in 
vulnerable people, I trained as a personal counsellor. My aim was to be more skilful 
and insightful in helping the families I supported. Before I had completed the 200 hours 
of counselling experience necessary for registration, I came to several realisations. The 
first of these was that I was not necessarily well equipped to take more responsibility 
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for (and exposure to) the emotional pain of others. The second was that the 'system' 
was letting people down faster than I could help put them back together. It seemed 
clear to me that, amongst the particular patienUfamily groups with whom I was working, 
the health system in particular and, to a lesser extent the related social and education 
systems, were frequently though unintentionally creating more, rather than fewer, 
health problems. Those affected were often amongst the some of most vulnerable 
people in society. On ethical, societal and (from a health system perspective) 
instrumental grounds this was, to me, unacceptable, especially in a western country. 
From an economic perspective (my first degree was in economics), it was inefficient 
and short-sighted; strong economies require a competitive edge and a productive 
workforce. The growing rates of depression and other mental illness in western 
economies were already being recognised as potentially undermining workforce 
productivity and the ability of western countries to provide for their members, including 
the relatively well. This was no less true of Australia. The increased incapacity of 
families with complex needs simply added to the economic problem. Though my 
interest in better coordinated, patient and family centred services was initially 'selfish', 
the ramifications were potentially serious to all. Much later, I came to realise that many 
of these problems are also experienced, though to a lesser extent, by families with 
members who have long term (chronic) conditions. 
I decided I was misdirecting my efforts. If I wanted to make a difference, I would be 
better off working towards a changed system which prevented these kinds of situations, 
rather than trying to hold a few people together once they'd 'gone through the mill' and 
been crushed. 
Initial Efforts to Understand the Issue of Service Inflexibility 
In my ignorance at this stage, I believed that my relatively ineffectual efforts as a 
family/patient advocate were the result of my voluntary status (which was definitely a 
hindrance on many occasions) and my lack of direct knowledge about the health 
service. I reasoned that to be an effective change agent, I needed to get some 
healthcare qualifications, to become an 'insider', and work to change the system from 
that knowledge base. My intention upon gaining a relevant degree was to work in a 
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community health organisation which focused upon care provision to either people with 
a learning disability or a mental health problem. I therefore applied, on the basis of my 
volunteer work, for admission to a Masters degree in health service management. 
The first indication that this would not necessarily provide the understanding that I 
sought came in the very first lecture which was on health systems. The lecturer asked 
all 60 or so people in the lecture theatre to provide their names, health related role and 
reason for undertaking the course. As I gave my reasons and role, a doctor at the back 
of the lecture theatre angrily announced that he had been in the health service for nine 
years and he'd never been able to access the services he required for his patients. He 
never had any impact on the system, so what right did I have to think that I could do 
better than he had? He went on to say that he felt just as much an outsider to the 
organisation of care as I did. The lecture was silent with held breath until other doctors 
also began to vent their frustration with 'the system'. It was a rude awakening for me to 
the frustrations inherent in the existing organisation and management of care, but a 
necessary one. 
The Masters programme was intellectually useful however the programme was taught 
principally from an instrumentalist perspective. Lectures, readings and exercises 
conveyed the impression that all one had to do was align the goals, strategies and 
incentives, press the 'go' button, and the desired solution would result. This did not 
explain why so many health professionals felt locked out of the system in which they 
were employed. Greater insight came from understanding the lived experience of the 
organisation and management of care by doctors, nurses, therapists, health scientists 
and managers. My discussions with practising health professionals suggested that 
instrumentalism in health service organisation, particularly at the level at which clinical 
work was done, was more illusion than reality. I gleaned strong impressions that the 
(Australian) health service was often long term, thinly disguised chaos, held together by 
goodwill and dedication from all who worked there, often despite very strong 
differences of opinion between professionals about what was in fact the best or right 
way to do something. 
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Learning about ICPS 
As a result of my progress on the Masters, I was invited to work with Professor Pieter 
Degeling, then of the Centre for Hospital Management and Information Systems 
Research in the Faculty of Medicine at the University of New South Wales. My position 
was editor of the research project report on professional sub-cultures in hospitals that 
Professor Degeling was writing. This report confirmed, via quantitative research 
findings, impressions I had developed from personal experience and the anecdotes of 
my new study colleagues. The Australian health service (in this case hospitals) was 
marked by deeply entrenched professional disagreements and sub-cultural stances on 
almost every aspect of healthcare provision including how care should be organised, 
how standards should be set, and how healthcare should be managed. 
At that time Professor Degeling became interested in integrated clinical pathways 
(ICPs) as a mechanism for achieving 'interpolar balance' between the various 
competing interests and values amongst healthcare professionals. ICPs are 
systematically developed written statements of the prospective trajectory of care for 
patients with a specific clinical condition e.g. a fractured neck of femur, stroke or with 
an ongoing chronic disease. They incorporate the views of clinicians (medical, nursing, 
allied health), patients, managers and carers about the agreed sequence of the phases 
and events in primary, acute and/or community care that will significantly affect quality 
and outcomes. The terminology of I CPs is not yet settled -they are variously described 
in the literature as critical paths, care maps, multidisciplinary action plans, care paths, 
research protocols, guidelines, algorithms, collaborative care pathways, problem 
orientated medical records, and anticipated recovery pathways. One of the most widely 
used definitions comprises three central components: a collectively agreed, 
prospectively planned package of care; a nominated person responsible for case 
management; and variance analysis and audit (lgnatavicius and Hausman 1995). 
However, if ICPs are understood as a health sector application of (industrial) process 
management, then an ICP will also include a fourth component, namely prospective 
costing of the outlined care. I was intrigued as ICPs seemed to be a means for 
providing that structured yet flexible organisation of care I was seeking for people with 
relatively complex and ongoing health needs. 
8 
Professor Degeling sought and achieved a major research grant to examine the 
practical outcomes of ICPs as an organising tool. A three year, three clinical condition 
research project was undertaken in three Australian states. This project, for which I 
was a researcher, suggested that ICPs offered a way to ensure higher quality 
coordinated care, efficiently and effectively (Degeling, Sorensen, Maxwell, Aisbett, 
Zhang, and Coyle 2000b). This confirmed what the academic literature, especially the 
nursing based literature, had been claiming for ICPs for about ten years. Contrary to 
the largely exhortatory published literature on ICPs at that time however, it also 
uncovered some of the reasons why ICPS might not necessarily be as well accepted 
and implemented as they could be. The reasons for this included: 
• Managements' priority to manage 'up' in response to political pressure and 
imposed targets, 
• The dynamics of management/clinician relationships, including relative 
power relations, and 
• Limited 'vision' i.e. it is very hard to imagine something that has not yet been 
seen, even when similar concepts exist in other economic sectors. 
Other researchers working with Prof Degeling in other projects at that time discovered 
that language, semiotics and power relationships also played significant roles in 
determining whether and how ICPs were adopted and what their outcomes might be. 
Yet something else was evidently also at work. In 2002, along with Professor Degeling 
and two others, I began work as the project manager on what became known as the 
Clinical Management Development project (CMDP). This project was an initiative of the 
then Northern and Yorkshire Regional Modernisation Board. It was a three year 
research and development project with a remit to operate in six local health economies 
in the North of England and Yorkshire. In truth, however, each health economy's 
involvement was driven by the involvement (or relative lack thereof) of the local NHS 
Trust. The project's aims were to identify sub-cultural stances on aspects of NHS 
modernisation, and in the light of identified awareness of these differences, to assist 
the participating health economies to implement ICPs. Only four health economies 
eventually participated in the CMDP; of these only two continued to participate into the 
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development phase. The two health economies which did not start the project withdrew 
after the local NHS Trusts decided that they had higher priorities; in one Trust this was 
a recent amalgamation and in the other it was a belief that finance, not the organisation 
of care, was the key problem faced by the Trust. Of the two health economies which 
commenced the project but did not complete it, one Trust did not accept that ICPs were 
a productive way forward and the other believed it could develop ICPs faster by going it 
alone. 
The two remaining health economies agreed that they would implement similar ICPs 
and similar ICP management structures and processes for three common clinical 
conditions. These two health economies appeared very similar in composition. The 
hospital Trusts were both formed out of the amalgamation of previous trusts relatively 
recently prior to the commencement of the CMD project. They both had two principal 
district general hospitals located in geographically distinct and competitive townships. 
They both had politically active local constituencies, significant inherited debt, and 
operated with a divisionalised internal structure. Both had three Primary Care Trusts 
(PCTs) that, reflecting the geographical and political sensitivities, did not always see 
eye to eye. Yet the CMDP had very different outcomes in the two health economies 
and particularly in the NHS Trusts. By the end of the project, ICPs in one Trust 
appeared to be becoming 'part of the way we do things here'; in the other, despite 
some gains on paper, there were few concrete results. The question for me was, and 
is, "Why was this so?" "Why did ICPs become more institutionalised in one Trust than 
the other?" 
Superficially and intuitively, part of the explanation for the different result resided at the 
level of the CMD project and its management, other explanations were internal to the 
Trusts, still others were probably the result of interactions between the PCTs, NHS 
Trusts, Durham University project team and local concerns. Yet almost undeniably, it 
was apparent that something more fundamental was also at work. The history of the 
NHS is anecdotally one in which, despite persistent change efforts, the coordination of 
clinical work remains problematic. The organisation of clinical work is still highly 
fragmented, plagued by problems in communication and coordination, and heavily 
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orientated towards the needs of the service provider rather than the service user (and 
their family). 
My Focus and My Method 
During this work on ICPs I established my employment within the higher education 
sector. On a professional level, I needed to undertake a PhD to further my career as an 
academic. On a personal leave I was still vexed by the difficulties in achieving more 
coordinated care. A PhD offered the possibility to achieve both goals. Recognising that 
that studying the coordination of care within and across the related sectors of health, 
social care and education was an enormous undertaking, I knew I needed to narrow 
my PhD focus and more tightly define my research question. Highly regarded cross-
sectoral work about joint working and planning was already being undertaken by 
Professor Bob Hudson. It made sense from strategic and logistic considerations (i.e. 
what could make a real contribution to knowledge and be manageable within the 
required time frame given my personal circumstances and time availability?) to focus 
upon the coordination of care in one sector. It also made sense to focus specifically 
upon one example of various putative means for coordinating and delivering care. 
The literature suggests that ICPs have the potential to simultaneously operate within 
and across organisations within one sector and across sectors yet my work experience 
had shown that even with significant funding, expert input and a reasonable time 
horizon, change in the organisation of clinical work within individual organisations had 
proven relatively difficult to effect. I therefore decided to focus my PhD around the 
identification of factors that may have contributed to the differing outcomes in the two 
NHS Trusts central to the CMDP. I regarded these as exemplars for understanding 
what impedes and/or facilitates the adoption and implementation of specific innovations 
in clinical work organisation and management, particularly ones directed at integrating 
and coordinating the care for nominated patient groups. I hoped these findings would 
be generalisable; firstly within hospitals and, perhaps even more broadly, across 
healthcare and other organisations and secondly, to other forms of innovation in clinical 
work methods. 
II 
Several possible causes for the differing results were available in organisational theory 
and business management literatures, especially papers which focused on healthcare. 
The health professional literatures also suggested possibilities. The potential causes 
included entrenched professional cultures, poor leadership and lack of vision, poor 
change management practices, the effectiveness (or not) of clinical teams, the deeper 
'structures' of management and clinician relations, lack of political awareness amongst 
managers, and poor organisation communication and learning. Each of these 
explanations appeared to be relevant but they were also interrelated. Moreover I was 
not sure how insightful any one of these explanations might turn out to be, or how 
generalisable any results might be. 
I decided that, rather than favour one theory or explanation over another, I would 
examine the contextual environment of ICP implementation in the wider NHS and in 
these particular Trusts. My goal was to understand how a variety of contextual factors 
interact within healthcare organisations to affect how clinical work is managed and thus 
how new modes of organising clinical work may be introduced. As I could not examine 
all contextual factors I chose to examine the following factors: 
• Historical factors, 
• Professional sub-cultures, 
• Staff views on their experience of work and its possible improvement, and 
• Conceptions and strategies re the organisation and management of clinical 
work amongst senior management. 
My reasons for choosing these factors were intertwined with my choice of method. 
Since I was looking for explanations for the persistence of established practices and 
modes of clinical work organisation (or the lack thereof) within organisations, I looked 
to research by organisational theorists as my starting point and then to methods being 
used within such research. I chose as my method 'interpretative structuralism'. 
According to Hardy and Phillips (Phillips and Hardy 2002), interpretative structuralism 
is a methodological approach which emphasises the importance of the social context 
underpinning the prevailing way of thinking about and making sense of something and 
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how that has been, and continues to be, constructed. It allowed me to analyse and 
interpret the contribution the social contexts of clinical work organisation and 
management (within the study organisations and within the wider organisational 
environment) make in structuring (or institutionalising) thinking about planning, 
organising and managing clinical work. 
The Structure of this Thesis 
The thesis begins with the outline of the rationale for examining the social context for 
the organisation of clinical work provided in this Chapter. Chapter Two contextualises 
and overviews literature on a selection of themes relevant to how clinical work is 
conducted and organised within organisations, primarily hospitals. The research 
method is outlined in Chapter Three. Chapter Four reviews the NHS and managerial 
decision making structures within hospitals from a historical perspective whilst Chapter 
Five reviews health policies, prior to and during the Clinical Management Development 
project, which sought to change the way clinical work is viewed, conducted, 
coordinated and monitored within organisations. Chapters Six and Seven are 
descriptive chapters. Chapter Six provides summaries of the two Trusts, their history, 
structures and local contexts. Chapter Seven extends this, outlining the Clinical 
Management Development project and each Trust's participation in this. Findings from 
the empirical work are reported in Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten. Chapters Eight and 
Nine report findings from surveys administered to managers and clinicians about 
factors affecting the healthcare system, the management of healthcare organisations 
and clinical practice, staff's experience of work and their suggestions for how their 
experience of work and the Trusts' clinical performance could be improved. Chapter 
Ten provides a thematic summary of interviews with both Trusts' Executive Team 
regarding organisational values, priorities and conceptions about clinical work. Chapter 
Eleven discusses findings, draws conclusions from the research, and discusses its 
limitations and future possibilities. 
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Chapter Two 
Contextual ising Literature Relevant to the Organisation, 
Coordination and Conduct of Clinical Work 
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Introduction 
Change in the NHS (and the lack thereof) has been a topic of discussion amongst 
academics, policy analysts and practitioners since the NHS' establishment. For many, 
the NHS demonstrates that old adage "the more things change, the more they stay the 
same". This is especially true in regards to the coordination and organisation of clinical 
work. Despite repeated and major structural reorganisations, programmes that have 
sought to produce improved coordination of work through increased teamwork, altered 
skills-mix and/or work practice change have not necessarily produced real change. 
Explanations for this persistent disparity between goals and achievement of better 
coordination and delivery of clinical work have been largely sourced in the instrumental 
aspects of healthcare arrangements. These instrumental explanations for the lack of 
change can be clustered into various related organisational and regulatory matters 
although other explanations include political and cultural elements. 
Lack of real progress can be attributed to strategic failures such as lack of strategic 
planning (Sibbald, Shen, and McBride 2004) and discontinuities in leadership of 
strategic change (Pettigrew, Ferlie, and McKee 1992). Organisational design issues 
include an absence of organisational supports for changes that take account of the 
organisational context and structures to support team processes (Borrill et al 2000); 
management issues that centre around human resource management, especially for 
middle management (McConville and Holden 1999; T and Holden 1999); and 
inadequate training of front line staff. This poor training stems from an over-reliance on 
'on the job' learning (and resulting absence of formal supervised training) and 
misjudgement of the gap between staffs' existing and required skills (Briggs 1997; 
Sibbald, Shen, and McBride 2004). Not surprisingly, this results in difficulties in 
discontinuing older ways of working and in coordinating the expansion of new roles and 
work modes (Lowy, Brazier, Fall, Thomas, Jones, and Williams 1993), variable results 
(Lewis, Tudor, Tsao, and Canaan 1998) and poor quality assurance techniques (Audit 
Commission 1992). 
Regulatory matters add to organisational problems by creating obstacles between care 
organisations and sectors (e.g. health and social care) seeking to act in partnership. 
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The most commonly reported regulatory impediments in health are boundary issues, 
e.g. differing lines of accountability and employment conditions/status within health 
care sectors (Audit Commission 1992; Sibbald, Shen, and McBride 2004 ), difficulties in 
aligning staff remuneration (Audit Commission 1992) (Bailey, Black, and Wilkin 1994; 
Baker and Klein 1991 ), and difficulties in role realignments through the lack of firm 
evidence about cost effectiveness of many substitutions (and therefore lack of 
management support for them) (Sibbald, Shen, and McBride 2004). A plethora of more 
abstract instrumental factors facilitating and hindering inter-organisational coordination 
has been identified in the wider social science literature (including industrial relations, 
management studies, organisation theory, politics, and social policy)(Hudson 1987; 
Webb 1991 ). Important amongst these are the presence or absence of domain 
consensus, reciprocal trust, incentives, intermediary bodies, power brokers and fixers, 
and political commitment (Degeling 1995). 
Perhaps more importantly, and frequently unacknowledged, this extensive literature is 
limited by authors' frequent failure to recognise that the very act of naming a formal 
boundary has both cognitive and social effects. 'Labelling' influences how people think, 
act and interact within each boundary - it assists the derivation of sense and meaning 
by implicitly delineating what is 'inside' and what is 'outside' the boundary. In so doing, 
people, especially but not exclusively the insiders, shape various complex ideas, 
processes and associated activities into a coherent, reified whole. This 'reification' 
presents social processes and cultural expressions as concrete, factual objects and 
imbues them with apparently universal truth. Accepting reification without question can 
lead people inside the boundary into organisational myopia (Nooteboom 2003) and 
cause them to reject alternative possibilities. The rejected alternatives can sometimes 
include the larger purpose for which the organisation was formed and its boundaries 
drawn. 
Even when social processes are recognised as such by researchers and writers, they 
often still adopt from a relatively instrumental perspective when analysing the outcomes 
of efforts to improve the organisation, coordination and effects of clinical work through 
improved team working. For instance, despite acknowledgement that relationships and 
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processes within the NHS cannot escape pervasive gender disparities in work and 
social life (Griffin 2001; Ohman, Hagg, and Dahlgren 1999), one study (Sibbald, Shen, 
and McBride 2004) explained these away, arguing that the continuance of traditional 
clinical work practices was simply the outcome of lifetime workforce participation rates 
and the associated costs of doctor-nurse substitutions, apparently without recognition 
of the gender issues implicit in these phenomena. A similar tendency to reduce 
complex social effects to relatively instrumentalist concerns can be seen amongst 
authors concerned with the more overtly political aspects of the NHS. Particularly 
relevant here are analyses which see the persistence of relatively poor coordination in 
care between organisations and professions as a result of the efforts of powerful 
interests to retain their benefits from the existing arrangements within the healthcare 
system (Hunter 2004). Such analyses can lead to conclusions along lines that the 
Department of Health maintains 'tight central control and constraining micro-
management of the service' by 'dictating the minutia of everyday activities of NHS staff 
through 'a plethora of complicated targets and initiatives' (Bradshaw 2003; Smith, 
Walshe, and Hunter 2001) whilst generally purporting to support a coherent approach 
to local autonomy. 
More overtly social explanations for the persistence of a lack of continuity and 
coherence in care planning and delivery have been sourced in (inter)professional 
issues particularly differing professional cultures and values (Degeling, Kennedy, and 
Hill 2001) (Degeling, Macbeth, Kennedy, Maxwell, Coyle, and Telfer 2002; Marshall, 
Mannion, Nelson, and Davies 2003; Neuhauser 1991) and associated entrenched 
attitudes to change within the health professions (Gale and Curry 1999; Gough and 
Richards 1999). The medical profession in particular is frequently accused of being 
inflexible and acting in self interest to maintain differentials in power, status, autonomy, 
and regulatory disparities in its favour (Atkin and Lunt 1996; Audit Commission 1992; 
Browne 1997; Herk, Klazinga, Schepers, and A.F. 2001; McLaughlin 2001 ). This power 
differential is maintained in part by traditional mono-disciplinary training and the history 
of separate professional development which create and maintain expectations of 
distinctions in professional domains, roles and authority, and limit understanding 
between professions (Lewis, Tudor, Tsao, and Canaan 1998; West and Slater 1996). 
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This combination of ignorance and presumption leads to disagreements and 
uncertainty between and within professions concerning role perceptions, work practice 
patterns etc (Castledine 1995; Dahle 2003; Richardson and Cunliffe 2003). 
Few authors, including those cited above, attribute failure to achieve the expected 
changes to individual causes requiring individual solutions; they acknowledge that the 
maintenance of the status quo is a product of a multiplicity of factors that, working in 
combination, stymie change. The above discussion suggests that the various 
reifications and 'boundary issues' in healthcare, whether social or instrumental, define 
professionals' work identities, shape their roles and expectations, influence their 
judgements about the 'right' and 'wrong' way to be/do their job. Thus they present 
differences and divisions as natural and the current way of working as right and 
rational. Differences and boundaries are unavoidable in a society built upon the division 
of labour, and they are necessary for defining areas of expertise, but they can be 
antithetical to achieving work practice change and effective teamwork. 
In the light of this complexity and the tendency towards stasis rather than effective 
change, I felt I needed to explore more deeply why this particular change effort, the 
Clinical Management Development project, in these particular Trusts had such 
seemingly different outcomes. I believed I needed to consider potential influences 
closer to the project itself as well as those lying more distantly in the wider context to 
identify influences worthy of deeper study. I framed my approach from within the 
perspective of organisational studies and more narrowly (though not exclusively) from 
organisational writers using a social constructionist approach. The field of 
organisational studies draws upon literature from many academic disciplines including 
sociology, social psychology, business management, policy studies, and economics, 
amongst others. In studies about healthcare organisations, the health professional 
literatures are also relevant. This is evident in the following discussion of the various 
foci and themes I considered in framing my research inquiry. 
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Organisational theory 
Organisational theory largely views common difficulties in improving organisational 
performance and/or implementing change within individual organisations across a 
whole sector of economic activity as an outcome of institutionalisation. It is defined as 
the "emergence over time of orderly, stable, socially integrating patterns out of 
unstable, loosely organized, or narrowly technical activities" (Broome 1990) p238). A 
systematic review (Bailey and Bristow 2005) of 50 studies of factors influencing health 
sector organisational performance found that these organisations' performance was 
dependent upon a complex amalgam of organisational variables including structural 
arrangements, culture, technological capability, clinical reputation, quality of staff, 
strategic relationships, Trust strategy, and operational capability. 
For better or worse, the distinctive forms, processes, strategies, outlooks and 
competences that emerge in response to these internal factors and to the shared 
external environment (Selznick 1957) shape and structure both what is possible within 
organisations and what is not (Giddens 1976; Giddens 1977). Over time, as 
organisational members come to understand these limitations and possibilities, and 
adapt themselves to them, they find it more and more difficult to think or act differently 
to those around them. What is seen, known, accepted and valued in organisations thus 
also becomes a way of not seeing, of not knowing or doing. When the environment 
changes and an organisation is required to adapt, the processes of institutionalism 
hinder corrective actions which may touch on key issues, significant values or the 
established network of norms and interdependencies, making the organisation hostage 
to its own history (Selznick 1957). Understanding how values, understandings and 
practices are built into the organization's culture, cognition and social structure, how 
these might be weakened or subverted, and the consequences of doing so, can 
therefore become critical in understanding the adaptability and long term viability of 
organisations. Organisational theorists take various approaches to this. 'Micro' and 
'meso' theorists focus on the contributions and reactions of individuals and groups in 
these institutionalising processes. Others take a wider perspective looking at the 
agency and actions of other institutions in the wider environment in creating 
institutionalism. 
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Psychoanalytic and Relational Perspectives 
Social psychoanalytic and relational perspectives approach these in terms of people's 
unconscious world and their expression of emotions. Their concern is how people 
think, in particular, how they construct identities to "make sense of other people and 
themselves" (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Maccoby 2004 ), how these identities create 
persistent tendencies to feel and behave in a particular way toward something (Luthans 
2002), or manifest (or not) emotional intelligence (Goleman 2000; Salovey and Mayer 
1990) in the workplace. Cognitive abilities are critical in two respects. At the level of an 
individual they influence the development of self-identity, linking identity to the person's 
environment (which for organisational purposes may be their workgroup (Ashforth and 
Mael 1989), their profession (Ibarra 1999) or the wider organisation (Dukerich, Golden, 
and Shortell 2002), and influencing their behaviour in the process. Secondly, the 
consequences of individuals' emotions, attitudes, thought patterns and behaviours 
reverberate throughout all organisational groupings (teams, work groups, professional 
bodies, interdepartmental relations) and activities (Turner 1987), affecting both self-
and group- motivation, social identity, interpersonal relations, and the definition of 
acceptable roles and norms. 
Empirical investigations have demonstrated that people tend to adopt 'miserly 
cognition' approaches when making assessments and decisions. That is, rather than 
making decisions based upon careful collection and analysis of data, people use pre-
existing mental structures or schemas to guide their analysis of the environment and 
derive their conclusions. They tend to select their schemas as early as possible when 
structuring information, usually on the basis of visual and physical cues about which 
are the most relevant schemas. When given 'specific' evidence, they will ignore 
statistical probabilities and information biases that may challenge their existing 
categorisations, often despite considerable pressure (Kahneman and Tversky 1973; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1981 ). In situations of threat, the preference for miserly 
cognition habits can lead to escalation of dysfunction and conflict due to the tenacious 
maintenance of illusions (Taylor 1983), counterfactual thinking (Roese 1997), and 
escalating commitment to established positions (Staw 1976; Staw, Sandelands, and 
Dutton 1981 ). 
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Emotions, "strong affective states that interrupt cognitive processes and/or behavior" 
(Morton, Billings, Hankinson, Hart, Nicholson, Rowlands, Saunders, and Walter 2003), 
are another mechanism which may affect facets of organisational life. Collins (Collins 
1981) suggested that it is these affective states, more than cognitive processes, that 
guide the interlocked cycles of behaviour in organisations that produce social 
structures. For him, people follow routines and behavioural cycles because they 'feel 
right'; the associated emotional dynamics of 'joining in' provide feelings of belonging, of 
connectedness, and other positive effects. The human relations school (Mayo 1933; 
Roethlisberger 1941) believed that the correct alignment of tasks, control over one's 
own work etc. produces job satisfaction, productive work attitudes and a healthy 
emotional life that is beneficial for organisational performance, and vice versa. 
However Collins' work suggests that it is not the relationship of people to their 
environment that matters but their relationships with each other. Thus the critical factor 
in organisational design may well be how the arrangement of tasks, roles and other 
operational components impact upon the affiliative dimensions of organisational life 
(Goodman, Ravin, and Schminke 1987). Hence the way in which teams, groups, 
committees etc. work can have an important bearing on how an organisation functions 
and on the outcomes of that functioning. 
Teams and Teamwork 
Initially, examining team work between care providers in the two Trusts appealed to me 
as it directed attention to the level at which clinical work is done. An extensive literature 
exists on teams, most of which is in agreement about their general benefits, their 
usefulness in promoting and managing change, and also their limitations. The business 
literature associates teams with high levels of productivity, quality, customer 
satisfaction, safety, job satisfaction and organisational commitment (Kirkman, Tesluk, 
and Rosen 2001 ), arguing that integrating different professional perspectives, 
competencies and contributions enables teams to be flexible, innovative, responsive 
and efficient (Mohrman and Mohrman 1997). 
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Definition of team 
'Team' is an amorphous concept -few people, including those in the health-related 
academic literature, define what they mean by it (Drinka and Clarke 2000). In practise, 
teams in healthcare can be very simple, small and operate in close proximity or large, 
complex and geographically dispersed. They can be recently formed with short term 
purposes (as in project teams) or well established with long term goals; provide 
complex ongoing care or administer 'one off diagnostic tests (e.g. x-rays, pathology 
tests); contain only specialists or be comprised of generalists; and have members from 
one or many disciplines. Finally individual team members may belong to only one team 
or to multiple teams. Faced with such an array of possibilities, Drinka and Clark 
concluded that defining a work group as a 'team' is misleading if it is not accompanied 
by a specific definition. 
Definitions of 'team' range from the very simple dictionary definition, "people who 
depend on each other to some extent to get their work done", to highly defined 
concepts that go beyond the team itself to include the structural elements required to 
create effective teams. These usually specify a (small) number of people, working in a 
coordinated and collaborative manner over an extended period of time. They have 
complementary and overlapping skills exercised towards a shared and organisationally 
sanctioned purpose, who identify as a collective, and who both hold themselves 
mutually accountable for the team's results or outcomes (Manion, Lorimer, and 
Leander 1996) and, in turn, are held mutually accountable by superiors for their 
contribution to the organisation's objectives (Brill 1976); (Redman 1996; Shonk 1992) 
(World Health Organization 1984). In addition, teams, especially multidisciplinary 
teams, create synergy such that their collective workings and outcomes are greater 
than that which could be achieved by members working individually, by one discipline 
working alone or by many disciplines operating in sequence (Colenso 1997; Pence and 
Wilson 1994 ). The benefits for patients with long term conditions (who tend to require 
treatment and assistance across a multiplicity of needs, physical, social, emotional, 
educational and spiritual amongst others, over an extended time span) have received 
particular, focused attention. These teams have been found to meet patients' multiple 
needs in an appropriately harmonised, coordinated fashion (Loxley 1997; Payne 1982), 
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providing increased continuity and consistency of care through holistic discussion, 
better planning, enhanced problem-solving and reduced ambiguity between team 
members (Birleson 1998; Proctor-Childs, Freeman, and Miller 1998). 
In general, any conception of healthcare teams usually assumes that members work 
alongside other team members at the same time and in the same space, at least for 
scheduled portions of time, even if that is only for certain hours of the week, such as in 
case discussions or discharge meetings. In practice however, such teams are often the 
exception rather than the norm. Research in Sweden suggests that, within hospitals, 
clinical staff often come together in fluid, temporary and unstable combinations as the 
need arises. Action in these 'teams' can be characterised as a "rapidly pulsating, 
distributed and partially improvised orchestration of collaborative performance between 
otherwise loosely connected actors and activity systems" (Engestrom, Engestrom, and 
Vahaaho 1999). Though such work is commonly described as teamwork, the 
researchers suggested that the ephemeral nature of these interactions is not teamwork 
but 'knot working'. This concern for how staff actually function together, however, is 
lacking in much of the 'team' literature. 
Team Context 
Others have different caveats about the operation of teams in healthcare. Jayasuria 
and Sim (Jayasuriya and Sim 1998) and Mickan and Rodger (Mickan and Rodger 
2000c) argue that the context and goals of teams in (publicly funded) healthcare differ 
widely from the manufacturing, IT and commercial service industries' contexts, from 
which most literature on teams and teamwork emanates (including the newer formats 
of virtual and self-managed teams). They believe the unique end goals and outputs of 
health care (treated patients, improvements in quality of life, cure) are qualitatively 
different to the more profit oriented industries. This seems somewhat unreasonable 
given that many service industries' goals and 'products' are also experiential and could 
be said to be primarily about 'quality of life'. 
Perhaps more powerful are their arguments that health care teams are unique in their 
need to balance and contain the powerful and competing influences of professionals 
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within and alongside public sector health care. Some factors create difficulties in team 
performance regardless of industry or sector. For example, poor or missing supportive 
organisational structures, unclear tasks and inappropriate leadership (Mohrman and 
Mohrman 1997), power differentials and conflicting loyalties within the team (Payne 
1982), internal competition, coercion, abuses of personal power, pressures to conform, 
adopt particular personas and/or exhibit a limited range of behaviours (Brill 1976; Firth-
Cozens 1998; Kane 1975; Raines 1988)). However specific factors additionally impede 
teamwork in healthcare. This is due, in large part, to different organisational structures 
and processes in healthcare, particularly as they relate to issues of professionalisation, 
relationships between senior management, middle management, the 'shop floor' and 
teams. 
Most public health care organisations are organised vertically into what are effectively 
hierarchical silos (Degeling, Maxwell, and ledema 2004; Horwitz 1970; McNulty and 
Ferlie 2002). Multidisciplinary teams do not fit easily into these silos because they 
include people with differing professional values, power, and breadths of organisational 
responsibility. Such team members, both individually and corporately, frequently have 
multiple responsibilities with different required standards of practice and multiple, often 
inconsistent, accountabilities (Brandis, Murtagh, and Selia 1998; Firth-Cozens 1998; 
Headrick, Knapp, Neuhauser, Gelman, Norman, Quinn, and Baker 1996). In hospitals, 
matrix management structures such as clinical directorates are ideally meant to bring 
clinical professionals together in joint responsibility for the corporate governance 
outcomes of their work, especially cost. In clinical directorates the clinical 'team' 
(medical, nursing, and allied health professions) frequently have simultaneous loyalties 
and responsibilities to a hierarchically arranged clinical department, a relatively 'flat' 
external professional structure such as a medical royal college, and both specialty-
based and multidisciplinary teams. Furthermore, team members are expected to work 
in additional 'teams' with managers, administrators and sometimes even scientists. 
With such diverse working relationships, complex accountability relationships and 
potential conflicts, it is perhaps not surprising that clinical directorates have struggled to 
achieve the goals mooted for them in health related organisational and management 
literature. Organisations with clinical directorates frequently do not demonstrate either 
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integration of clinicians into management or effective multidisciplinary team functioning 
around the process control of their work. Rather, they commonly simply replicate the 
previous organisation of clinical work (Braithwaite 1999) and struggle to overcome 
medical dominance in decision making (Hearnshaw, Reddish, Carlyle, Baker, and 
Robertson 1998; Horwitz 1970). Moreover, they increase complexity (Pich, Loch, and 
De Meyer 2002; Pisek and Wilson 2001 ), create blurred boundaries and uncertain 
power relationships (Mickan and Rodger 2000b), and fuel tension between those 
professionals subject to greater and lesser professional autonomy and associated 
flexibility in work practices (Abelson, Maxwell, and Maxwell 1997). 
Alongside this is the fact that participants in teams with strongly competing interests 
may have dissimilar conceptions of how teams should be structured. In addition to the 
diversity outlined above, for instance, teams can be structured traditionally (focused 
upon their internal dynamics) or openly (focused upon outward relations and 
networking) (Payne 1982); be hierarchically- or self- directed (Blanchett and Flarey 
1995); and function coordinatively or integratively. (Coordinative teams are comprised 
of separate professionals with their own roles and professional hierarchies who 
nonetheless are influenced by each others' ideas whilst integrative teams have 
members from different professions who share responsibility and work roles such that 
information, knowledge and skills are transferred across their professional boundaries 
with members frequently taking on roles associated with each others' disciplines) 
(Garner and Orelove 1994; Ovretveit 1997). 
The changing healthcare environment adds further complexity to these already 
complex work relations. The increasing expectations for patient, family and public 
involvement in wider decision making, for example, have a specific expression in 
expectations that the families of children with learning disabilities or patients with long 
term medical conditions be active and equal contributors in early intervention teams 
spanning health and other environments (education, social care, employment, even 
housing and transport). However, as noted above, multidisciplinary teams are 
frequently characterised by an already precarious power (im)balance. The addition of 
patients and families, whose contributions may be widely variable, extremely 
26 
knowledgeable and competent in some areas but far less so in others, increases the 
combinations and potential for conflictual relations within the team (Maple 1987). 
Furthermore, attempts by doctors to adapt to this flexibility by working in a more 
egalitarian and interdependent manner may lead individual doctors to risk fragmenting 
medical knowledge, fall foul of their colleagues' professional values and interests, and 
exacerbate pressure for ongoing dynamism and renegotiation in team structures, roles, 
and responsibilities (Cott 1998; Horwitz 1970). This further contributes to confused 
expectations about the expected pace of work and accountability for teamwork (Loxley 
1997; Maple 1987; Qualls and Czirr 1988). Apart from the obvious potential for conflict 
within the team, this may also result in the patients' needs being subjugated to the 
internal politics of professional power and conflicting messages from team members, at 
moments when patients (and their families) are least capable of dealing with ambiguity 
(Kane 1998; Mickan and Rodger 2000a). 
Clinical work and executive teams 
Interestingly, discussions on team work in the health related literature have focused 
predominantly upon team work at operational levels. There is relatively little about the 
functioning of the "executive team" although there are several studies about the 
operation of the Trust boards (see for example (Hackett and Spurgeon 1996; Mueller, 
Harvey, and Howorth 2003; Mueller, Sillince, Harvey, and Howorth 2004)) and many 
more about 'senior management' (variously and usually loosely defined). Some who 
have considered the role of the executive in the functioning of teams, even if obliquely, 
have argued that the executive is not a team at all. Manion et al (Manion, Lorimer, and 
Leander 1996) and ledema et al (ledema, Meyerkort, and White 2005) for instance 
have argued that the executive level of health care organisations usually comprises 
working parties or committees in which each senior manger coordinates his/her own 
individual areas of responsibility with others rather than being jointly accountable 
across the entire executive. Both argue that, unlike teams which directly control the 
outcomes of their work in a fluid and dynamic manner, the top management 'team' is 
dependent on others to achieve their objectives. As earlier discussion has suggested, 
in organisations such as the NHS which are comprised of a series of professionalised 
bureaucracies, the compliance of others in achieving the executive teams' goals cannot 
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always be assumed (Mintzberg 1989). Also, unlike teams, senior managers are not 
free to self-define their work, changing foci, responsibilities, constitution and tasks as 
they learn more about themselves and their tasks. Others however, perhaps using 
'team' more loosely, have argued that the long term future of the NHS depends on the 
local leadership capacities and an extremely high order of skill and expertise in local 
executive teams (Berwick, Ham, and Smith 2003). 
Disputes about the nature of the executive group aside, few would argue that there has 
been little study of how a Trust executive conceptualises clinical work and its 
performance. It seems there are several unquestioned assumptions on the part of both 
academics and the health service regarding the executive's role and responsibility for 
clinical work. These are that clinical work performance management is the prerogative 
of clinicians rather than management, that any corporate responsibility to oversee 
clinical work is met adequately by existing clinical governance structures and 
committees, and that meeting external performance targets and passing external 
inspections equates with system optimality. Perhaps more importantly, despite myriad 
acknowledgements in published papers on team and clinical practice change that "the 
support of the senior management was sought", there is next to nothing about what this 
means in practice or about how, if at all, the effectiveness of the executive 'team' 
relates to the effectiveness of clinical teams and vice versa. Some (limited) work on this 
in Australia (Maxwell, Degeling, Sorensen, Zhang, and Coyle 2007) found that, when it 
came to thinking through how clinical work can be better organised and managed, the 
effectiveness of both clinicians and senior management were, to some extent, mutually 
limiting. This was attributed to, firstly, a poor definition and understanding of the role 
and potential of clinical managers by clinicians and managers at all levels and, 
secondly, by the inability of both managers and clinicians to envisage an alternative 
way of doing things. In an extension of this work, Sorensen (Sorensen 2002) found that 
hospital performance was better in hospitals in which management had a clear method 
for clinical work management, (clinical) team-based incentives to direct and reward 
effort, and inclusive strategies for change. How executive teams achieve an agreed 
model for clinical work management between themselves and with clinicians, and 
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effectively motivate and reward clinical teams in a professionally and politically complex 
environment, however, has not yet received attention. 
In the light of this, I decided that focusing attention on the operation of clinical teams 
within the two Trusts may be extremely helpful but could result in me seeing the trees 
and missing the forest. It would be however useful to consider how the executives in 
both Trusts conceptualised clinical work and its management and, if this was coherent, 
whether this view was disseminated throughout the organisation. This led me to also 
consider more theoretically 'macro' level attributes of organisational institutionalism. 
Leadership 
Definition of leadership 
Leadership, the ability to inspire, persuade, develop and empower followers (Addicott 
and Atun 2003; Yuki 2002; Zaleznik 2004), has become a very popular explanation for 
superior and/or improved organisational performance over the last 50 years or so in the 
commercial, business and, more recently, healthcare press. It is seen as critical during 
times of organisational stress and required change (Day 2001; Kotter 1996) particularly 
in response to environmental pressures such as increased competition, changing 
preferences by consumers, and increased regulatory control (Kotter 1990; Kotter 1996; 
Kotter 2001 ). Yuki (Yuki 2002) suggests that leadership is often confused with 
concepts such as power, authority, management, administration, control and 
supervision. He argues that these wrongly imply domination, compliance and 
obedience rather than the winning of 'hearts and minds' about what needs to be done 
and how it can be done effectively, and the voluntary offering of willing and collective 
support to accomplish shared objectives. Much of the literature on leadership originates 
in, and reflects the culture of, the United States of America. It is characteristically casts 
the 'leader' as an heroic individual leading from on high; possessing skills and abilities 
beyond those with whom the leader works; bending organisational cultures, structures, 
people, processes and practices into an exceptional coherence, competency, capability 
and achievement through the sheer force of his (rarely her) brilliance and vision. 
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At the same time (and somewhat paradoxically) it also implies that leadership is a tool 
or technique that can be learnt and applied stepwise if one simply adopts the right 
personality traits, personal qualities, tactical behaviours (Allport 1937; Bass 1990; 
Bennis 2003; Stodgill 1974) and skill competencies (Goleman 1998; Tarplett 2004). 
'Good' leaders, adopt a 'transformative' relational style which is characterised as being 
visionary, proactive, creative, innovative and supportive of alternate viewpoints 
(Empey, Peskett, and Lees 2002). They apply these behaviours to 'manage meaning' 
within an organisation by defining an organisational mission, promoting an 
organisational vision, endorsing preferred practices and enacting desired values (Bass 
1985; House, Spangler, and Woycke 1991; Westley and Mintzberg 1989). 
Transformative leaders are thought to be outside organisational culture, comfortable 
with conflict (often finding it creative, empowering and change enabling), lead from a 
desire for something better, to inspire loyalty and to take risks (Zaleznik 2004 ). Such 
leaders however need not be flamboyant or malignant (Conger 1988; Hogan, Raskin, 
and Fazzini 1990; Mintzberg 1999); effective leadership can be humble (Schein 1985), 
servant based (Greenleaf 1970; Greenleaf 1996), and again somewhat paradoxically, 
shared (De Marco and Lister 1987) or distributed throughout the organisation (Aiimo-
Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe 2004; Gronn 2002). 
Leaders are frequently juxtaposed with mere managers who are believed to be 
supporters of the organisational status quo, seekers of stability and control who 
instinctively try to solve problems quickly - sometimes before understanding the 
problem's significance. They are believed to operate out of necessity rather than from 
heartfelt desires and to be good at defusing conflicts in order to get the day to day 
things done. They tend to diffuse power by favouring forms of bureaucratism, 
emphasising structures, due process, incremental thinking, and cohesion through rule 
keeping. They are strong on technical knowledge and knowing how each layer of the 
organisation works; they use rationality, functional methods and good relationships with 
staff to achieve stability (Bryman 1992; Goleman 2000; Kotter 1990; Yuki 2002; 
Zaleznik 2004 ). In practice however the roles of leaders and managers overlap: 
effectively led organisations are not characterised by division and poor staff morale, 
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instability, an absence of due process, ill fitting operational structures, poor 
functionality, and a lack of inspiration and purpose. 
Leadership in the NHS 
Smith and Fiori (Smith and Fiori 1989) argued that any advance in leadership theory 
and understanding must involve simultaneous (and complex) consideration of the 
leader's characteristics, behaviour and context. In healthcare there is a longstanding 
distinction between the leadership of the CEO (and/or his/her team of directors) and 
clinical leadership (Firth-Cozens and Mowbray 2001 ); usually in the form of a 
profession and mostly, but not always, doctors. However, Firth and Mowbray note that 
clinical leadership can also include leadership of multidisciplinary teams and thus is 
distributed throughout the organisation. Zaccaro and co-writers (Zaccaro, Rittman, and 
Marks 2001) noted that, despite the ubiquity of leadership influences on 
organisational/team performance and the large literatures on leadership and 
team/group dynamics, surprisingly little is known about how leaders create and handle 
effective teams. Further, little attention is paid to the reciprocal influence of leadership 
and team processes upon each other. Taken together with the increasing pressure to 
involve clinicians in management at senior levels, these factors create an extremely 
complex context for NHS executive teams. Moreover, the larger the executive team, 
the greater the potential for conflict. This conflict need not necessarily be destructive 
however. A study of 48 effective top management teams (non-health based) noted that 
effective executive teams engage in cognitive conflict (task-oriented disagreement 
arising from differences in perspective) but limit affective conflict (individual-oriented 
disagreement arising from personal disaffection) and also promote this style of relating 
throughout the organisation (Amason and Sapienza 1997). 
Despite this care by some to distinguish between types of conflict and modes of 
personal operation in senior management teams, much of the leadership literature still 
adopts a relatively simplistic means-ends conception (Degeling, ledema, Winters, 
Maxwell, Coyle, Kennedy, and Hunter 2003a). This preoccupation was evident in the 
NHS Modernisation Agency's and related organisations' literature which consisted 
principally of extensive listings of tools, techniques and competencies, primarily 
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(although not exclusively) to develop the quality of leadership within small clinical 
teams; see for examples (Centre for Diversity and Work Psychology 2004; Clarke, 
Bailey, and Bristow 2003; Hartley and Hinksman 2003; NHS Leadership Centre 2002; 
Williams 2004). Whilst of a high standard of presentation, the Agency's and related 
publications promoted leadership as a solution to NHS organisational ills without first 
being clear what those ills were, why they existed, and what sustained them. They did 
not address fundamental questions at the core of the academic debates around both 
leadership and the NHS - leadership by whom, of who, for what purpose, in which 
context, and around and within which structures. An interim review of the relative 
contributions of legacy, luck and leadership to NHS organisational performance (Bailey 
and Bristow 2005) purported to begin to address these questions. The report writers 
argued that their proposed model, by treating organisational performance as a feature 
of an organisation rather than of an individual, enabled them to ask "enlightening 
questions" about who contributes, and how, to the leadership of the organisation, and 
what roles specific groups or teams play in the leadership of Trusts. However it is not 
evident how the model enabled this nor is the final report available to comment on its 
adequacy or revelations. 
Calls for leadership in the NHS often seem to be a means for implicitly obtaining the 
elusive but highly desirable goal of 'clinical engagement', a vague term that appears to 
have evolved over time. In the 1980s and early 1990s clinical engagement was seen 
as hospital doctors becoming more accountable for the financial aspects of their work, 
however, the incoming Labour government in 1997 greatly expanded the term. Under 
the new regime clinical engagement initially meant asking doctors, nurses and allied 
health professionals in primary care, through (medically led) Professional Executive 
Committees of new primary care groups and Trusts, to take leadership and 
responsibility for developing health improvement plans for their local communities. 
Thus clinicians were meant to make investment decisions about where and how 
services should be provided. Later the term meant a much greater involvement of 
healthcare professionals in reshaping how clinical services are provided in hospitals. 
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As earlier discussion noted however, multidisciplinary leadership is problematic in 
organisations plagued by entrenched differences between professional bureaucracies. 
Grint (Grint 2000) and others argue there can be no leaders without followers; the 
relationship between these two requires a sense of community and mutuality and that 
leaders must, to some extent, also be followers if they are not to lose their social 
authority (du Pree 1993). Hence the leader's exercise of authority is always conditional 
and in need of constant reaffirmation in the dynamics and actions of the relevant 
communities of practice and institutional authorities (Degeling and Carr 2004; Wenger 
2000). But healthcare managers and leaders of individual clinical communities are 
often not accorded widespread authority amongst staff from other professional 
disciplines, even within the one organisation. Leadership, especially multidisciplinary 
leadership, within the NHS therefore frequently remains highly contested (Degeling 
1993b; Edwards, Marshall, McLellan, and Abbasi 2003; Ham and Mciver 2000; Ham 
and Hunter 1988; Harrison, Hunter, Marnoch, and Pollitt 1992a; Marnoch 1996; Piper, 
Muir, A, and J 1997; Pollitt, Harrison, Hunter, and Marnoch 1988). 
There are additional absences in the academic leadership literature in relation to the 
NHS which raise important (unanswered) questions about the potential for leadership 
to effect change. Firstly, with some key exceptions, most notably Beverley Alimo-
Metcalfe and John Alban-Metcalfe (Aiimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe 2004; Alimo-
Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe 2005; Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe 2006), there is 
a relative dearth of leadership theories and research relating to public healthcare in 
general and the NHS in particular. A growing consensus exists that the NHS needs 
'local leaders' but there is as yet little consensus about what this concept looks like. 
Secondly, there are relatively few articles about leadership in medical journals and 
relatively few doctors who are CEOs of NHS organisations. What is the significance of 
this? Are doctors just not interested in organisational leadership as some studies seem 
to suggest e.g. (Forbes, Hallier, and Kelly 2004), at least in a significant number of 
cases? Do doctors just 'assume' a mantle of leadership amongst their colleagues or 
nurses by virtue of traditional medical status and power and see no need to discuss it? 
Or do doctors consider themselves so autonomous that leadership is a contradiction in 
terms for them? Further, critical theorists would say that doctors have always been 
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engaged in the NHS, just not with others' agendas; hence much 'leadership' and 
reform is aimed at de-empowering them and empowering others, and is consequently 
ignored and resisted by doctors. 
Thirdly, there is a relative abundance of writings on leadership within nursing literature 
and specific nurse leadership training programmes yet they are relatively under 
represented in organisational and policy debates. This suggests that nurses are highly 
aware of their traditional subordination, that leadership development is more integral to 
the wider nursing agenda than medicine's, and that nurses are working strenuously to 
overcome their weak power base. Evaluation of the three year Leading Empowered 
Organisations (LEO) training scheme, however, revealed that this programme was 
relatively ineffective in creating changes in both nursing and organisational practices 
due to the significant personal, organisational and wider contextual factors operating to 
disempower nurses (Hancock, Campbell, Bignell, and Kilgour 2005). 
The literature on leadership would also imply that the quality of NHS leadership is to 
blame for persistently poor progress in improving the coordination of care - too much 
'transactional' leadership and too little 'transformative' leadership leaves the status quo 
relatively unchanged. However the context can be extremely unhelpful to the 
development of transformational leadership: it is difficult for CEOs and senior 
managers to chart their own course in a highly centralised and politicized network of 
organisations held together by (amongst other things) a socialistic belief in the common 
good, government obligation for the welfare of the community, and government-
sponsored monopoly of organisations and profession. Despite the movement towards 
Foundation Trusts and their supposed freedoms, and the pressure for Trusts to 
become more competitive and commercially viable, few political (or other) players have 
argued that the foundational values and professional structures of the NHS need to 
change. Indeed the opposite is usually the case. Whilst requiring better managerial 
performance and accountability, successive Labour Secretaries of State for Health, 
from Dobson to Johnson, have echoed (though perhaps less loudly) Bevan's 
commitment to the primacy of the professions, particularly the medical profession. This 
established inequality in power relations between professions represents, if not a 
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natural limit on the reach of 'leadership' (however defined) within NHS organisations, 
then at least an often vexing constraint. 
But change needs to begin somewhere, and having begun, needs to be appropriately 
supported and managed. Leadership within the Trusts therefore seemed to be relevant 
to my question and could not be ignored; however, I was skeptical about how fruitful an 
avenue it would prove as a focus of investigation in isolation from other considerations. 
Culture 
One cannot fully understand how a leader (whether an individual or group) acts without 
an understanding of the relationships between culture and the people who both shape 
and are shaped by it. While debate continues regarding the extent to which culture 
enables or constrains an individual's leadership ability, and the degree to which culture 
itself can be influenced by 'the leadership', the fact remains that effective leadership 
occurs within the context of a particular culture or cultures. The management literature 
on leadership therefore almost inevitably also discusses the impact of organisational 
culture and promotes particular forms of it, whether a 'quality' culture, a 'learning' 
culture, or something else. Hence in much of the leadership and management 
literature, culture is assumed to be an instrumental concept, an organisational attribute 
that is malleable in the hands of the leader, in support of enhanced organisational 
performance. 
Understanding culture 
An analysis of the literature reveals a plethora of definitions of organisational culture. 
One key definition was provided by Schein who described organisational culture as "a 
pattern of basic assumptions- invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it 
learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration - that 
has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems" 
(Schein 1985), p 9). This collective construction of culture suggests that culture is best 
viewed as part of a system, a social process, something that is experienced, lived and 
reproduced (Smircich 1983). In the words of Marvin Bower (Bower 1966), culture 
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controls the informal but still often sacrosanct aspects of organisational life, "the way 
we do things around here". These informal aspects of organisational life are manifested 
in the prevailing norms, dominant values (learned and inherited), 'rules of the game' 
(accepted behaviours and practices), feelings and 'climate' within an organisation, and 
in the philosophies and paradigms underlying thinking, decision making and action 
taking. They are displayed in "characteristic ideology, language, dress codes, 
behaviour patterns, signs of status and authority, modes of deference and 
misbehaviour, rituals, myths and stories ..... and unspoken assumptions of a group" 
(Scott, Manion, Davies, and Marshall 2003), p1 ). 
For cognitive theorists, culture is essentially a system of knowledge or learned 
standards that structure perception, belief and evaluation in ways that enable 
individuals to act acceptably to other group members (Goodenough 1971 ). For 
symbolic/semiotic theorists and sociologists, culture is perhaps more subtle, hidden in 
the symbols and understandings shared by social actors. Both groups, however, argue 
that, as a result of the unique combination of its origins, history, socio-cultural context, 
technology, and successive leaders, an organisation may evolve and sustain its own 
culture, its own system of symbols and meanings that elicit the commitment of staff to 
the organisation (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984 ). The 'core' or essential values of this 
binding culture however will not be visible or known to the participants for they "operate 
unconsciously ... in a basic "taken-for-granted" fashion(ing of) an organisation's view of 
itself and its environment" (Schein 1985), p 6). 
Because these values are covert, hidden and invisible even from people inside the 
organisation, staffs' explanations of their actions to external audiences or even to 
themselves, their 'espoused theories' of action, may be incongruent with their theories-
in-use i.e. what they do (Argyris and Schon 1978). (Self aware) newcomers however 
will often recognise, through the responses of others, when they have transgressed an 
unseen cultural norm. Often this is because the norm is based upon ideal patterns of 
behaviour which members of the culture hold as highly desirable, even if they seldom 
practise it. Longer term organisational members will be able to tell the newcomer that 
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they have offended the norm, and could explain even what that norm is, but would 
probably be hard pressed to justify the basis and existence of the norm. 
Organisational culture and performance 
Hence much of the behaviours, espoused theories and theories-in-use in organisations 
are 'tacit knowledge' (Polanyi 1958, 1998). Such tacit knowledge includes 
unrecognised (and perhaps, if recognised, publicly unacknowledged) assumptions 
about the self, others, the situation, and the connections amongst action, consequence 
and the situation (Argyris and Schon 1974). As a result, one cannot assume that one 
understands any individual's or professional group's 'theory-in-use' and how this drives 
their individual behaviour by observation alone; one must somehow 'get inside 
someone's skin' to access this level of understanding (Bartol and Richardson 1998). 
Hence, on one level, understanding an organisational culture requires somehow 
identifying and making sense of a vast complexity of overt and covert, individual and 
professional, histories and stories. It further entails identifying the dynamics by which 
they intertwine, complement and compete with each other to create "the way things are 
done around here". This not withstanding, it is often possible to identify key practices 
and perceptions within a particular culture; this possibility has led to an interest in 
'tweaking' or 'improving' NHS culture to enhance organisational performance regarding 
service delivery, patient outcomes and public satisfaction. NHS staff have consequently 
become familiar with calls for a 'no blame', 'performance enhancing', 'patient centred' 
and 'improvement oriented' cultures (Campbell, Sheaff, Sibbald, Marshall, Pickard, 
Gask, Halliwell, Rogers, and Roland 2002; Department of Health 2000; Peck and 
Crawford 2004 ). 
Some attempts to provide a robust metric for this mooted relationship between culture 
and performance have suggested that healthcare cultures which emphasise group 
affiliation, teamwork, and coordination are more likely to be successful in implementing 
work changes oriented towards ongoing quality improvement and health outcomes 
(Shortell, O'Brien, Carman, Foster, Hughes, Boerstler, and O'Connor 1995; Shortell, 
Jones, Rademaker, Gillies, Dranove, Hughes, Budetti, Reynolds, and Huang 2000). In 
the main, however, authors have found that whilst organisational culture may be a 
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relevant factor in health care performance, articulation of the nature of the relationship 
is difficult; interactions between culture and performance, if any, are indirect (Davies, 
Hodges, and Rundall 2003; Dowswell, Harrison, and Wright 2001; Scott, Manion, 
Davies, and Marshall 2003; Scott, Mannion, Davies, and Marshall 2003). Accepted 
understandings about organisational culture and performance assume that the primary 
work groups within organisations contribute complementarily to the larger 
organisation's purpose. That is, they assume the circulating stories, prevailing myths, 
accepted codes of behaviour and established rituals within subgroups bring people 
together in a value-infused institution glue (Boje and Fedor 1982; Deal and Kennedy 
1982; Harrison 1972; Mitroff and Kilman 1976) which 'provides a sense of identity, 
promotes loyalty to something larger than the self and the small group' (Smircich 
1983). The greater integration, the more corporate leaders can motivate workers into 
sustained work practice change and better performance (Bass 1990; Burns 1978). 
However, as earlier discussion revealed, healthcare organisations are not typical 
hierarchically governed entities. In complex professionally based organisations, the 
multiple organisational professions, subgroups, subcultures and countercultures are 
likely to compete to define the nature of the organisation for their own ends (Brown 
1954) (Scott, Manion, Davies, and Marshall 2003) (Selnick 1957). Further, the NHS is 
not a unitary organisation but a network of many smaller organisations, across various 
sectors, each employing staff from many different professional tribes, each of which 
has its own set of values and beliefs. These staffs are drawn from many educational, 
ethnic, religious, class and gender groupings, and their associated cultures. The sub-
cultures of the NHS therefore are likely to be multihued, varying from locality to locality 
and group to group, depending upon the composition and interactions of its constituent 
staff. For these reasons, there is a pressing need to understand the individual work 
group cultures that comprise the larger organisation (Seago 1996) and to identify 
relevant conflicts in values (Ehrich 2006). 
Research has shown that the health professions' different values, practices and 
approaches to 'care' impede staffs' ability to discuss clinical work across disciplines 
(Degeling, Kennedy, Hill, Carnegie, and Holt 1998; Degeling, Maxwell, Kennedy, and 
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Coyle 2003; Degeling, Hill, Kennedy, Coyle, and Maxwell 2000a; Degeling, Kennedy, 
and Hill 2001; Degeling, Sage, Kennedy, Perkins, and Zhang 1999). Staff tend to be 
more influenced by their professional perspectives than the objectives of their 
employing organisation. They have their own view of reality and their own way of doing 
things; they often take the stance that the other professionals in their facility are not 
only different but wrong; and they defend their own group from attack or threat from 
another group (Neuhauser 1991 ). Further, these professional cultures are particularly 
resistant to change. Their professional outlooks and loyalties persist across, and 
perhaps even replace, otherwise important local or national organisational boundaries 
(Degeling et al. 1998; Degeling, Maxwell, Kennedy, and Coyle 2003; Degeling et al. 
2000a; Degeling, Kennedy, and Hill 2001; Degeling et al. 1999; Degeling et al. 2002; 
Degeling, Zhang, Coyle, Xuc, Meng, Que, and Hill 2006). If then a particular 
organisation does noticeably better than others in creating change in work practices, 
and work practices are primarily the domain of individual professions and occupations, 
the possibility exists that the cultures of subgroups are better aligned in this 
organisation compared to others. This suggested that an examination of the 
subcultures within the two study Trusts in contrast to other Trusts would be a useful 
avenue for investigation. 
Power 
The role and impact of power (popularly understood as "the ability to get others to do 
something that they would not otherwise do" (Selznick 1957) and power contests in 
organisations are central to more critical interpretations of social constructionist 
understandings of organisations. In organisation theory, power is distinguished from 
authority although the two may coincide. Authority is legitimated power in which the 
right to control is vested in accepted entities. This implies that true authority has both 
social and legal facets which, in combination, are assumed (at least in western 
traditions) to make the exercise of power visible, accountable, less arbitrary and 
relatively efficient (Pfeffer 1981 ). When certain aspects of legitimated authority are held 
by some groups or individuals within an organisation and other aspects are held by 
others, the potential exists for contests about which group holds most power. This is 
compounded by the fact that functional and other divisions within organisations allocate 
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different goals and activities to subunits such as departments and teams, fragmenting 
staff and organisational interests (Morgan 1997). 
Contestation and conflict about which groups and individuals hold most power can be 
quite destabilizing to an organisation, undermining its ability to achieve apparently 
desired goals. Much of the 'dilemma of reform' in the NHS revolves around the 
competing interests, power bases and status of the managerial cadre and the medical 
professions. The former have been charged with the difficult task of simultaneously 
meeting policy makers' requirements for greater hierarchical control and organisational 
performance through the use of targets, performance indicators and external 
inspections, whilst also accepting the rhetoric about the pre-eminence, expertise and 
special abilities of the latter in understanding healthcare. The struggle by both 
professions to fulfil expectations, and take the lead in setting the direction and 
operations of Trusts, can result in a deflection of organisational effort. Efforts to lead 
effectively became mired in the development of informal political coalitions, attempts to 
create resource dependency or independency, attempts to control the measurement of 
work through arguments about definitions, standard setting and form completion, the 
fostering of competing systems of reward and sanction (these need not necessarily be 
either financially based or punitive), and the setting up of structures designed to control 
knowledge, information, and decision making in an effort to both restrict others' access 
and reduce uncertainty for the power holder (Burns 1978; Cohen and March 1972; 
Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, and Pennings 1971; Strauss, Schatzman, Ehrlich, 
Bucher, and Sabshin 1963). 
Status plays a significant part in this at both individual and group levels. High status 
strengthens and underpins a profession's claim to power and helps to entrench the 
power of the elite; people and professions of higher status will tend to be evaluated 
more positively by others, and people and professions of low status will not. People in 
positions and professions of low status therefore will find it difficult to challenge their 
place in the system and the system itself. This is demonstrated in the dominance and 
status of medicine over other professions, the dominance of specialists over 
generalists, and the seeming absence of nursing's voice in wider NHS debates. Whilst 
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authors within healthcare acknowledge, comment on, and at times deplore ongoing 
power struggles to amend, subvert or overturn entrenched status and power in the 
NHS, the level of acceptable, even desirable, 'creative tension' between professional 
groups remains a moot point (Davies, Hodges, and Rundall 2003; Degeling, Maxwell, 
Kennedy, and Coyle 2003; Edwards and Marshall 2003; Fitzgerald and Sturt 1992; 
Kenny and Adamson 1992). 
One way of reconciling this situation is to accept that competing views and interests are 
a fact of life, there is often no 'right' way, and contestation is not always dysfunctional. 
Organisations with an ability to live with these inherent tensions and also to manage 
paradox, for example between the needs to innovate and to avoid mistakes, the needs 
to minimise cost and to produce high quality processes and outcomes, and the needs 
to be flexible and to respect the rules, may therefore be considered, on these grounds, 
to be successful (Morgan 1997). When a CEO and/or senior management team can do 
this, there is likely to be a widespread acceptance (if not necessarily quiescence) 
regarding hierarchical authority within the organisation and an associated greater 
acceptance of the prevailing structures within the organisation. There will be less 
resistance to the prevailing allocation of goals and resources, and greater willingness 
to Trust executive decisions, even when the executive seeks to introduce change. 
Subordinates are likely to want to maintain and enhance the executive team's power 
(since no-one wants to rock the boat), providing a mechanism for the senior team to 
continue to manage 'meaning' through effective two-way communication. This, in turn, 
strengthens the central leadership and fosters successful organisational change via the 
creation of a widely owned corporate vision, organisational cohesion and operational 
commitment (Stace and Dunphy 1994 ). 
Abraham, Crawford, and Fisher (1999) argue that good organisational communication 
is central to creating and protecting these facets of organisational life. Good 
communication is inclusive in that people of all levels in the organisation can suggest 
ideas, give and receive feedback, and critique developments. It is also symbolic in that 
leaders and managers "walk the talk". By this they mean that leaders model the 
message and mission of the organisation in every organisational activity and practice, 
41 
including the realms of structure, policies, procedures, work practices, traditions, 
rewards, and management of internal and external relationships. In this way they begin 
to institutionalise new distinctive forms, processes, strategies, outlooks, competencies 
(Selznick 1957) and to create new 'taken for granteds' that shape and restructure what 
is becoming possible within the organisation and what is not. Sathe (Sathe 1985) and 
Vaill (Vaill 1993) have argued that 'talk', particularly about organisational vision and 
values, should be couched in imagery (depictions of heroes, metaphors, vivid pictures, 
stories and the like) as well as more ordinary forms of communication. Such imagery 
should be consistently woven into official communications such as inspirational speech 
making to groups, corporate publications, memos and slogans as well as personal 
intimate conversations with individuals. 
Though I did not want to focus on the role and distribution of power in the two Trusts, 
preferring to focus more specifically on themes that would open up my thinking about 
the management of clinical work, I knew that it could not be ignored. I decided that I 
should be careful not to ignore how power and language were used in the Trusts and I 
should look for indications that common linguistic images and catch phrases, 
originating from the 'powerful' were being employed in pursuit of the Trusts' goals and 
desired change. 
Organisational Change 
An extensive literature has developed around organisational change management, 
especially in business-related literature. Much of this literature suggests that 
organisational change, including that relating to fundamental processes within an 
organisation, can be achieved quite successfully through careful planning and 
execution, such that the right methods are applied in the right order and in the right 
time frame. One review of organisational change in U.S. hospitals found that hospital 
change management projects required an overall strategy that linked all relevant 
factors and managed them simultaneously (Walston and Kimberley 1997). The main 
facilitators were: establishing and maintaining a consistent vision, preparing and 
training for change, planning smooth transitions, establishing multiple communication 
efforts, ensuring strong support and involvement, creating mechanisms to measure 
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progress, establishing new authority relationships, and involving physicians. Hence, 
extremely complex amalgams of interrelated and interdependent complexities, 
ambiguities and uncertainties (Baccarini 1996) (Pich, Loch, and De Meyer 2002) are 
approached in the literature in a very instrumental manner. 
This instrumentalism has been severely critiqued on several fronts and often by well 
respected commentators, e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky's seminal analysis of public 
policy implementation failure in the US (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973), more recent 
criticism of change projects in large commercial organisations (Beer, Eisenstat, and 
Spector 1990), and McNulty and Ferlie's analysis of the failed Leicester Royal 
business process re-engineering project (McNulty and Ferlie 2002; McNulty and Ferlie 
2004). (The latter focused on the reorganisation of care processes in a Trust believed 
to be a relatively well-performing organisation receptive to such techniques). Drawing 
on their experiences, these commentators and others noted that the multiple priorities 
and decision points in the change process, the resilience of existing cultures, and the 
'defensive routines' (Argyris and SchOn 1978) of staff groups to 'top down' change all 
impede the likelihood of success in (imposed) major change projects. 
Taking a wider approach, DiMaggio and Powell (Di Maggio and Powell 1983) have 
argued that internal pressures for organisational innovation will usually be significantly 
outweighed by external pressures for conformity. Organisations are thus much more 
likely to change to become more like the industrial status quo, and thus each other, 
rather than less so. Innovations that go against industry norms and accepted practice 
are likely to be resisted in the face of governmental policies and regulations (especially 
those relating to regulations and external standard setting and monitoring), professional 
standards by other players such as auditors, pressures for risk minimisation etc from 
financial lenders, and other pressures for conformity with other 
institutions/organisations operating in the relevant field. In the case of the study Trusts, 
external pressures for conformity would include Departmental policy, centralised 
targets, guidance and directives from Strategic Health Authorities, contractual 
requirements with PCTs, care management, referral practices and patterns amongst 
general practitioners, and partnership arrangements with Local Government providers. 
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Despite a plethora of change initiatives in the NHS over the last decade and more, a 
recent systematic review of change management in service innovations in health 
service delivery and organisations (Greenhalgh, Robert, Macfarlane, Bate, and 
Kyriakidou 2004) found very few robust examples of successful, sustained major 
changes in the organisation of healthcare care delivery processes. As a corollary, it 
also found, no doubt to the chagrin of harassed NHS managers pressed to achieve 
swift, significant and sustained change under New Labour, that the evidence base for 
successful change is very limited and changes in service delivery are difficult to 
achieve. In fact, the evidence suggests that, as organisational cultures and institutional 
structures can be extremely robust, they may only respond well to specific, localised, 
and incremental change efforts (Harrison, Hunter, Marnoch, and Pollitt 1992b; 
Meyerson and Martin 1987; Peck and Crawford 2004; Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew 1973). 
The importance of strong, internally coherent, and organisationally specific approaches 
to change is discussed at length in the work of W Richard Scott (Scott 2001 ). 
Integrating many of the themes discussed above, he argues that organisations consist 
of three central 'pillars', "cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour." These three pillars provide 
alternative bases for legitimacy which are transmitted by various carriers (ideas, values 
and rules). Each operates at multiple levels of jurisdiction; one pillar and its associated 
'carrier' may be more dominant, but none is necessarily exclusive of the other. Virtually 
all organisations and institutions are made up of combinations of regulative, normative, 
and cognitive elements (Scott 1998). The repeated enactment of these elements, 
whether rules, values or conceptions, by people within institutions provides an internal 
sense of stability and common purpose and projects a veneer of objective reality 
externally. This suggests that in Trusts in which institutionalised processes are being 
transformed against prevailing NHS norms, there would need to be a very high degree 
of coherency in the alignment of the goals, structures, processes, accountability 
mechanisms, and reward systems, as well as congruency in the actions of both the 
management and the managed. Such congruency will have no value however in the 
absence of an ability to imagine an alternative way of being for the organisation, to 
inspire others to see it also, to believe in it, pursue identified achievable gaols and 
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means for achieving it (Morgan 1997), to receive feedback about progress, to learn 
continuously, and to effectively disseminate new knowledge (Senge 1992). 
I therefore decided that I needed to understand both the history and development of 
the NHS as it related to the conduct, coordination and management of clinical work. I 
also decided that I needed to examine the histories of the two study Trusts for 
congruency and coherency in the alignment of structures, activities and values prior to 
examining more recent factors associated with the Clinical Management Development 
Project. 
Conclusion 
My final choices about relevant themes in the reorganisation and coordination of care 
in the study Trusts, the research design, the collation and reportage of my results, and 
the interpretation discussion of my findings reflect the priorities identified in the above 
discussion. Some secondary themes, such as the management and conduct of the 
CMD project itself and the way in which it 'played out' in the various health economies, 
have been included as background material and to provide important snippets of 
relevant information about local Trust strategies and conditions. 
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Chapter Three 
Method 
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Introduction 
As a result of my initial questions and my reading I decided to use interpretative 
structuralism to frame my approach. Hardy and Phillips (2002) ague that interpretative 
structuralism emphasises the importance of the social context of the phenomenon 
being examined, and seeks to explore and understand the way in which socially 
produced ideas and objects constitute a "reality" that is then maintained through 
repeated enactment. Once the generation of the status quo is understood, 
stakeholders with an interest in change, including researchers and policy advisers, can 
then begin to develop ideas for how change might be successfully introduced into that 
en vi ron ment. 
I chose a mixture of techniques to examine, in relative detail, the external and internal 
organisational contexts in the study Trusts in order to understand their relevance for 
the implementation (or not) of ICPs as a means for improving the coordination of 
clinical work. These were: 
• An historical review of how NHS hospital care was traditionally organised, 
attempts to change this (especially around the management of work), and 
the outcomes of these 
• A review of Trust documents 
• A survey of Trust staffs' views about: 
• Professional cultures around aspects of healthcare work and its 
management 
• How their own clinical performance and experience of work could be 
enhanced 
.. How services can be improved 
• Interviews with senior staff about their views of the organisation, what 
constitutes good clinical management, whether/how this relates to 
organisational management. 
The survey and interview schedules are attached in Appendices 1 & 2. 
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Historical Review 
This involved a thematic review of historical policy documents and related academic 
comment about the history of the NHS, the management of hospitals, and their 
relationship to the management of clinical work. It drew upon a wide variety of sources 
and databases. The results of this review are reported in Chapters Four and Five. 
Document Review 
A review of documents internal to the Trusts since amalgamation was undertaken. 
Documents included were pictorial representation of Trust structures, vision 
statements, Board minutes, Executive committee minutes, minutes from committees 
reporting to the Executive committee e.g. clinical governance committee reports, 
financial reports, required internal policy documents for example policies relating to risk 
and safety, minutes of committees relating to the CMD project, publicity papers such as 
newsletters, internal communications such as the email spill down of Department of 
Health news, alerts and instructions to Trust executives, some pathway documents, 
Commission for Health Improvement (later the Healthcare Commission) reports, NHS 
staff survey results, and for North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust, the Darzi review's 
report. The Trusts' websites were also examined. 
Where possible, documents relating to the predecessor Trusts were also included. 
These were limited, however, in coverage (essentially the only available documents 
were Trust Board minutes and some financial reports) and in time frame; in both study 
Trusts few documents from the predecessor Trusts had been kept. 
Information from these documents was used to develop an understanding of the Trusts' 
histories, structures, internal emphases in focus and approach, the Trusts' self 
depiction to its community, and the extent to which language in use in the Trust 
reflected or implied a view of clinical work. This information is not specifically reported 
in any one chapter however it informs the descriptions and discussions in Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven. 
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Survey of Staffs' Reform Values 
The survey results in this thesis are derived from a survey conducted as part of the 
Clinical Management Development project. The CMD project ran from 2002-2004 in 
four NHS (hospital) Trusts and their associated Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in 
Northeast England and Yorkshire. 
Study Sites 
The selection of individual Trusts was not random but depended on the willingness of a 
hospital's senior clinical and managerial staff to participate. Accordingly, the survey 
results reported in this thesis have, in effect, been derived from a series of case 
studies. As such the results may not be representative of NHS Trusts more generally. 
Although the primary study sites, the NHS Trusts and their associated PCTs self-
identified for participation, organisations associated with PCTs, such as general 
practices and district nursing units, were identified by the PCTs; PCT staff assisted with 
the recruitment of staff participation within these further organisations. 
Sampling procedures 
The ideal sampling frame within each health economy consisted of simple random 
samples of 30 staff within each occupational group: medical managers, medical 
clinicians (surgeons and physicians), general managers, nurse managers, nurse 
clinicians, allied health managers and allied health clinicians in hospital Trusts; Trust 
managers including PEC members, community nurse managers and clinicians, allied 
health managers and clinicians in PCTs; and general practitioners, practice nurses and 
practice managers within general practices. Assignment of respondents to occupational 
classes was determined by each of the Trusts and practices who also prepared the 
(occupation group based) staff lists from which the random staff samples were 
obtained. Medical managers were defined by their employers as including clinicians 
who spent 5% or more of their time performing what were regarded by senior 
management as managerial tasks. 
Where a sample member failed to return a completed questionnaire they were followed 
up twice. In those cases where it proved impossible to contact a respondent, i.e. they 
49 
had either left the organisation or were on extended leave, a further member of each of 
the sub-populations was selected at random. Where the overall population of a 
particular occupational class within an organisation fell below its nominated sample 
size (a common event) all the members of that class were included in the sample. The 
numbers for some occupational groups are slightly larger than thirty. The reason for 
this is that in some organisations questionnaires were distributed to the whole staff 
population during local 'timeout sessions'. The sample was also somewhat constrained 
in that, within secondary care, at least thirty percent of the sample (where applicable) 
included staff who treated patients with a fractured neck of femur. This limitation was 
included to ensure that the views of staff whose work was anticipated to be a focus for 
the developmental phase of the Clinical Management Development project were 
represented in the survey. 
The views of 987 staff across all project partners were obtained (refer Table 3.1 below). 
Provided no inferences are drawn from the data as to the incidence of a particular item 
in an organisational or occupational category (when the relationships between the 
sample sizes and sub-population sizes would have to be taken into account), the 
sample may most conveniently be treated as a simple random sample in time drawn 
from the four health economies. The various statistical tests and significance levels 
have been used primarily to describe the strength of a relationship or difference rather 
than as a basis of an inference to a larger population. Analysis showed that results for 
each organisational type were generally consistent across health economies. Small 
differences existed but these were relatively minor. 
Table 3.1 Completed Questionnaires by Occupational Class and Organisational 
Type 
Medical Medical General Nurse Nurse Allied Allied Heaah Health Total Clinician Manager Manager Managers Clinician Manager Clinician 
SCTs 103 24 63 69 81 51 63 454 
Lead PCT PCT PCT General Practice Practice General Nurse Nurse Practitione Total Clinician Manager Manager Clinician r Nurse Manager 
, PCTs 
·" 
32 87 39 111 138 65 61 533 
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When analysed by health economy the actual survey population was constructed as 
summarised in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below: 
Table 3.2 Sample by Acute Care Trust 
Medtcal Medical General Nurse Nurse Allied Allied Health Health Clinician Manager Manager Managers Clinician Manager Clinician 
Trust A 21 5 22 14 10 17 18 
Trust B 39 9 16 23 34 21 19 
Trust C 19 5 11 16 19 4 10 
Trust D 24 5 14 16 18 9 16 
Tot<il 103 24 63 69 81 51 63 
Table 3.3 PCT Sample by Health Economy 
Primary Care Trust General Practice 
Lead GM NM NC GP PN PM 
Health Economy A 0 16 6 12 9 5 5 .y 
Healtti Economy B 3 30 5 33 33 16 24 
Health Economy C 6 11 7 7 •14 9 3 
Health Economy D ·lo 22 17 29 50 27 18 
Health Economy E' 5 3 4 25 32 8 6 
Total 32 ;37 39 111 '138 65 61 
'PartiCipatiOn by th1s health economy was l1m1ted to one PCT part1c1patmg m the phase one staff su1vey only 
Questionnaire Design and Analysis 
The questionnaire closely followed the format of a validated questionnaire used in 
previous research (Degeling et al. 1998; Degeling et al. 2000a; Degeling, Kennedy, 
and Hill 2001; Degeling et al. 2002) which in itself was partly comprised of other 
validated instruments. (It has been used previously to make cross-national 
comparisons of the views and values of health care workers in western economies.) 
For this study, the entire questionnaire was piloted using different groups within 
hospitals in the UK. Minor adjustments were made to adapt the instrument to English 
circumstances. 
Closed ended questions 
The questionnaire firstly elicited demographic data on respondents' occupation, 
qualifications, sex, age, clinical and managerial experience, and employment duration 
with their hospital. Individual items within the questionnaire were worded to fit the 
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occupation and organisational circumstances of respondents. Thus, nurses were asked 
to describe their highest educational qualification in nursing while lay managers were 
asked to supply their highest educational qualification in management. General 
practice staff were asked how they perceived the goals of the Practice whilst hospital 
staff were asked how they saw the goals of the hospital. 
It then used sets of interrelated close-ended questions to ascertain respondents': 
• Views on some issues that have been said to face the health care system, 
• Assessments of a number of strategies for addressing resource issues 
confronting the health care system, 
• Perceptions of what they regarded as important for their professional 
autonomy, 
• Perceptions of how certain expectations affected their professional 
autonomy, 
• Views about the relative importance of factors which may produce variations 
in clinical practice, 
• Views on a range of factors which can affect their clinical practice, 
• Views on a range of issues pertaining to resource allocation in clinical 
settings, 
• Perceptions of the scope and limits of their accountability, 
• Views on who should be involved in formulating clinical care standards, 
• Views about which knowledge bases should be included in setting 
medical/nursing clinical standards, 
• Assessments of nominated strategies for improving a clinical unit's overall 
performance. 
On all substantive questions, across all occupations and organisations, the form of the 
questions was essentially identical however two sets of substantive questions were 
omitted from lay managers' questionnaire forms as these were only relevant for people 
with clinical experience. 
Within these close-ended question banks items were arranged using one of three 
question formats. With the first, respondents were required to rank a set of items 
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(statements) in terms of their perceived importance. With the second, respondents 
were asked to allocate percentage points between a set of statements to indicate their 
subjective assessments of the prevalence of nominated situations or conditions. In the 
third (and the most often used form), respondents were asked to rate individual 
statements (using a five-point Likert scale) to indicate their degree of agreement or 
disagreement with the statement or to describe their assessments of its 
appropriateness or inappropriateness. 
The collected data from Likert scale questions were difficult to assess in relation to 
single items. Rather these were explored in relation to other related items i.e. the 
responses to a number of linked items were analysed for an underlying structure in 
participants' responses. For example one of the questions asked respondents to 
assess the extent to which variations in medical practice "are caused by shortcomings 
in medical/surgical education". The assessments of individual respondents could have 
arisen from a) having studied a report which sought to establish an association 
between clinical practice and medical education; b) direct experience of working with 
colleagues from different medical backgrounds; c) a personal recognition of areas 
where there was a knowledge gap. The point here is not that respondents might or 
might not have provided answers on these bases but that it was apparent there was an 
underlying pattern in responses to items relating to clinical practice variation. 
The relationships between items and across banks of items were therefore explored 
initially using chi squared test. (Monte Carlo methods were used when the expected 
values were less than 5). The results (not reported here) suggested that the 
relationships between the items may be regarded as essentially linear in form. These 
tests were carried out using either one way analysis of variance or two way analysis of 
variance modified to cope with the unequal number of cases in each cell. The results 
indicated that the bulk of the survey items discriminated strongly between occupational 
categories. Principal component analysis was then used to derive a set of orthogonal 
factors, which typically accounted for 50-60% of the variation in the responses to items 
within a theme. Respondents' scores on a factor were regarded as reflecting patterns 
of values, meaning and beliefs that structured their assessments of the issues and/or 
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matters that were referenced by themed items that loaded on the factor in question. 
Respondents' factor scores were explored, using analysis of variance, to establish the 
extent to which the already noted occupation-based differences were preserved and to 
test whether the results varied when other demographic variables such as gender, age 
and education were taken into account. The results showed that the effects of these 
secondary demographic variables were minor relative to the impact of respondents' 
occupation. 
Factors across organisations were examined for their stability. The result showed that 
factors were relatively stable. In light of this, the responses of all cases from each 
organisation were combined and again analysed (using principal component analysis) 
to derive a set of common factors on which all respondents could be measured and 
hence compared. Finally, discriminate analysis was used to examine the patterns of 
difference between the mean scores for all the hospital reform related factors by 
occupation. The results suggested that the responses varied primarily along two 
dimensions. 
Issues with the quantitative data 
Whilst surveys have traditionally been regarded as a quantitative research method, the 
surveys here are surveys of opinions. As such, the participants' responses, whether to 
Likert scales or opened questions, are interpretations of complex social concepts and 
phenomena at a particular point in time and in a particular social context. In that sense, 
the data are not strictly reproducible in the positivist sense and could be classified as 
essentially qualitative data. They provide an insight into the context and values of staff 
around the conduct of clinical work and its organisation, indicating both commonalities 
and differences between staff within and between the two study Trusts. The findings 
from this section of the survey are reported in Chapter Eight. 
Opened questions 
Open-ended questions (to permit free response) sought to elicit respondents' views on 
their: 
• Perceptions of the role of various parts of the health economy, 
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• What could be done to improve the operation of the health economy and its 
constituent components, and 
• What could be done to improve their working lives. 
The responses to these questions were typed into an Excel spreadsheet and grouped by 
Trust and occupation. A content analysis was undertaken to identify the major themes that 
emerged within Trusts and within occupational groups. A coding frame was developed out 
of the responses to categorise these. A thematic analysis of the findings from the open-
ended questions is reported in Chapter Nine. 
Interviews 
All members of the executive management teams, all the divisional (medical) directors 
in each Trust, the lead staff member for clinical pathways during the CMD project, and 
the Trust-project liaison person were invited to participate in the interviews. (In CHFT 
the project liaison officer was the Organisational Development Director, a member of 
the Trust executive. In NTH project liaison officer was the Assistant Human Resource 
Manager for Organisational Development who was not a member of the executive 
team.) The majority of the executive team in both Trusts agreed to be interviewed. The 
exceptions were the Director for Human Resources in both Trusts and the Medical 
Director in NTH. The staff member who had been medical director during the Clinical 
Management Development project, however, did agree to participate. The position of 
Finance Director in NTH was vacant hence this position on the NTH executive team is 
not represented in the interviews. No divisional medical director in either of the Trusts 
agreed to participate; the only exception was the acting divisional director for Medicine 
and the Elderly in Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Trust. As I did not consider that 
one interview would be representative of medical directors' opinions and may in fact 
skew the findings, I did not include this interview. The ICP leads in both Trusts also 
agreed to be interviewed. 
The interview schedule was highly structured; however, I have styled the interviews as 
semi-structured. The reason for this is that I had (and still have) an extended working 
relationship with many of the interviewees. I had deliberately cultivated an interactive 
working style when undertaking developmental activities in these Trusts to promote 
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trust and reciprocity. I anticipated, and subsequently verified, that it would be very 
difficult to step outside that working relationship when interviewing. As expected, the 
interviewees often conducted themselves within that framework and, in order to 
maintain the working relationship, so did I. Furthermore the interviews often referred to 
matters about which I had prior knowledge and experience. In this sense the interviews 
at times departed from the standard, relatively objective and uninvolved interview 
format, taking on aspects more akin to that of a participant observer. The interviews 
were content analysed; a thematic summary of the findings is reported in Chapter Ten. 
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Chapter Four 
An Historical Perspective on the NHS with a Special Focus on 
the Management of Clinical Work 
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Introduction 
NHS history is characterised by reform efforts that have sought to reshape professional 
priorities and organisational structures in order to improve and ensure delivery of 
effective and efficient care. The issues faced in the early days of the NHS- how best to 
organise and manage the service; fund it; balance the frequently conflicting demands 
and expectations of patients, professionals and the public; and how to target resources 
to areas of greatest need - remain fundamental issues that successive governments 
have to address. The pressure for simultaneous resolution of these issues to ensure 
the key tenets of the NHS - a national service, free at the point of entry for all who 
have need of it has grown over the past 30-40 years with changing economic and 
societal issues. 
The difficulties in simultaneous resolution of many of these issues were inherent in the 
way the NHS was designed (Barnard 1976; Pollitt, Harrison, Hunter, and Marnoch 
1988; Strong and Robinson 1990). The nearly sixty years of NHS history have 
therefore been a history of numerous initiatives in pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness 
and respectful patient 'experience' in healthcare delivery. This chapter describes the 
traditional structures and management practices of NHS hospitals, highlights important 
reforms and initiatives, and provides a rationale and critique of each. 
The Design of the NHS 
The NHS was established to meet several complementary concerns. It was in part a 
response to widespread expectations that government should ameliorate the 
deprivations of the Second World War and the associated shortages including, in the 
new centres of population, healthcare services. It was in part an attempt to promote 
social equity, economic reconstruction and domestic growth. And it was in part a 
compromise response to the inequities, tensions and vested interest within the prior 
existing structure of healthcare provision in the UK (Barnard 1976; de Jong, 
Groenewegen, and Westert 2003; Department of Health 2004; HMSO 1942; Levitt 
1979; Milburn 2001; Pollitt, Harrison, Hunter, and Marnoch 1988). 
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It was primarily centrally funded with a tripartite structure: general practice, provided by 
independent contractors on a capitation basis and administered by an Executive 
Council (dentists, pharmacists and optical practitioners were also retained on this 
basis); community health and preventive services such as maternal and child welfare, 
health visiting, ambulance services and the School Medical Service, provided by local 
government; and hospital services. Teaching hospitals were overseen by Boards of 
Governors who reported directly to the Minister of Health; others were overseen by 
Hospital Management Committees which oversaw groups of hospitals within the 
region. Each Board and Committee reported to the Minster of Health and each 
employed an administrator to oversee its responsibility for service provision. 
Traditional Structure and Management Practice in Hospitals 
Historically the hospitals in the NHS, as elsewhere, were organised internally around 
the specialist functions of running a business, namely accounts, finance, R&D, 
personnel and so on. In addition hospitals organised their operational processes on a 
functional basis according to established healthcare disciplines and roles; medicine 
and nursing and, in later years, allied health. As expert opinion was that no clear 
boundary could be drawn between medical, lay and nursing administration, 
management of hospitals was consciously shared between them. Individual hospitals 
were usually managed by a triumvirate of the Hospital Secretary, the Matron and the 
Medical superintendent or other medically qualified administrator. A "conception of 
partnership between these three .... should be regarded as fundamental and should 
determine the lines of all future development" (Council1954) p20). 
Functional arrangements such as these were believed to apportion roles and 
responsibilities in a rational and efficient fashion, permitting the development and 
maintenance of specialist knowledge and skills, efficient resource allocation and 
effective centralised and prescribed control over all organisational operations. In this 
way they were considered to express the principles and values of the scientific 
management paradigm (Fayol 1949; Stoner 1982; Taylor 1911; Urwick 1938). 
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Contrary to the deskilled work places of 201h century industry (Braverman 1998), 
however, the expertise and knowledge of hospitals' 'core business' and its associated 
production processes did not (and still do not) reside with either the administrator or the 
managing triumvirate. The 'productive expertise' was under the care of the highly 
skilled, autonomously functioning professionals, principally doctors. Hence, unlike other 
functionally organised businesses, hospital managers were not in control of the 
production process. It was not expected that they should be; moreover professionals, 
more accountable to their professional bodies than to organisational management, did 
not contemplate, much less accept, even the idea of management's right to control 
(Bettner and Collins 1987; Edwards and Marshall 2003; Harrison and Lim 2003; 
Marnoch 1996). 
Despite their centrality to the operational processes of the hospital, health 
professionals also did not have overall or collectivised control of the production 
process, at least in any collective or organisationally purposive sense. Clinicians did 
not establish, direct or control the processes of treating patients by rational and 
prescribed management methods. The patterns of clinical activity that occurred in 
hospitals and across health economies, and the processes ensuring the appropriate 
resource and clinical requisites for those treatments, resulted from continual 
renegotiations of patterns of clinical and financial relationships (Strauss et al. 1963). 
The actual provision of care was an opaque process, fragmented along and within 
professional lines; control over it was diffused amongst many professionals (Elwyn and 
( eds) 1999; Lowe 1998) and rarely understood in its entirety by any one person. The 
broadest level of fragmentation of care occurred along familiar professional lines, 
doctors were responsible for 'cure' activities, nurses for 'care' activities and allied 
health professionals for therapeutic activities (Mowry and Korpman 1987; Wicks 1999; 
Witz 1992; Wolf 1989). 
Medicine was (and remains) divided into many specialities and sub-specialities each 
highly particularistic (and often exclusionary) in its disease or anatomical focus and its 
standard approaches to appropriate care e.g. cardiac surgeons intervened surgically 
whilst cardiac physicians intervened using drugs and other 'non-invasive' procedures 
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(Veith and Marin 1996). Further, medicine was and is traditionally arranged on a very 
individualistic basis. Hospital employed doctors were in control only of their particular 
aspects of the treatment for specified conditions of specified individual patients. 
Although in treating patients for a particular condition they were also responsible for the 
care conducted by others at their behest (e.g. nurses and therapists), they were not 
accountable for the totality of care for that patient. Different doctors were responsible 
for treating different conditions in the same patient (hence for complex patients there 
can be blurring of roles and accountability even within medicine). Each doctor was 
responsible only for the patient immediately in his/her care; he/she was not responsible 
in any way for the population of patients with the same condition in the hospital. 
Each doctor's accountability for his/her individual patient was also highly individualised. 
In post war Britain all consultants were equal, no doctor had responsibility for or to 
another (Bujak 1998; Strong and Robinson 1990) even for the training of, and 
delegation of responsibility to, more junior doctors. This was and remains a relatively 
fluid process influenced by the competency of the junior doctor in the eyes of his 
mentor rather than according to defined rules or strict lines of accountability (Davies 
and Francis 1976). The result was that "no hospital had a boss, no doctor had a 
manager" (Strong and Robinson 1990) p15). In contrast, other health professionals, 
such as allied health professionals and in particular nurses, were usually multiply 
accountable - to the doctor under whose authority there were working, to their direct 
manager and to their professional body. 
In this organisational and political environment, hospital structures and operations more 
closely resembled the interaction of co-located 'tribes' (see figure overpage). The tribes 
had (and have) varying histories, internal organisation, cultures and power; fierce 
internal loyalties; different perceptions of the nature of clinical work; and, despite their 
common commitment to patients' welfare, lacked a sense of wider vision (Strong and 
Robinson 1990). 
In such an environment the hospital manager/administrator's role was more akin to a 
diplomatic organisational maintenance one, not one of responsibility for ordering the 
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strategic and operational direction of the organisation a· Ia scientific management. 
Their role was essentially reactive and consisted of mediating the competing claims of 
the various professional groups and providing the resources and facilities that the 
individual professional groups said that they needed (Degeling 1993a; Harrison 1988; 
McMahon and Newbold 1986) in ways that maintained relationships between the 
professions. The resulting lack of a strong coordinating managerial process throughout 
all levels of the organisation resulted in an administrative process focused on 'issues 
management', strengthened the individual professions' ties and interests, left 
medicine's preferred work practices unchallenged by staff of other professions, created 
a multiple hierarchy within the organisation, and significantly impeded any ability to 
provide a consumer oriented and effectively coordinated service (Davies 1980; Davies 
and Francis 1976; Strong and Robinson 1990; Tap and Schut 1987; Zadoroznjy 1998). 
These deficiencies were noted early on. In 1966 the Advisory Committee for 
Management Efficiency in the National Health Service (Advisory Committee for 
Management Efficiency in the National Health Service 1966) criticised the lack of 
supportive and critical elements of industrial managers' roles in British hospital 
management (quoted in (Harrison 1988) p13) and in 1967 the Advisory Committee on 
Hospital Management (Joint Working Party 1967b) advocated the setting in place of 
arrangements so that "someone had ... command of the (hospital) with authority over 
the rest of the staff' (emphasis added). Nevertheless, and despite the "obsession with 
notions of better management" (Harrison 1988), subsequent attempts to strengthen 
management of hospitals did so from within the context of the individual professions, 
maintaining the triumvirate arrangement. For example, the 'Cogwheel' reports on the 
organisation of medicine recommended the establishment of speciality based divisions 
within hospitals, each of which would send a representative to a Medical Executive 
Committee whose chairman would act as the chief medical spokesman for the hospital 
(Joint Working Party 1967a); the Salmon report recommended a hierarchical structure 
within nursing (Ministry of Health and Scottish Home and Health Departments 1966), 
and the Zuckerman Report and Noel Hall Report recommended separate management 
structures for scientists and technicians and pharmacists respectively (Watkin 1975). 
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Consensus decision making 
The insufficiency of these arrangements for providing effective management 
increasingly stringent budgetary circumstances however became increasingly apparent 
during the 1970s (Klein 1983). Increasing consumer service demands, coupled with the 
simultaneous rapid expansion of costly care technologies, exerted significant cost 
pressures that were difficult to contain. Effective management of the NHS increasingly 
became a major preoccupation. The financial pressures challenged the way that both 
policy agents and hospital managers conceived of the efficiency, effectiveness, 
performance, design, roles and responsibilities of hospitals and their operation (Harris 
1977; Klein 1985; Schieber and Poullier 1990; Tap and Schut 1987). In particular, they 
highlighted the fact that medical clinicians were responsible for the bulk of hospital-
based healthcare expenditure without any formal accountability or responsibility for that 
expenditure. From as early as 1972 there were calls for more clinician inclusive 
management approaches such as management teams of "those whose unanimous 
agreement is essential to the making and effective implementation of decisions for the 
totality of care" (DHSS 1972a)p15). 
A series of reforms were undertaken during this period, the most significant of which 
were those of 1974 and 1983. The 1974 reorganisation gave the NHS a new corporate 
structure and management ethos. New 'local' layers of management (areas and 
districts) were added and a host of innovations' based upon 'modern business 
methods' were introduced (Strong and Robinson 1990). These included strengthened 
nursing hierarchy, managerial hierarchies in a number of health professions not 
previously so organised including dentistry and various therapy professions, an 
elaborate planning system, management training for health professions, and local 
community representation (Levitt 1979). However funding was still centralised and the 
reorganisation was not so business-like as to introduce a CEO or anything approaching 
a recognizable chain of command. 
Rather, following prevailing intellectual opinion that doctors should not be accountable 
to non-clinicians (Harrison 1988), the 1974 reform initiatives, reinforced the multiple 
hierarchies of hospital management by introducing the notion of 'consensus decision-
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making' within hospitals, district, area and regional health authorities (DHSS 1972a). 
These bodies were headed by multiprofessional teams consisting of the administrator, 
treasurer, a nurse, and two doctors, a consultant and a GP, representing clinical (and 
not managerial medical) interests. Team members had personal responsibility for their 
own spheres of work; however, strategic and multidisciplinary issues were to be 
decided collectively. Elaborate consultative structures within the professions, focused 
upon elected professional advisory committees, were set up to aid the teams' 
coordinating work with professions. Authority relationships between teams existed only 
between the various area and regional health authorities. In deference to the notion of 
consensus other team relationships were restricted to monitoring: the higher level 
teams could advise but not instruct lower level teams. In effect the core principles of 
medical self organisation were applied to the whole service; it was to be a self 
organising service coordinated through consensus decision-making (DHSS 1972b) 
(Levitt 1979; Strong and Robinson 1990). 
In retrospect the apparent rationale for consensus decision making was two pronged 
(Harrison 1982). On one part it was assumed that the NHS was a unitary organisation, 
that team members' perspectives were fundamentally aligned and their objectives 
similar, and that participation in teams would produce greater commitment to jointly 
solving the NHS' management problems. This, together with the widening of the range 
of specialist knowledges within the team, was expected to produce more innovative 
and effective solutions and greater ownership of the decisions which, in turn, would 
facilitate change (Gourlay 1974). From an alternative perspective, consensus decision-
making was a pragmatic management, a formal recognition that no practicable 
alternative to team management existed in a bureaucratically structured service so 
profoundly shaped by technical uncertainty, clinical judgement, the powerful sense of 
responsibility to individual patients by individual professionals and the dominance of 
what was effectively a medical syndicate (Jacques 1978; Strong and Robinson 1990). 
These arrangements did not, however, achieve the improvements being sought. The 
lack of a direct chain of responsibility throughout the NHS and within hospitals, the 
complexity of new management tiers, and the lack of management skills within the new 
hierarchies, meant trivial and routine decisions were frequently referred upwards 
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through the multiple organisations, often being unresolved until at least the District 
Management Team level (Harrison 1982; Haywood 1977). Some believed that the 
ability to refer decisions upwards suited those who used it as means to either distance 
themselves from unpopular decisions or to garner wider support for them (Royal 
Commission on the National Health Service 1979). This argument, however, was 
dismissed by Harrison as being both contrary to the evidence and (at the level of chief 
officers) sound management practice (Harrison 1982). 
All of these issues led to significant disillusionment and dissatisfaction within the 
Service. More significantly from the perspective of this thesis, these arrangements 
failed to provide mechanisms for integrating and managing the various professions and 
their work at levels closer to the conduct of that work. Whilst at the macro level there 
were some real successes in planning and containing costs, at the clinical level the 
negative features of tribalism were readily apparent; there was little coordination within 
hospitals and work places, very little knowledge about individual medical activity and, in 
contrast to emerging trends in the US health industry, no techniques for the 
micromanagement of health provision (Ham 1985; Pollitt 1990; Strong and Robinson 
1990). 
Consensus management however remained in place until the early 1980s. Attempts to 
financially manage the Service prior to this time were restricted to the (bitterly 
contested) removal of private beds from the NHS in 1974-76 (Klein 1983; Klein 1980), 
the introduction of budget caps in 1976 (Klein 1983), and a system for centralised 
management cost control in 1978 (Levitt and Wall 1984) . Even the incoming Thatcher 
government, with its desire to reform the NHS structure and its commitment to more 
market based provision of services and closer supervision of public instrumentalities, 
initially explicitly rejected the introduction of command management through the 
creation of chief executive posts (DHSS and Welsh Office 1979),p7). 
The Rise of General Management 
Nevertheless it was evident to all that major change was required. The Conservative 
government's reform of NHS management began slowly with structural changes such 
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as the abolition of the area tier, the creation of 'units' within districts commonly centred 
around focused clinical activities such as psychiatric hospitals or community health 
services in 1981, and the establishment of management teams within each level of the 
service in 1982. However what some regarded as a tidal wave of change aimed at 
radically shifting the culture of the NHS began in 1982 (Harrison 1988). Included in the 
process changes were the introduction of hierarchical annual performance reviews, 
cost-effectiveness scrutinies of services such as transport and residential 
accommodation, 'efficiency savings', central control of manpower numbers, restrictions 
on doctors' prescribing rights, a review of NHS audit arrangements and the publication 
of the first set of performance indicators. This time period also saw the commencement 
of more market-based operational approaches with the initiation of compulsory 
competitive tendering for catering, domestic and laundry services (Bristol Royal 
Infirmary Inquiry 2001 a; Pollitt, Hunter, Harrison, and Marnoch 1991 ). 
Virtually all these initiatives were poorly supported within the Service. Performance 
indicators in particular were criticised for the unreliability of the associated data and 
their lack of clinical relevance, especially in relation to the quality and outcomes of care 
(Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry 2001a). These criticisms were to become a familiar 
refrain to subsequent initiatives that sought more detailed management information on 
professional activity. 
The 1983 'Griffiths' report supported and amplified the tenor of the management 
changes, marking a major change in thinking about the management of the NHS. It 
departed from orthodox thinking about the nature of healthcare and its delivery, 
depicting healthcare as being just another product, requiring coordination and 
management just like any other business. Hence, although the report did not challenge 
the functional structure of hospitals and wider organisations, it strongly endorsed 
elevating the role of general management, replacing consensus management with a 
more linear approach. A single chain of command from a general manager to the 
clinical frontline was to be established to provide overall direction and control ... "If 
Florence Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the NHS today, she would almost 
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certainly be searching for the people in charge" (Department of Health and Social 
Security 1983), p12). 
The Griffiths report acknowledged the power and dominance of the medical profession, 
emphasising the role of doctors as natural managers in healthcare and their moral and 
organisational responsibility for the financial aspects of their clinical work. It 
recommended that efforts be made to provide appropriate administrative, information 
and management budgetary systems in support of this role (Department of Health and 
Social Security 1983). Further, the report recommended drawing into the NHS a new 
cadre of managers with commercial expertise comprised of people with expertise in 
other industries and NHS staff with untapped leadership potential, particularly doctors, 
who aspired to general management positions. (Officially at least) healthcare 
management as the coalition of separate but equal professions was dead. 
These changes in thinking required hospital managers to move from administration as 
the governing principle to operational and strategic management as their governing 
principle and with that, a stronger focus on the products of the hospital and their means 
of production (Braithwaite 1999; Grant 1986). Subsequent years saw an array of 
managerial tools and techniques into the NHS such as (Pollitt 1996). However these 
initiatives occurred at an organisational level that was relatively abstracted from the 
clinical workplace such as the heads of clinical units, divisions or upper management 
and did not affect individual clinicians directly (Foster 1986; Pollitt, Harrison, Hunter, 
and Marnoch 1988) and remained focused upon the management of traditional 
functions and issues such as finance, personnel management etc. Though their use 
became routine at these upper management levels their introduction and operation at 
more professionally immediate levels were often strongly contested by clinicians 
opposed to the introduction of any practice likely produce greater transparency into 
medical workloads and clinical decisions (Ham and Hunter 1988; Pollitt 1996). 
Nearly a decade after the general management revolution the impact of what came to 
be known collectively as the 'Griffiths' changes was very unevenly distributed. Though 
the broader structural changes were substantive and greater clarity was achieved in 
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the role, responsibility and authority of senior managers these did not permeate the 
hierarchy ... "below UGM level, things became murky" (Harrison, Hunter, Marnoch, and 
Pollitt 1989); p9). Small changes were noticeable in some areas such as routine 
operational decision-making by nurses but in other arenas change was negligible. At 
more strategic levels senior managers' agendas were not as wider ranging as was 
initially anticipated. The central government's almost exclusive focus upon fiscal 
concerns meant senior managerial efforts remained overwhelmingly on the 
management of inputs, particularly the need to run a balanced budget (Harrison, 
Hunter, Marnoch, and Pollitt 1989). 
This dominance of financial concerns contributed significantly to the persistence of the 
dual hierarchy in hospitals for a variety of reasons. On the professional front 
consultants retained far more power over issues related to the obtaining of substantive 
improvements in the management and delivery of care, including the movement of 
resources out of acute care and into the community, than Griffiths had supposed. 
Further many doctors were just not interested in management, and additionally, 
managers who were concerned with patient issues often found themselves 
sympathising with clinicians' concerns. On the managerial front and in contrast to 
doctors, managers were employed on fixed short term contracts. Their job security 
depended upon their bottom lines, not the outcomes of the other agendas. The new 
hierarchical nature of decision making meant that many middle managers found their 
efforts to attain the desired bottom lines (by building credible authority and trust with 
doctors) were often undermined by more senior managers, acting on the basis of 
decisions taken further up the line at regional or district level. Their credibility and 
efforts to influence clinical decisions were further derailed by inadequate or inaccurate 
performance data. 
By the beginning of the purchaser- provider split (or 'internal market') the 'revolution' 
in NHS management had altered the larger geographical structures of the NHS and 
increased the authority of senior management at least within these hierarchical 
structures. Within hospitals in many instances nurses and other health professional had 
accepted the notion of general management and numerous initiatives (discussed 
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below) had been introduced to deal with the various issues facing the NHS. But, at the 
level at which the clinical work was done, traditional clinical and managerial practices 
and relationships continued essentially unchanged. 
Resource management 
The Resource Management Initiative (RMI) of 1986 was aimed at creating incentives 
for doctors to accept devolved budgets for the direct and indirect costs of patient care, 
to accept management positions, and to undertake service planning (Dearden 1990; 
Sturt undated). This marriage of the financial and clinical agendas was supported by 
the medical hierarchy in a joint statement by the Department of Health and the Joint 
Consultants Committee (DHSS 1986) attached to White Paper, 'Working for Patients' 
(Department of Health 1989), which incorporated the fundamental tenets and timetable 
of the RMI. The RMI coincided with the work of the NHS/DHSS Steering Group on 
Health Services Information which recommended simplification, standardisation and 
hence comparability of minimum data sets (the Korner reports) and hence improved 
control and performance information for use by all operational levels of all disciplines in 
hospitals (DHSS 1984a; DHSS 1984b; NHS/DHSS Steering Group on Health Services 
Information 1984; Perrin 1988). Together these represented the first concerted attempt 
within the NHS to routinely collect accurate casemix data about individual patients in 
order to aggregate information about activity, resources and required care (Keen, 
Buxton, and Packwood 1993). 
The RMI, and its associated agendas, were not entirely new. By the early 1970s 
treasurers of healthcare organisations had systems sufficient for calculating average 
costs per inpatient or outpatient or by given functional department and a few small 
scale pilot projects involving clinicians in budgeting for direct costs of patient care had 
been trialled (Bourn and Ezzamel 1986; Pollitt, Harrison, Hunter, and Marnoch 1988) 
(Wickings 1978). Further, the 1978 Royal Commission's recommendations (Royal 
Commission on the NHS 1979) on testing the redeployment of resources through 
clinician involvement in speciality budgeting had been enacted on a trial basis in three 
health authorities in the early 80s (Perrin 1988). Post Griffiths, efforts on resource 
management, the management budgeting initiatives (MBI) (DHSS 1985), were 
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especially prominent in the acute sector (Disken, Dixon, Halpern, and Shocket 1990; 
Packwood, Keen, and Buxton 1991; Strong and Robinson 1990). 
However the general consensus amongst commentators is that these prior attempts to 
incorporate clinicians into financial management were failures. The principles, 
incentives, and outcomes of these initiatives were heavily dependent on a number of 
prerequisites most of which were deeply problematic: willingness among clinicians to 
co-operate in the development of the budgetary systems, appropriate computerised 
data collection systems, an acceptance by professionals that output could be 
managed, defined reporting lines and a systematic capacity for dialogue between 
managers and clinicians on the patient care to be provided. Perhaps the most 
fundamental and problematic prerequisites were cultural changes such that general 
managers were willing to 'hire and fire' and clinicians were willing to change their 
'habits of a lifetime' in terms of their clinical practice patterns in treatment, training 
medical teams etc (Perrin 1987; Perrin 1988; Pollitt, Harrison, Hunter, and Marnoch 
1988; Sturt undated). In fact, clinicians were so disillusioned and anatagonised by the 
lack of consultation, inadequate planning and unreliable data generated in the MBI 
immediately prior to the RMI that the DHSS took the unusual step of noting that 
suspending MBI for the immediate future would be a sensible course of action 
" ... where fundamental difficulties have been encountered or medical and nursing staff 
seriously antagonised ... " (DHSS 1986) para 4 quoted in (Pollitt, Harrison, Hunter, and 
Marnoch 1988)). 
In contrast, RMI was judged broadly successful (Foster 1986) (Keen, Buxton, and 
Packwood 1991) although in practice it was heavily weighted towards cost containment 
and complicated by the fact that "there was general confusion ... about how the RM 
process, objectives setting and improvements in patient care could be linked", thus 
providing few incentives for enabling service improvement (Keen, Buxton, and 
Packwood 1993 ). There were some successes in integrating doctors into management, 
increasing the general accuracy of inpatient data, and promoting the use of medical 
audit and the value of a variety and financial data in the eyes of consultants. Across the 
six pilot sites individual service providers agreed to the setting of written standards and 
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to the measurement of outcomes for selected procedures and treatments. One pilot 
site, Hudddersfield Royal Infirmary (a predecessor organisation to the Calderdale and 
Huddersfield NHS Trust), enjoyed several years of real success in integrating the 
financial and clinical aspects of care, with great enthusiasm amongst staff of all 
backgrounds (Freer 2005a). 
On the other hand, across the pilot sites, implementation of information systems was 
generally slow, out-patients and referral data remained poor, and the clinical data 
generated was often profession specific, fragmented and poor quality. They therefore 
provided little useful information for either clinical or managerial purposes. Moreover 
nurses were marginalised in these initiatives and there was little evidence that the 
benefits from the initiative outweighed the costs or that the management changes had 
led to improvements in patient care (Keen, Buxton, and Packwood 1991; Keen, Buxton, 
and Packwood 1993). 
Pollitt, Harrison et al, in a large scale study of the attitudes of staff to RMI, found very 
few enthusiastic managers and clinicians, many cautious managers and many 
determinedly sceptical doctors who were often not "diehards, resistant to any 
consideration of resource constraints ..... many were perfectly prepared to acknowledge 
the need for efficiency and economy, and a number of them made critical references to 
colleagues who, in their view, disregarded such criteria" (Harrison, Hunter, Marnoch, 
and Pollitt 1989; Pollitt, Harrison, Hunter, and Marnoch 1988). In the view of many 
interviewees, RMI foundered because 'it was put to doctors in the wrong way'. At one 
site in which RMI foundered, the cause was not attitudinal but technological. It 
foundered because, in a period of financial restraint, there was insufficient investment 
in extending the capacity of the IT systems to meet the burgeoning (clinical and cost) 
informational inquiries generated by enthusiastic clinicians. The result was a cycle of 
profound disappointment and disillusionment leading to decreased commitment and 
poorer results creating more disillusionment . . . "We demoralised the clinicians by 
enthusing them - and then disappointing them .... When I think of many good doctors 
heavily involved in RMI who lost all that passion, many now are just jobbers" (Freer 
2005a). In other sites, RMI's potential to identify the costs directly controlled by each 
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consultant was not realised. The data that was generated was mainly high level 
aggregate data such as the numbers of patients treated, waiting lists and waiting times. 
This was attributed to a "deeply rooted reserve" by government to address the "highly 
sensitive issue" of clinical performance which traditionally had been "the exclusive 
domain of the professions" (Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry 2001 b). 
A series of financial crises faced by a number of NHS hospitals during the winter of 
1987/8 led to the hasty incorporation of the RMI into the "internal market" espoused in 
the White Paper (Cm 555, 1989) despite the difficulties in obtaining and maintaining 
clinician support. 
Medical Audit 
As noted above, the same Health Notice that established RMI also detailed plans for a 
comprehensive medical audit (DHSS 1989) since RM could only be effective when 
based upon sound understanding and management of clinical processes. (Or because, 
viewed from an alternative perspective, structured audit is one of the few mechanisms 
equally applicable to clinical decision making and organisational efficiency.) It is not 
surprising therefore that medical audit suffered from similar problems as the RMI: poor 
(even overtly hostile) clinician perceptions of the initiatives, a lack of systems 
understanding about how to structure initiatives, management systems that were 
coordinated at the top but not at the level at which the clinical work was done, efforts 
contained within professional silos, inadequate information technology and, 
consequently, poor quality data (Johnston, Crombie, Alder, Davies, and Millard 2000; 
Miles, Bentley, Polychronis, and al 1996; Nolan and Scott 1994). 
Medical audit (nursing audit and clinical audit were introduced in 1990 and 1993 
respectively) was about "reviewing the delivery of care to identify deficiencies so that 
they may be remedied" or, in more detail, "the systematic, critical analysis of the quality 
of medical care, including the procedures used for diagnosis and treatment, the use of 
resources, and the resulting outcome and quality of life for the patient" (DHSS 1989). 
The central idea of audit, that health professionals take time to review, reflect upon, 
and reform their work as necessary, has always been part of the professional ethic 
72 
(Hopkins 1996). It was a voluntary exercise for professionals and their participation in it 
depended upon their commitment, enthusiasm and available time (Bristol Royal 
Infirmary Inquiry 2001 b). There were no organisational structures, funding, time 
allocation or requirements for undertaking audit. The introduction of the official audit 
initiatives did little to change these arrangements or to introduce recognised 
authoritative standards for the performance or clinical work beyond those of the 
individual professions for which each clinical staff member had trained. Nurses simply 
sought to meet the standards of professional practice generally expected of them; 
doctors did likewise within their profession. And, as there were no standards, there 
were no benchmarks against which to assess the quality of the care given. 
From the start clinicians had strong reservations about official audit believing, to some 
extent rightly, it was yet another attempt to bring them under management control. 
Respected policy advisors therefore recommended against making medical audit 
compulsory, arguing successfully that, although healthcare organisations should 
provide funds and other support for audit, it should remain a voluntary activity 
encouraged through appeals to professionalism (Ham and Hunter 1988). The 
consequence was that neither the processes, application, undertaking, and results of 
audit were systematic, strategic or nationally comparable. This led the DoH's Clinical 
Outcomes Group in 1993 to successfully advocate modification of the existing medical 
audit scheme. Multidisciplinary clinical audit was introduced and, with it, the beginnings 
of a systematic approach to audit, including various audit methodologies and 
publication of a clinical audit handbook. Continuing concerns about "considerable 
professional sensitivity" however led to clinical audit being presented as an educational 
tool rather than an accountability mechanism (Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry 2001a). 
Clinician distrust of systematic audit was strongly related to their concept of profession. 
This includes the belief that professionals managed their own business hence 
managerially mandated audit, by diminishing clinical ownership of the audit process, 
diminished professionalism, restricted clinical freedom and autonomy, invited litigation, 
permitted hierarchical and territorial incursions into their domain, increased workloads 
and replaced valuable clinical time with time wasting and ineffective activities whilst 
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contributing little to improved care (Kerrison, Packwood, and Buxton 1993; McKenna 
1995; Sellu 1996; Smith, Russell, Frew, and al 1992; Webb and Harvey 1992). 
Clinicians also saw it as personally threatening, blame apportioning, "professional witch 
hunting", and a means to reorganise their services thus threatening their employment 
(Black and Thompson 1993; Firth-Cozens and Storer 1992). Junior doctors additionally 
viewed clinical audit as an activity from which they received little support, direction and 
feedback, and which laid an unfair burden on them (Gabbay and Layton 1992; Gabbay, 
McNicol, and Spiby 1990; Lough, McKay, and Murray 1995). These concerns were 
also shared by junior therapists (Millard 1996; Robinson 1996a; Robinson 1996b ). 
Organisational shortcomings impeding effective audit and resource management were 
manifested in poor planning and systems. a multiplicity of audit methodologies with 
different techniques, requirements, measurements and action points often being used 
at the same time in the same healthcare organisation (for example mortality and 
morbidity reviews, small area analysis, preadmission certification, uni- and multi-
disciplinary audits, audits conducted by audit staff and those conducted by clinicians) 
the results of which were not integrated into wider organisational processes (Buttery, 
Walshe, Rumsey, and et al 1995; Firth-Cozens and Storer 1992; Foster, Willmot, and 
Coles 1996; Walshe 1995; Willmott, Foster, Walshe, and al 1995). These 
organisational shortcomings were simultaneously the cause and result of other 
problems such as inadequate practical and financial resources (Chambers, Bowyer, 
and Campbell 1995), lack of time and support staff (Davison and Smith 1993; Karran, 
Ranaboldo, and Karran 1993), poor quality information systems, and intra-
organisational confusion, even conflict (Buttery, Walshe, Rumsey, and et al 1995; 
Robinson 1996a). Time and time again researchers identified the absence of strong 
and supportive relationships between managers and clinicians and a lack of common 
perspectives on audit as crucial issues hindering the audits' effectiveness (Foster, 
Willmot, and Coles 1996; Robinson 1996b; Smith, Russell, Frew, and al 1992; 
Thomson, Elcoat, and Pugh 1996) (Lord and Littlejohns 1994; Webb and Harvey 
1994). 
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These problems, together with the finding that there was little objective evidence 
supporting audit's value and that the depth of involvement across healthcare was still 
highly dependent on individual professionals' enthusiasm (Bristol Royal Infirmary 
Inquiry 2001 a; Buxton 1994; Johnston et al. 2000), contributed to reviewers continuing 
to report in 2000 that audit was still essentially confined to 'enthusiasts' (Johnston et al. 
2000). 
Quality assurance and quality improvement 
The resource management and clinical audit agendas were not the only agendas 
aimed at improving NHS efficiency and effectiveness over this time frame. A myriad of 
quality initiatives based on ideas drawn from beyond the health sector developed over 
this time period. These efforts included utilisation review, profile analysis, quality and 
performance indicators, quality circles, Total Quality Management, and Continuous 
Quality Improvement. From a very small base in 1984 quality assurance and quality 
improvement programmes proliferated such that in 1989 there were 1 ,478 identified 
initiatives in 116 districts (Carr-Hill and Dailey 1992). These quality initiatives did not 
attract the level of hostility of resource management and clinical audit as they focused 
more on management techniques and less on professional competence. Further, these 
initiatives were voluntary, unsystematic, often the preserve of nursing staff and 
innovative managers, and left the acceptable standard of care in the hands of individual 
clinicians. 
Quality assurance initiatives were also encouraged by professional bodies. 
Professional guidance poured forth from the Department of Health, royal colleges, 
nursing bodies, professional journals, international collegial symposiums, quality 
assurance experts, and others. The clinical guideline movement, the first professional 
movement to advocate more explicit control over clinical policy and decision-making 
(Lomas 1991 ), was perhaps the best known and most successful of these profession-
based quality movements during this time period . 
The common factor across all these efforts was lack of overall coherence. Whilst the 
programmes, advice and efforts may have seemed internally coherent, advice offered 
by different bodies on the same subject was often contradictory, incomplete or 
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confusing. (A recent example is the contradictory advice about the use of spirometry in 
the care for COPD patients contained within the NICE guidelines and the Quality 
Framework in the new GP contract.) Furthermore, each audit, QA initiative, clinical 
guideline etc had a different authoritative source that developed its particular initiative 
in isolation from other initiatives. Within hospitals, methods and interventions were not 
integrated, implementation efforts were not coordinated, roles and responsibilities were 
ill defined (Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry 2001a). 
As the above discussions suggest, the key Griffith's initiatives were limited in their 
potential partially because complementary strategies in support of them were not 
sufficiently recognised and prioritised as significant factors in the strategy. Two such 
support strategies were the establishment and development of the technological bases 
for information reporting and the selection of a casemix classification system. 
Information Systems 
Despite the need for reliable clinical and resource information throughout niuch of the 
NHS' history and particularly post Griffiths, there was no coherent policy on information 
systems for the NHS prior to 1992 (NHS Information Management Group 1992; 
Wainwright and Waring 2000). It had been evident from the early 1980s that, firstly, 
doctors both recognised the value of clinical information in their work and desired 
information systems with sufficient flexibility to meet their varying needs (Carter and 
Magee 1983; Davis and Miles 1984) and secondly, that for useful comparison of the 
data generated (whether clinical or resource based) the information systems would 
have to be nationally compatible (Ferguson and Lapsley 1989). However the 
information systems supporting the varying resource management and clinical audit 
initiatives were abundant, uncoordinated, and bore no connection to the hospital wide 
patient administration systems (which were designed to provide throughput information 
rather than data about clinical or resource usage). This was primarily the result of the 
fragmented funding systems for the various initiatives, the desire by managers to 
increase clinical ownership of initiatives by encouraging clinicians to design their own 
system and the entrenched thinking that isolated clinical and non-clinical matters into 
isolated domains of authority (Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry 2001 a; Freer 2005b ). 
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Casemix 
Casemix is a generic term for classification systems that group hospital patient activity 
by similar clinical diagnosis and/or treatments, resource use and other associated 
criteria. It is used to understand, manage and, in many countries, fund hospital activity 
on a product basis. Work on a UK version of casemix began in the 1980s by the 
Clinical, Accountability, Service Planning and Evaluation research group and 
transferred in 1991 to the National Casemix Unit in Winchester. However the 
Department of Health failed to support the introduction of the various managerial tools 
and techniques referred to above and the RMI with a clear casemix message. 
Although the RMI databases were casemix based (Street and Dawson 2002), each 
hospital was free to use whatever casemix system it wanted. Huddersfield Royal 
Infirmary successfully adopted READ codes "which gave very rich detailed information" 
on both the clinical process of care and costs (Freer 2005a); other sites used various 
forms of diagnosis related groups (DRGs). This freedom of choice in the use of 
casemix was detrimental in two ways. The absence of consistent casemix systems 
prevented comparability of data across RMI pilot sites ... "you were going it alone, 
there was no-one to share your results and progress with". Secondly and consequently, 
it limited wider appreciation of what could be achieved with casemix analysis (Freer 
2005a) at both the organisational and national levels, contributing to a continued 
paucity of product orientation within NHS hospitals. 
In the 1990s the Department of Health and Social Security selected health related 
groups (HRGs), a local variation of US derived diagnosis related groups (DRGs) based 
on the Korner hospital episode statistics, clinical meaningfulness, and similar resource 
use (Street and Dawson 2002). Despite this, the possibilities for casemix during the 
resource management initiative and later the internal market (see below) remained of 
little significance. In the eyes of the director of the National Casemix Unit at this time, 
this was attributable to the centralised funding mechanism prior to the internal market 
and during the internal market, the government's political preoccupation with block 
contracts to ensure volume activity (Sanderson 2005). Another commented that 
"despite putting all the returns in, the Korner returns etc, nobody was interested, there 
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were no other drivers, no natural push for it" (Freer 2005a). Yet others believe technical 
and managerial failure were partly to blame (Dixon 1998; Light 1998). 
Whatever the explanation, the restricted benchmarking role for casemix applications 
prior to the 2005 introduction of the Payment by Results funding agenda minimised the 
organisational transparency of clinical work, inhibited a product focus within the NHS 
and impeded the efficacy of various efficiency and effectiveness initiatives. Even in 
2002, researchers working in the Northeast and Yorkshire found that staff in hospital 
Trusts and PCTs, used to thinking in terms of block contracts, commonly viewed the 
clinical load of hospitals as an undifferentiated whole. They were unable (without 
outside assistance) to clearly stratify the clinical load of hospitals and to frame product 
centred interrogations of the Hospital Episode Statistics as a prerequisite to rethinking 
service redesign and overall efficiency (Degeling, Maxwell, and ledema 2004; 
Degeling, Maxwell, ledema, and Hunter 2004) (Wickings 1978). 
Clinical Directorates 
The RMI's impact was primarily, but not solely, upon managerial processes. It also 
provided a major impetus for structural and cultural change within hospitals via the 
establishment of clinical directorates (CD). The CD structure first emerged in John 
Hopkins Hospital in the US in mid 1970, was adopted in the UK initially by Guy's 
Hospital in 1984. They have since become almost ubiquitous in larger district and 
teaching hospitals. A CD is an aggregation of a number of clinical departments, wards 
and units into a formal organisational entity or subunit configured on product line 
management principles around a disease type. COs have devolved budgets and are 
managed by a doctor with managerial qualifications (though many medical clinicians 
tend to see the CD as a manager with medical qualifications) with the support of a 
nurse manager and a business manager. 
The claimed benefits of the clinical directorate derive from its asserted propensity for 
overcoming corporate level managers' inability to penetrate the clinical work space, 
obtain a detailed understanding of clinical production processes and their costs, and 
thereby gain control of the resource implications of the production side of hospital 
78 
activity. By engaging clinicians in management processes and hierarchies at a level 
closer to the clinical work place, COs were said to provide the decentralised decision 
making (Heyssel, Gaintner, Kues, Jones, and Lipstein 1984; Hickie 1994; Sang 1993), 
reconciling clinical freedom with management authority and accountability, and 
equating power with responsibility (Fitzgerald and Sturt 1992; Lee, Clarke, and 
Glassford 1993; Packwood, Keen, and Buxton 1991 ). These, in turn, were thought to 
combine to produce a clearer focus on the health service offered, the needs of patients 
(Lathrop, Seufret, MacDonald, and Martin 1991 ), and improved efficiency (Braithwaite 
1993; Disken, Dixon, Halpern, and Shocket 1990; Ruffner 1986). 
However comparatively recent evaluations of COs and their contributions to hospital 
performance have found that there is little definitive evidence of these supposed gains 
(Braithwaite 1999; Braithwaite 2006). The findings applied regardless of whether the 
issue at hand was the devolution of appropriate authority and power for clinical 
directors, accountability relationships between CD managers and corporate manages 
and/or between clinical directors and clinicians, or resource management and audit. 
Although the evidence tends to suggest that management tasks have undoubtedly 
been devolved further into the clinical space, clinical directorates, rather than facilitating 
new ways of working between clinicians and managers have tended to recreate the 
traditional hospital patterns of authority and practice. The usage of product line 
management approaches to clinical work within clinical directorates is frequently 
minimal and doctors remain substantially autonomous in their work practices. 
In part, this is the outcome of successful professionally structured resistance aimed at 
retaining the negotiated power arrangements inherent in traditional ways of working 
(Boyce 1993); (Braithwaite 2004). However it is also the case that clinical managers 
such as clinical directors are hampered by the limited availability of management 
training and a focus on generic management skills rather than the skills required for 
managing a highly politicised workplace. More particularly, they are hampered by a 
lack of familiarity with, and use of, casemix management systems (Maxwell, Degeling, 
Kennedy, and Coyle 2005) and limits on the number of sessions for undertaking 
management tasks and clinical sessions (Allen 1995; Fitzgerald and Sturt 1992; Mark 
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1994; Packwood, Keen, and Buxton 1991; Pettigrew, Ferlie, and McKee 1992; Rea 
1994). 
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Chapter Five 
An Historical Perspective on Clinician Engagement in 
Organisational Management 
(Up to and During the CMD Project) 
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The Internal Market 
The drive towards simultaneous attainment of efficiency, effectiveness and changed 
management practices took a dramatic change of direction in 1989 with the separation 
of purchasers (district health authorities and GP fundholders) from providers. 
Interactions between the purchasers and the providers were mainly through contracts 
or service agreements which set out prices, volume and quality of services. The reform 
aimed to merge the private and public sectors of health care in the sense that health 
authorities are free to choose providers for any source in order to meet the needs of 
their resident populations, thus creating incentives for NHS providers to increase their 
efficiency in providing quality services. In order to facilitate this freedom of choice by 
purchasers and of response by providers, beginning from 1991 public hospitals were 
transformed into separate self-regulating legal entities 'NHS Trusts'. The rationale for 
these decisions was described by Salauroo and Burnes (Salauroo and Burnes 1998), 
quoting and expanding upon Carr and Donaldson (Carr and Donaldson 1993), as the 
"belief that a market system would induce positive behaviour [by managers and 
professionals] which would work in the interest of patients, and that it would bring 
accountability and value for money within a proper management framework." Clinical 
effectiveness was to be protected and promoted throughout these reorganisations via 
teamwork and reorganisation of clinical work; skill-mix reviews, multi-skilling initiatives, 
job re-evaluations, and process re-engineering became common (Dyson 1991; Unit 
1996): "The best and most cost effective outcomes for patients and clients are 
achieved when professionals work together, engage in clinical audit of outcomes 
together, and generate innovation to ensure progress in practice and service (NHSME 
1993) para 4.3)". 
The introduction of the internal market was motivated largely by ideological motives: 
individualism and its associated concepts of competition, value for money, consumer 
choice, and a desire for "visible, active and individualistic form of leadership" (Ferlie, et 
al., 1996) had triumphed in the previous two decades over more socialistic concerns 
such as equity, need and universalism (Flynn and Williams 1997). It was also likely 
informed by the relative acceptance of US clinicians to involvement in managing the 
profitability of their organisations through the use of utilisation reviews, shorter lengths 
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of stay, more ambulatory and lower cost care alternatives- a willingness that had not 
been matched in the UK (Ginzberg 1996; Redisch 1988; Stoeckle and Reiser 1992; 
Winkenwerder and Ball 1988). 
The three main areas whereby the NHS internal market reforms might have been 
expected to influence hospital productivity/efficiency were Trust status and the 
managerial changes and incentives believed to accompany that, competition between 
providers, and the rise of a multiplicity of small purchasers (fundholders) in addition to 
the larger health authorities. Evaluations of the productivity effect of internal market 
reforms tended to be politically polarised and poorly supported by data (Hunter 1994; 
Radical Statistics Health Group 1995). Several well known studies of the internal 
market (Bartlett and Le Grand 1992; Bartlett and Le Grand 1994; Propper 1994; Smee 
1995) failed to use casemix based data which may have significantly biased their 
results. Whereas studies of unadjusted data showed that the transformation from 
directly managed hospital to Trust status increased costs, a later casemix based study 
claimed exactly the opposite. Competition between hospitals had only marginal effect 
on productivity (Klein, Day, and Redmayne 1996) suggesting that either the expected 
pressure on hospitals to reduce costs did not eventuate or that the hospitals competed 
on a non-price basis factors such as perceived competence of specialists, waiting 
times, and access (Culyer and Posnett 1990; Glennerster and Matsaganis 1993; Miller 
1994). More disconcertingly from the viewpoint of resource management, in hospitals 
that had multiple purchasers compared to those that had fewer the transaction costs 
associated with the need to contract (Klein, Day, and Redmayne 1996) raised average 
costs. Further, as the National Audit Office reported, the use of block contracts instead 
of specified product contracts meant patients tended to follow the money instead of 
vice versa, replicating patterns of provision and resource allocation from the previous 
globally budgeted and directly managed hospitals (National Audit Office 1995). 
The conflicting needs of market oriented organisations for diversity and innovation and 
the bureaucratic and political needs of the government to retain overall control of the 
NHS (and the Thames region's financial crisis in particular) resulted in increasing 
intervention in the management of the internal market. In 1994 extensive national 
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guidance (Department of Health 1994) was released and the internal market was 
repositioned as a programme of management reforms using market-like mechanisms 
rather than competition per se (Ham 1999). 
Researchers' conclusions on the impact of the internal market were that it failed to 
stimulate the expected changes in management of costs, quality and monitoring of care 
(Ham 1999; LeGrand, Mays, and Mulligan 1998). There were some gains in efficiency, 
offset by increased transaction costs for Trusts dealing with large numbers of 
fundholders (see above), and despite a record increase in patient dissatisfaction with 
the health service (Judge, Mulligan, and New 1997), no evidence of an impact on the 
technical quality of care. In addition there was little change in consumer orientation 
especially in terms of patient choice and provider responsiveness although equity of 
access had declined somewhat. Finally, there was no real difference in service 
allocation or accountability arrangements. In the internal market's favour there was 
some evidence that the influence of general managers and clinical managers was 
increasing (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, and Pettigrew 1996) and that the 
requirements of purchasing had produced some weakening of the cultural emphasis 
within organisations on the individual patient towards public health and patient 
populations (Ham 1997; Ham 1999). 
The Third Way 
In 1997 'New Labour' came to power committed to a 'third way' of extending the search 
for efficiency via new funding models, management structures and information systems 
and a simultaneous strengthening of the emergent clinical performance agenda. The 
government sought to do this in the NHS using the same broad framework it had put in 
place for other industries. This was characterised by heavy reliance on regulation as an 
intermediary mechanism between an unfettered free market and 'monolithic 
bureaucracy', and on 'partnership, driven by performance', in this case between health 
care organisations and between health and social care (Bradshaw 2003; Giddens 
1998; Ham 1997; Ham 1999; Walshe 2002). Hence the regulatory context of 
healthcare under new Labour was, and is, much more extensive than under the 
previous NHS arrangements. In essence and the words of the then new Prime Minister, 
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these changes were designed to produce a new NHS defined by 'values, standards, 
inspection, regulation and funding'. The usual corporate governance regulations and 
requirements were sharpened through a carrot and stick approach encompassing 
amongst other things performance targets and ratings, access to a new Performance 
Fund, and the heightened threat of unemployment for 'nonperforming' senior 
managers. The clinical performance agenda was pursued via the establishment of new 
national bodies such as the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (now the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence) and the Healthcare Commission (previously 
the Commission for Healthcare Improvement) and locally through the introduction of 
clinical governance. 
Figure 5.1 The Policy Context for Quality Modernisation 
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A summary of the early policy arrangements is depicted pictorially in Figure 5.1. The 
two key interventions designed to define how services for key patient groups should be 
delivered in accordance with best practice are NICE and the NSFs. The National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence was established as a Special Health Authority for 
England and Wales on 1 April 1999. Its remit is to provide patients, health 
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professionals and the public with 'authoritative, robust and reliable guidance' on current 
best practice. Its guidance covers individual health technologies (medicines, medical 
devices, diagnostic techniques, procedures etc) and the clinical management of 
specific conditions. National Service Frameworks are not organisations but statements 
of requirement that elaborate minimum national standards and defined service models 
for a nominated service or care group, programmes to support implementation and 
measures against which performance can be assessed. They are intended to provide a 
systematic approach in the drive to improve standards nationally thereby improving 
equity and quality across health care sectors, in partnership with social care and other 
organisations, and across the nation ((Neath Port Talbot Local Health Board 2003) 
Though primary in England and Wales, these are not only the only initiatives that seek 
to specify minimum standards of care. Such efforts are proliferating both across 
disease groups, e.g. the national Cancer Plan's Improving Outcomes Guidance, and 
across organisations with varying degrees of interest and influence, e.g. the Royal 
Colleges and international disease study groups such as the Global Initiative for 
Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease (GOLD) which was launched in 2001 following an 
NHLBI/WHO sponsored workshop. 
The Commission for Healthcare Improvement (now the Healthcare Commission 
responsible for the Annual Health Check for NHS Trusts), National Performance 
Framework and National Patients and Users Surveys provided a three pronged 
monitoring arrangement whereby performance, across a wide range of measures 
including implementation of NICE and NSF guidance, was monitored from the 
viewpoints of an independent auditor, the Department of Health and end users. These 
measures externalised arrangements for overseeing clinical work to an extent not 
believed possible ten years previously (Harrison 2002; Harrison 1989). Further, via 
clinical governance, Trust managements acquired legislated responsibility for ensuring 
local implementation of national standards of care, thus supplementing clinicians' 
individual responsibilities to their peers and their professional bodies' standards with a 
responsibility to their organisations' management as well. The implementation of 
structures and processes in support of service redesign and delivery, and clinical 
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quality assurance and improvement, was expected to be prioritised in line with local 
health improvement plans (known colloquially as HlmpS). 
Responsibility for production of these plans rested with new local primary care 
organisations (primary care groups, now Trusts) which also had responsibility for 
commissioning care for the local population. These organisations, formed out of the 
previous internal market's Health Authorities and GP fundholders, were to be led by a 
Professional Executive Committee comprised of GPs, nurses and allied health 
professionals and working in partnership with local social services bodies. They were 
charged with undertaking extensive consultation and partnership with local 
communities about their health-related needs and desires. 
Taken as a totality, these arrangements greatly increased expectations that health 
professionals became much more explicitly accountable for the design and delivery of 
services to the Department of Health, the general public, and the local community. The 
accountability of health professionals (to each other) was also increased through the 
introduction of required peer review processes and revalidation procedures for doctors 
announced around this time (though not formally introduced until several years 
subsequent to the announcement). 
The financial and clinical agendas became increasingly interlinked in the government's 
thinking. A plethora of policy documents outlined how the broad initiatives for achieving 
the effectiveness and efficiency goals were to be implemented, preparing the way for 
significant service changes at all levels of the NHS (see for example (Department of 
Health; Department of Health 1998a; Department of Health 1998b; Department of 
Health 1999a; Department of Health 1999b ). At the broader systems level these 
policies include the interlinked initiatives discussed above, the redistribution of 
resources and power into primary care (Department of Health; Department of Health 
1998a; Department of Health 1998b; Department of Health 1999a; Department of 
Health 1999b; Department of Health 2002d), a new casemix based financial framework 
for acute care (Department of Health 2002c), and attempts to create a 'patient centred' 
NHS through increased competition (Department of Health 2002a). This included 
mandatory offering of alternative treatment options to patients by GPs (under the 
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auspices of the PCTs), the establishment of alternate care providers such as the 
establishment of the independent treatment centres (Department of Health 2002b), the 
required awarding of designated percentages of clinical activity to the private sector, 
and, latterly, Foundation Trusts. These policies can and do provide conflicting 
incentives. For instance, whilst the drive for commercial success for both acute 
providers and PCTs, in combination with restricted funding formulas for PCTs and new 
pricing mechanisms, encourages PCTs to keep activity out of acute providers, it 
simultaneously encourages acute providers to increase their activity. This is 
accentuated by Foundation Trusts' ability to operate independently and integrate 
vertically, bringing primary care inside the acute providers. 
At more clinically immediate levels policies have introduced, among other things, new 
performance based contracts for medical professionals (Department of Health 2005; 
Dyson 2003), compulsory audit for secondary care consultants (Barnett 2000; Barnett 
2001 ), dissemination of industrially based production techniques such as process 
mapping and other 'best practice' techniques by the Modernisation Agency. (See for 
example (NHS Modernisation Agency 2004; NHS Modernisation Agency 2005; NHS 
Modernisation Agency Demand Management Group 2002). Underpinning many of 
these policies, and for that reason, the most significant in terms of setting overall 
direction, has been the NHS Plan (Department of Health). 
The NHS Plan 
The NHS Plan provided for steadily increased funding of the NHS over ten years and 
linked this to 'modernisation' of the Service i.e. devolution of responsibility to health 
professionals for reform of systems and local clinical practice centred around the needs 
of the patient. Amongst its promises were: 
• Significant increases in funding targeted via National Service Frameworks 
for particular patient/disease groups, 
• Patient empowerment through more information and greater choice, 
• Changed clinical work patterns, and 
• Quality improvement, tougher standards and a system of incentives for 
achievement. 
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The Plan outlined a real expectation that clinicians would be involved in management 
and would take the lead in setting the agendas for their organisations, particularly 
primary healthcare Trusts. It also laid a clear responsibility on clinicians for 
transforming the health service at the levels at which clinical work is done, 'Radical 
changes are needed in the way staff work to reduce waiting times and deliver modern, 
patient-centred services. This is not a question of staff working harder. It is about 
working smarter to make maximum use of the talents of all the NHS workforce' (ibid, 
p82). This included greater emphasis upon multidisciplinary team working, changed 
role requirements and altered responsibilities e.g. the adoption of prescribing practices 
and minor surgery by nurses and others, and the expansion of responsibility for clinical 
management by nurses, midwives, pharmacists, therapists, scientists and health 
visitors (ibid, pp82-84 ). 
Many participants and observers however would agree that, although there has been 
some progress towards achievement of the NHS Plan, its goals, particularly at the level 
of the wider NHS system, are still long way from routine enactment (Freer 2005b; 
Mullen 2005). The reasons for this are numerous. On an instrumental level, new roles 
ands responsibilities take time to define, design, develop, assess, disseminate, and 
locate within career paths, professional standards, accreditation regulations, 
remuneration packages etc. On a more fundamental level, these changes drive 
multiple and complex changes into the core arrangements of the traditional NHS. 
Whereas the earlier consensus decision-making management strategy required 
multidisciplinary team working only at the most senior levels of organisations, these 
changes require it at all levels within and even across organisations, from senior 
management to the clinical shop floor. 
Ongoing Impact of Traditional Healthcare Structures and Practices 
An extensive body of research has shown relative immutability at practice levels as a 
consequence of a variety of interwoven factors. As discussed earlier a key element is 
doctors' fear of an enforced restriction on clinical freedom and an associated 
renegotiation of clinical autonomy (especially when viewed in the light of the 
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compulsory appraisal of consultants' work and the GMC revalidation 
procedures)(General Medical Council and Department of Health 2002), professional 
defence of narrowly rigid interests (Atkin and lunt 1996; Audit Commission 1992; 
Browne 1997; Gough and Richards 1999; Herk, Klazinga, Schepers, and A.F. 2001; 
Mclaughlin 2001; Neuhauser 1991 ). Other key elements include inadequate larger 
structures and organisational processes, the incentive structures provided by 
regulatory and financial arrangements, and broader social and political issues (Griffin 
2001; Hunter 2004; Ohman, Hagg, and Dahlgren 1999). Finally, pervasive 'sagacious 
conformity' i.e. the appearance by staff of having adopted the latest reforms and 
modernised but avoiding substantive change in order to preserve accepted norms is 
thought to have been widespread (Bradshaw 2003)p100). This is perhaps an 
unavoidable tendency given the volume and pace of change (eighteen reorganisations 
in the twenty years up to 2003), problems in envisaging new ways of doings things, and 
the lack of national platforms for bureaucrats, clinicians and managers to meet, discuss 
and find common ground. Though nominally such platforms exist through 
representative bodies such as the British Medical Association, Royal College of 
Nursing etc, the problem is more fundamental at local levels. Figure 5.1 over the page 
maps the limited range of work related discussions, meetings, and conversational foci 
associated with existing functional conversation spaces within an Australian public 
hospital organised upon traditional lines common in the UK (Degeling, ledema, White, 
Meyerkort, Mallock, Smith, and Mclennan 2004). 
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Figure 5.1 Conversation Spaces in an Australian Functionally Oriented Hospital 
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It shows that 'talk' on the wards primarily concerns individual patients on a disciplinary 
basis. Nurses talk about nursing issues and about individual patients' needs at shift 
change; doctors ta lk about individual patients during ward rounds. Medical 
conversations about medical issues also take place elsewhere and are primarily 
centred on specialties. Managers talk about organisational concerns in offices 
elsewhere and, although some of these meetings do bring together some nurses and 
doctors, the conversational focus is driven by managerial concerns. Abstracted 
bureaucratic/managerial conversations were also common and specifically located. 
Crucially, there was no place where representatives from all professions came together 
at an intermediate and multidisciplinary level to discuss the whole patient journey, 
devise preferred multidisciplinary treatment regimes for nominated patient groups, 
discuss roles and responsibilities, or jointly review treatment by all professionals across 
a clinical condition . Nor was there a forum to provide a logical interconnection between 
the highly individualised, patient and profession specific conversations of health 
professionals and the highly aggregated and organisationally oriented conversations of 
managers and policy authorities. The only place where these types of conversations 
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could have taken place was the externally oriented benchmarking groups. But these 
focused on overall activity, length of stay etc rather than the composition of clinical 
care, its coordination or its outcomes. Finding new ways of working therefore also 
requires finding new ways of talking, new places in which to talk, and new means for 
authorising such talk. Without these supports, new initiatives risk falling by the wayside 
through lack of shared understanding or becoming trapped by the old patterns. 
The short history of clinical governance in most NHS Trusts illustrates the point. 
Clinical governance was conceived as being local in its orientation and its operation. It 
was designed to integrate financial control, service performance, and clinical quality in 
ways that will engage clinicians and generate service improvements. It was therefore a 
mechanism for locally ensuring clinician engagement in the pursuit of efficiency and 
effectiveness. It was intended to inspire and enthuse and create a no-blame learning 
environment characterised by excellent leadership, highly valued staff, and active 
partnership between staff and patients (Degeling, Hill, and Kennedy 1999; Scally and 
Donaldson 1998). However beyond the understanding that there needed to be a 
committee that reported to the CEO few, if any, policy makers, bureaucrats, clinicians 
or managers were clear about what was required for clinical governance to operate in 
practice. A brief reading of several of the key publications on implementation at the 
time, including most critically the advice published by CHI (Degeling, Maxwell, 
Macbeth, Kennedy, and Coyle 2003b), quickly conveys the sense that the 
commentators were 'talking around the topic' unable to give a definition of the essence 
of clinical governance beyond a committee structure that reported to the CEO 
(Goodman 2001; O'Kelly and Maxwell2001; Swage 2000). 
The resulting implementation of clinical governance in Trusts was in keeping with the 
traditional need of NHS administrators and managers to manage issues and inputs; 
clinical governance structures adopted throughout the NHS in England and Wales 
overwhelmingly emphasised the individual components of clinical governance as 
shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Prevailing Silo Structure of Clinical Governance 
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The resulting silo structures meet the formal arrangements required by government but 
their focus is upon individual issues. These issues based reporting structures currently 
in place (risk management committees, professional education committees, quality 
assurance committees, complaints committees etc) do not equip or support clinicians 
to consider the full range of clinical , organisational , and interpersonal processes that 
are entailed in treating a patient with a chronic disease or requiring coronary artery 
bypass graft. Rather than supporting the coordination of care components and the 
integration of clinical and organisational aspects into a coherent framework they dissect 
the clinical process into abstracted issues, none of which can be satisfactorily 
addressed in isolation from the components and the wider internal systems of care 
providers. For example, it does not assist a cancer care team to monitor the 
components, timeliness, coordination, effectiveness, efficiency, and safety of care for 
patients undergoing treatment for cancer. Nor does it assist clinicians identify and 
minimise the system errors underlying an estimated 59% of adverse events in other 
Western health care systems (Wilson, Runciman, Gibbard, Harrison, and Hamilton 
1996). 
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Thus the current structures of the NHS, even within clinical directorates, continue to 
reproduce two core absences in the NHS - the lack of a clinical product focus and the 
lack of platforms from which to develop it. This prevents the prospective integration of 
the components of clinical work and governance at the level at which clinical work is 
actually carried out. 'Governance' of clinical work becomes another enactment of the 
traditional separation of managers and clinicians; it is a managerial exercise with little 
direct clinical relevance and providing little evidence about where either efficiency or 
effectiveness improvements should be directed. This diminution of the potency of 
clinical governance has been further compounded by the (anecdotal) tendency for 
Trusts to structure the content of clinical governance activities, such as clinical audits, 
complaint investigation and staff development, around whatever needs to be done to 
achieve the latest performance targets. It has not been used to develop a clinically 
prioritised and systematic analysis of how clinical work is organised, performed and 
assessed. The inspection changes that accompanied the amalgamation of various 
inspection agencies into the Healthcare Commission and its introduction of seven key 
pillars of corporate performance (safety, clinical and cost effectiveness, governance, 
patient focus, accessible and responsive care, care environment and amenities, public 
health) have gone some way in remedying this. However formats for multidisciplinary 
working still tend to have to work across the grain of traditional healthcare patterns. 
Pursuing Clinical Engagement in Management 
Clinical engagement requires clinicians to see the value for their patients and their own 
work experience of greater involvement in management. Efforts to increase clinician 
participation in the wider activities of the organisation will therefore need to pursue 
strategies carefully designed to create 'space' for conversations that link patient and 
organisational concerns, draw clinicians into wider conceptions of clinical work, its 
conduct and its management. Achieving the deep structural and practice change 
required to facilitate "conversations" requires careful, even inspirational, renegotiation 
of existing practices within a coherent and professionally acceptable framework 
(Degeling and Carr 2004; Degeling et al. 2003a; Ham 2003). Specifically it requires 
understanding and coherent action on three fronts; firstly, what motivates professionals 
in their daily work, secondly, about methods for achieving an integrated, 
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multidisciplinary approach to care delivery, and thirdly, in developing organisational 
structures that will support multidisciplinary professionals in designing, delivering, 
reviewing and improving care. On the first of these, research has shown that achieving 
change in NHS organisations most often requires that doctors and their clinical 
colleagues can see benefits for their own practice and for patients, that they have a 
sense they are leading the change process rather than being driven by it (Bowens and 
McNulty 1999; Ham and Hunter 1988; Joss and Kogan 1995); financial reward is a 
secondary, though strong, motivation. A demonstrated potential for achieving 
improvements in the quality of care is also a potent motivator for professional 
acceptance of the need for organisational and process change (Chantler 1988; Walshe 
and Offen 2001 ). 
Integrated Care Pathways as a Means for Clinician Engagement 
As mentioned earlier in this work, one potentially useful method for achieving 
integrated multidisciplinary approaches to clinical work is more routine use of ICPs. 
The definition of ICPs has been evolving over time with growing understanding of their 
potential consequently there is no one agreed definition of an ICP. The Department of 
Health uses a privately copyrighted definition that fails to include any reference to the 
financial dimension of clinical work. However the literature in total suggests that the 
concept of ICPs is maturing towards a definition as systematically developed written 
statements of the agreed sequence of the phases and events of care for specified 
clinical conditions that, in the view of clinicians (medical, nursing, allied health) and 
managers and in light of the available evidence, resource constraints and experience of 
patients, are essential for achieving nominated outcomes. They are developed in the 
light of available evidence, stated resource constraints and experience of patients 
about which care events are essential for achieving nominated outcomes for specified 
clinical conditions. Quality and outcome indicators are incorporated into the pathways. 
The delivery of care is routinely recorded and performance is assessed against these 
specified standards for the sequencing, delivery and outcomes of care. 
ICPs were initially strongly advocated in the nursing literature (Borokowski 1994; Del 
Togno-Armansco 1993; Guiliano and Poirier 1991; Johnson 1997; Selwood 2000; 
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Zander 1988a; Zander 1988b). Increasingly, the medical literature also reports an 
extensive array of benefits to patients and health professionals from such techniques 
(Armon, MacFaul, Hemingway, and Werneke 2004; Board, Brennan, and Caplan 2000; 
Gendron, Lai, Weinstein, Chalian, Husbands, Wolf, DiDonato, and Weber 2001 ). A 
growing body of evidence suggests that benefits include a strengthening of the 
evidential basis of clinical practice and outcomes, improved patient and professional 
communication, improved clinical risk assessment, improved care delivery, and 
resource savings without adverse clinical impact. (For examples (Ellis 1997; Ellis and 
Johnson 1999; Jones 1999; NHS National Electronic Library for Health 2005)). A large 
multi-site study of the organisation and management of care for various clinical 
conditions found that sites that had implemented clinical management methods 
oriented towards ICPs had better clinical and resource outcomes than sites with lesser 
ICP orientations (Degeling et al. 2000b). 
Although they specify the agreed outline of care, ICPs are not immutable documents 
setting out inviolable treatment regimens. When the care process varies from that 
described in the pathway, the reasons for the variance are recorded and analysed. The 
analysed variances, together with any changes in organisational circumstances, 
become the focus of structured across-profession conversations regarding: 
• The points and extent to which the care being provided for this condition 
varies from that outlined in the clinical pathway, 
• The direction and extent to which these variations have affected service 
integration, the experience of patient, quality, safety, risk, clinical 
effectiveness and technical efficiency, 
• The clinical, organizational and behavioural factors that produced these 
variations, 
• Whether the variations are best resolved (or in the case of beneficial 
variations, routinely adopted) by changing the clinical, organisational or 
professional environment or by changing the pathway. 
Thus an ICP is more than a document about a series of care practices. It's a piece of 
information technology specifically designed to enable clinicians, in a time period as close 
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cluingto real time as is sensible given the volume of cases, to jointly retain and improve 
control over both the conduct and outcomes of their work. For this reason, I CPs appear to 
be a key element in successful reform of the NHS. Further, by specifying of the 
conduct, organisation and products of clinical work yet allowing clinicians to exercise 
autonomy and clinical judgement to vary from the pathways (including withdrawing 
patients from pathways) and recording their reasons for so doing, ICPs should enable 
greater understanding by management of clinical decision making processes and 
greater understanding by clinicians of the wider implications of their care activities. 
Such understandings should help to bridge the ideological clash between clinicians and 
the NHS healthcare management. Moreover, since they include and raise the profile of 
healthcare professionals who have traditionally been the handmaidens of medicine, 
namely nursing and allied health professionals, they also contain the potential to 
address resolve some of the tensions between clinical professions. In summary, ICPs 
provide a 'shop floor' means for ensuring all relevant practitioners are included in 
healthcare debates, discussions, design, development, delivery systems, and devolved 
governance of the care they jointly provide. 
However for this to occur, ICPs will need appropriate authorisation and coherent 
institutional structures within which to embed them. Despite the growing use of ICPs in 
the NHS, the traditional structures, designed to enforce professional separation, tend to 
enable only piecemeal or individually championed approaches to pathways (Sorensen 
2002). Refocusing clinical governance around ICP based structures provides one way 
of providing support. Examples of how this might be done are provided in Figured 5.3 
and 5.4. 
97 
Figure 5.3 ICP-Based Clinical Governance Arrangements in Acute Sector 
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Figure 5.4 ICP-Based Clinical Governance Structure in Primary Care 
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Some Issues regarding organisational support for this approach will need to be 
addressed at a level once removed from the direct performance of individual instances 
of clin ical work, such as 'Who has responsibility for implementing ICPs? Everyone and 
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hence no-one? Or is there a first among equals?', 'How could an ICP clinical 
management system be naturalised within and across organisations?' and 'What then 
is the role of officially designated clinical managers?' 
An immediate issue here relates to competency and education for both clinicians and 
managers. A large number of doctors (and other health professionals) move into 
important and generally part-time managerial and leadership roles with little, if any, 
management training99 . Further, traditional managerial training emphasises generic 
management traits such as budgeting and personnel management. These skills are of 
use in managing the inputs of a clinical department (funds, staff etc) but they do not 
equip health professionals to conceptualise 'doing' clinical work on the product line 
basis that ICPs provide. 
Market research conducted for new postgraduate courses in clinical management, 
designed to provide these types of skills, revealed that although clinicians were 
beginning to recognise the need for these types of skills, few senior managers saw the 
importance of the distinction. Senior managers and CEOs were reticent to support 
skills in producing a product focused approach to clinical management preferring to 
send clinical staff on generic management programmes such as Masters of Business 
Administration (Woodholm and Associates 2005). Despite common acknowledgement 
that doctors, by and large, simply aren't interested in abstracted concepts divorced 
from their clinical underpinnings, and that this has repeatedly thwarted the ambition of 
successive governments to attract the medical profession into generic managerial 
posts, managers continue to see the problem in terms of lack of knowledge (Bradshaw 
2003). But the lack of knowledge is two-sided. CEOs appear to have taken on Griffiths' 
recommendation that the NHS should invest in the types of work measurement and 
evaluation systems, performance targets and customer focus without a clear idea of 
how to achieve these. They tend to see these initiatives as stand alone issues, missing 
the product management emphasis which is core to success in other businesses. This 
failure to see the deeper connection between clinical and managerial provides another 
demonstration of an entrenched functionality in the NHS mindset. 
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Beyond the immediate concerns of the delivery of care for specified clinical conditions 
and patient populations, a whole systems approach to healthcare requires clinicians 
and clinical managers to have considerable understanding about healthcare 
organisations within their local health economy and region. But, as noted above, the 
NHS is moving away from a conception of itself as a unified organisation. This 
tendency is gathering momentum as Foundation Trusts become more common and the 
competitive ethos becomes more embedded. Implementing the changes envisaged in 
the NHS Plan requires clinicians and their managers in both primary care and NHS 
Trusts to understand the roles of other organisations, the values of health professionals 
working in different settings, and the needs of patients. Having understood these, the 
Plan requires staff to work together for the patients' best care. By focusing on the work 
to be done rather than the larger environments and building from there, ICPs offer a 
potential means for coordinating this efforts at the level of patients rather than the 
previous pattern of attempting to coordinate services at a level distanced from delivery. 
The above discussion provides an example of how ICPs can embed and naturalise 
clinician engagement in the wider policies of the NHS, simultaneously linking efficiency 
and effectiveness across the various agendas. As the discussion above has outlined, 
effective operational management within and across NHS organisations is foundational 
to the success of the NHS Plan and the modernisation of the NHS. Recognition of this 
in a more competitive environment will assist organisations in pursuing improvements 
in timeliness, appropriateness and access to quality care, ideally providing a better 
service for the same price. Pathway based clinical management links these concepts 
by providing the framework for specifying what care can be provided, by whom and 
where. 
PCTs can fulfil their responsibilities for clinical standards and service improvements by 
setting parameters that define 'acceptable' pathways of care and (therefore) 
'acceptable' providers from which services will be commissioned. Patients can then 
choose a service provider based upon specified standards of care and outcomes and 
factors relevant to their personal situations such as convenience of location, waiting 
times and care support. This has the additional benefit of allowing PCTs/GPs to offer 
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considered, yet constrained, choice. A capped number of organisations with whom 
PCTs (or associated GP practices) will negotiate should produce the additional benefit 
of reducing transaction costs in service commissioning (although the drive for patients 
to have complete freedom in choosing a care provider significantly erodes, if not 
obliterates, this potential). 
Success in these activities however requires the active involvement of patients, their 
families, and all relevant clinicians and other care providers in systems development. 
There is accumulating evidence to suggest that the hierarchical imposition of externally 
developed systems will result in failure to achieve what is expected. The evidence 
comes from the: 
• Common failure of change programs to produce the desired changes within 
more goal coherent commercial organisations (Pratt, Gordon, and Plumping 
1999), 
• Poor returns from major IT development projects, despite the productivity 
and service improvement claims made for them (and the high hopes and 
vast capital invested in them) (Landauer 1995), and the 
• Fact that technical failure accounts for only about 20% of 'failed (IT) 
projects' (Gad 1995). 
Failure in the remaining 80% of unsuccessful projects is therefore attributable to a 
melange of social/historical, cultural, psychological, political, professional, legal and 
work practice based factors that shape the conduct and structuring of relations in the 
work settings (Gad 1995). In health settings these include, at least in part, the 
undermining of the functionality of the policy community by a failure to adequately 
include patient groups at senior and local policy setting levels (Salter 2001 ). 
Because of all these influences, it is imperative that clinicians have significant 
involvement in the design, development, implementation, use and governance of 
systems, including information systems, that are (supposedly) designed to support their 
work (Ham, Kipping, and Mcleod 2003). Together with patients, they are the people 
best placed to map the complex range of factors that are integral to service provision, 
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identify their requirements, and design and implement required improvements. Thus, 
whether the focus is information support, design and management of care provision, or 
new accountability structures clinician involvement is crucial to success. 
Summary 
Several policy strands provide impetus towards a coordinated product-based approach 
to care delivery and management. These approaches are widely utilised in the 
competitive US managed healthcare industry for several decades to integrate 
effectiveness and efficiency albeit primarily from a profit motive (Johnson and McGinty 
1989; McCormick 1991; Ruffner 1986) (Savary and Crawford-Mason 2006). At the UK 
national level these policy strands include the disease management and practice foci of 
the National Institute of Clinical Excellence, National Service Frameworks, and some 
initiatives from (the former) Modernisation Agency's. The commissioning function of 
primary care Trusts offers a more local mechanism for this particularly when combined 
with internal organisational structural initiatives closer to or at the clinical level. These 
initiatives extend from a more developmental model of clinical governance, through 
disease-specific local 'collaboratives' and 'networks', a range of process related 
initiatives, the NHS National Electronic Library for Health's collection of ICPs, and the 
provision of information technology providing IT support for ICPs. Taken together, 
these initiatives have the potential to support a movement towards more integrative, 
product based approaches to healthcare management. 
However the Labour government has been criticised for producing disconnected policy 
initiatives rather than coherent policy (Caiman, Hunter, and May 2004; Gray 2004) and 
in recent years this criticism has been perhaps more apt that it was previously. The 
criticisms have some validity in that, although most of the fundamentals for a 
professionally led, product focused approach to healthcare and hospital management 
are in place, DoH policies, organisational management structures, and shop floor 
practices still operate fundamentally within the traditional mentality and structures of 
issues-based functionalism and tripartite professionalism. It is apparent that, within 
almost every policy initiative, opportunities to integrate efficiency and effectiveness 
concerns and to facilitate greater professional involvement in the management of the 
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NHS through the use of product focused management approaches are not recognised 
and capitalised upon. The failure by the NHS to capitalise upon these incentives 
appears to stem from multiple sources. At the Departmental and Strategic Health 
Authority levels these sources include 'mechanistic and reductionist thinking' 
consequent to the need for governments to retain command and control of a highly 
politicised public sector institution (Chapman 2004) and a lack of experience in real 
world delivery by the centre (Select Committee on Public Adminstration 2003). At an 
organisational level these sources include the impact of a pervasive target culture still 
substituting for real commercial thinking (Straughan 2003), a lack of organisational 
learning (Brunnson and Olsen 1993; Meyer and Rowan 1971) which contributes to 
sagacious conformity, and an entrenched functionally in the NHS mindset associated 
with an inability to see beyond the realms of current practices. Specific, purposeful, and 
mutually coherent policies across all levels of the NHS in pursuit and support of 
improved management of care, its coordination and outcome for patients and their 
families are needed. Without these, the likelihood is that effective care coordination will 
remain a relatively piecemeal practice - a few case managers here, a few pathways 
there -with patients and families providing the glue that holds their care together. 
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Chapter Six 
Two Trusts 
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Introduction 
When similar projects have dissimilar outcomes in two organisations several questions 
immediately come to mind. Among these are: How similar are the two organisations in 
histories, context, and structures? Do differences between these predispose success in 
one Trust and not in the other? This chapter therefore examines the recent histories, 
contexts, and relevant initiatives within the study Trusts to begin to address these 
questions. 
The chapter shows that at face value the two Trusts were/are similar in many ways. 
They are both relatively large Trusts providing general district hospital services on two 
sites. In each case one predecessor Trust had a reputation for strong fiscal 
management whereas the second predecessor Trust transferred a significant debt into 
the new Trust. The study Trusts also each had a predecessor Trust which had been 
one of the six national pilot sites for the Resource Management Initiative in the late 
'80s. Hence both Trusts had longer experience than others in enticing doctors into 
greater managerial responsibility. Both Trusts were structured around clinical 
directorates. Although they interpreted these differently, the Trusts had similar 
expectations about what the clinical directorate structure was expected to achieve. Both 
were/had participated in a well funded, NHS management-authorised, three year 
research and development project to 'modernise' care delivery over and above that 
available to other trusts in the NHS. 
Form an outsider's perspective, the Trusts differed from each other most clearly in 
terms of their immediate communities. Yorkshire as a region has experienced much 
more sustained immigration over the past 50 years than has the northeast. The local 
communities which the Calderdale and Huddersfield Foundation NHS Trust serves 
have become much more ethnically mixed than many in the northeast and, in this 
regard at least, have experienced a greater degree of change. The second aspect of 
difference between the two trusts related to the intensity of local political activity. For 
the last ten years many local communities in the northeast have been represented at 
national level by local members of parliament with senior governmental responsibilities. 
These local members are not always averse to what locals sometimes regard as 
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'interfering' in significant local institutions though the motives for this 'interference' may 
be variously attributed to selfish re-electioneering, politicians doing their 'thing', and to 
genuine desire to make a positive difference locally. The influence of the local member 
has been more marked in Hartlepool than in most communities due to the prominence 
of his national and European roles, his close friendship with the former Prime Minister 
who held the adjoining electorate, and his personal style. This influence was a 
significant contributor to ongoing reviews of service provision within the Tees Valley 
region. At the commencement of the CMD project, all NHS organisations in the Tees 
Valley were participating in the Tees-Wide Review of services which was expected to 
recommend realignment and redistribution of acute hospital services north and south of 
the River Tees. Subsequent to this review North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust was 
subject to two other reviews of acute services; the third of these, the Darzi review, was, 
rightly or wrongly, attributed by many locals as having been instigated by the member 
for Hartlepool on purely political grounds. 
At the outset of my research the structural similarities between the Trusts appeared 
more significant in terms of potential research findings than the differences. The 
periodic reviews in the Tees region seemed to be simply more obvious manifestations 
of the highly politicised operating environment common to all north east Trusts with 
which I had worked in some capacity. Further, during the conduct of the CMD project, 
staff in Calderdale and Huddersfield Foundation NHS Trust had described their own 
experiences of managing difficult local politics. Thus the key factor for this dissertation 
was that the similar histories and structures of the two study Trusts suggested neither 
Trust was predisposed towards success in changing how clinical work was organised 
and coordinated than the other. This, in turn, suggested that the difference in outcomes 
was more likely to be the result of internal factors (structures, strategies and processes) 
associated with the management of the organisation as a whole and with the 
management of clinical work. 
Despite their apparent organisational similarity, the Trusts did adopt different 
approaches to the management of key events and activities in their recent history, 
particularly managerial processes immediately prior and subsequent to amalgamation. 
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These differences appear to be crucial to the manner in which senior management 
operated, to the progress of the Clinical Management Development project within each 
Trust, and to how each Trust approaches the coordination and management of clinical 
work. 
Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust 
Overview of Services and Location 
Calderdale and Huddersfield Foundation NHS Trust (CHFT) formed in April 2001 following 
the merger of Calderdale Healthcare NHS Trust and the Huddersfield Healthcare Services 
NHS Trust. At amalgamation it provided 24-hour acute (general district hospital) services 
on two main sites, the Calderdale Royal Hospital, Halifax (CRH) and Huddersfield Royal 
Infirmary, Huddersfield, (HRI), and a mixture of community and inpatient services at St 
Luke's Hospital, Huddersfield (SLH). 
Halifax and Huddersfield are approximately 8 miles distant north-south as the crow flies. 
They are divided geopolitically and psychologically by a high ridge which runs north-south 
along which the M62 travels and which also marks the boundaries of the Metropolitan 
Boroughs of Calderdale and Kirklees. The Calderdale Royal Hospital (CRH) is 
approximately one and a half miles south of Halifax town centre. The hospital opened in 
April 2001 (on the same day as the amalgamated Trust began operations) and replaced 
the existing hospital on that site, the Royal Halifax Infirmary and Northowram Hospital. It 
was constructed through a £16m PFI arrangement; the physical asset is owned by the 
Catalyst Healthcare consortium and is maintained by Bevis Lend Lease Facilities 
Management Division. Non-clinical services including cleaning, catering, laundry and linen, 
car parking, security, switchboard services and portering are provided by ISS Mediclean. 
Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust is responsible only for the provision of 
all clinical services. This arrangement has led to greatly increased facility costs at the CRH 
site. 
The Huddersfield Royal Infirmary (HRI) is approximately three miles west from 
Huddersfield town centre. The hospital opened in 1965 and is owned and maintained by 
the Trust. The main hospital building has not aged well despite several upgrades over the 
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years which have also enabled the establishment of new clinical and staff services, 
specialist wards, laboratory services, and a new pharmacy manufacturing unit. 
St Luke's Hospital was built in 1965 is situated a few miles south of HRI. In 2007 the St 
Luke's site provides collocated services for South West Yorkshire Mental Health Trust, 
Huddersfield Primary Care Trust (previously South Huddersfield Primary Care Trust and 
Huddersfield Central Primary Care Trusts) as well as CHFT. Services provided here by 
CHFT include elderly complex care (73 beds), dietetics, neurophysiology, physiotherapy, 
speech and language therapy, rehabilitation, wheelchair services (which covers 
Huddersfield & Dewsbury), X-Ray services (primarily for direct referrals from GPs), and 
some outpatients services. 
(The establishment of three local primary care Trusts, Calderdale PCT, Central 
Huddersfield PCT and South Huddersfield PCT and a mental health Trust one year after 
amalgamation, in April 2002, meant the Trust underwent a further significant restructuring 
at this time. Many of its experienced staff who provided mental health services and 
services in the community were transferred to the newly formed Trusts. The establishment 
of the PCTs meant that the Trust needed to coordinate its services between and across 
six organisations, each with its own priorities and statutory requirements, clinical priorities 
and internal agendas. These organisations are CHFT, the three PCTs and two local 
authorities, one centred in Huddersfield and one centred on Halifax.) 
The Trust initially bid for Foundation Trust status in 2004 however the bid was deferred to 
due to technical financial issues arising in large part from the inherited debt and the 
financing terms entered into by a predecessor organisation to finance the development of 
the CRH. In 2007 the Trust provides services to more than 420,000 people, has 
approximately 5,300 staff and an operating budget of just over £200 million. Some 
services, especially its informatics services, but increasingly also some of its clinical 
services, are shared services operating across the Calderdale and Huddersfield health 
economy which includes the Primary Care Trusts and Mental Health Trust. Most of these 
shared services are managed by CHFT. 
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Organisational Structure 
Figure 6.1 overleaf shows that the Trust is structured into five divisions, four clinical 
divisions and one corporate division. 
Figure 6.1 Organisational Structure of Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS 
Foundation Trust *Source:http://www.CHFT.nhs .uk/ 
Calderdale and Huddersfleld NHS Trust 
The clinical divisions, further divided into various directorates, are Children and 
Women's Services (maternity, gynaecology and children), Medicine and Elderly (which 
includes cancer, heart problems, diabetes, services for older people and therapy 
services), Surgery and Anaesthetics (including theatres, intensive care and Accident 
and Emergency), and Diagnostic and Therapeutic services (including pharmacy). The 
fifth division contains the corporate directorates that support the overall running of the 
organisation. These directorates have both centralised functions and teams located run 
across the clinical divisions hence, as well as having a central location, some members 
of this division are also located in each of the clinical divisions (shown diagrammatically 
as arrows directed into the clinical divisions). These include finance managers and the 
clinical governance teams. In a subtle but significant symbolic accenting of the 
website's proclamation, "the focus of the Trust is on clinically-led services with 
consultants and clinicians taking the lead role in the management of the organisation", 
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the Trust's web pages outline the clinical divisions before corporate division is even 
mentioned. 
The operations of the Trust are overseen by the Trust Board (supported by various 
committees including an Audit and Remuneration Committee). The Board ensures the 
Trust both has a clear strategic direction and fulfils its statutory responsibilities in 
relation to finance, governance, clinical quality and partnership working. It also plays a 
part in validating the performance of the organisation via the Executive Management 
Board (another sub committee) which is responsible for developing and operationalising 
strategic and business service objectives in response to local needs. The Executive 
Management Board is comprised of the Executive Team (chief executive, medical 
director, director of service development, director of nursing, director of finance, director 
of IM& T, director of personnel and development, and head of organisational 
development) plus the medical directors of each division. This Board is underpinned by 
the Clinical Management Structure (CMS), Clinical Modernisation Forum (CMF) and 
various (functional) Standing Sub-Committees such as occupational health and safety 
etc. 
The CMS is the formal organisational arrangement for managing clinical work 
hierarchically within the Trust. It is essentially a series of management triads (medical, 
nursing and general management) devolved through out the organisation. Each division 
has a triad management arrangement as does each directorate within each division. 
Within the directorates are multidisciplinary clinical teams. This devolved clinical 
managerial structure was created at amalgamation by the CEO with an aspiration to 
promote a culture in which clinicians are at the heart of decision making, establish a 
common clinical management across the two hospitals, and align and integrate work 
flows across sites and divisions. Reducing unnecessary duplication in services and 
variation in clinical practice, and improving the coordination of clinical work, were seen 
as key contributions to the attainment of these goals. To this end, a series of regular 
meetings between clinical and general managers was introduced. The divisional 
managerial triads meet monthly to discuss basic operational performance such as 
finance and activity. Every six months they meet to discuss performance against all 
110 
required indicators i.e. the basic operational indicators plus patient safety, complaints, 
mortality rates, etc. Since 2005, they also discuss clinical pathways in terms of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the current patient journey, how performance on this can 
be better measured, and whether additional clinical conditions should be pathwayed. 
Within the Divisions the assistant (general management) directors meet monthly whilst 
the directorate triads meet quarterly. Once a year the Divisional triads meet 
(individually) with the Executive team to discuss all aspects of divisional performance. 
The CMF operates in tandem with the CMS. It is a series of clinical meetings across the 
matrix, attended by clinicians and clinical managers to discuss and agree matters which 
cross the divisions. There are also regular meetings between the divisional and 
directorate triads and other senior health professionals across the wider health 
economy. Other matrix meetings for clinicians occur on an ad hoc basis as needed. 
The CMF was formally introduced subsequent to the Clinical Management 
Development project (March 2002-March 2005). 
The chief executive of the combined Trust was appointed in March 2001. She 
previously had been chief executive for Huddersfield NHS Trust for four years and has 
had more than 25 years experience in the health service, included working in the North 
West and in the West Midlands. Once appointed the CEO decided, with the Board's 
agreement, that members of the Executive Management Board should be drawn from 
the two predecessor Trusts and that (as far as realistic given competency 
requirements) senior management positions across the executive and the divisions 
should be drawn equally from the two previous Trusts. All senior organisational and 
clinical managers would be responsible for operations Trust-wide i.e. there would be no 
site specific management. She also suggested (but did not require) that each new 
appointee's office would be located on the alternative site to that from which they had 
previously operated. Despite the voluntary nature of this suggestion, the senior 
managers adopted this practice. Administrative offices followed the senior managers 
and senior management and Trust-wide meetings rotated between the Huddersfield 
and Halifax sites. (Five years down the track all but two executive managers have 
relocated back to HRI due the difficulty of getting the senior management team to 
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function smoothly when they were geographically separated. The four divisional 
managements however are split between the two sites.) 
These decisions were taken in recognition of the powerful symbolic statement they 
made regarding the intention and commitment of the Trust's senior management to 
create an integrated and united organisation. The arrangements implied that no site 
was 'better' than the other and that favouritism based on previous work relationships 
would not be acceptable. It also put the managers in good stead for future reviews and 
potential reconfigurations of clinical services (as managers would not be asking 
clinicians to do something that they had not already done themselves). The immediate 
outcome for various departments was not popular amongst all staff but there was a 
grudging recognition within the Trust that this was a 'fair' arrangement. 
Vision and Values 
At the commencement of the CMD project (2002) the Trust's vision (as presented on its 
website and in various community oriented Trust publications) was summarised as: 
"Our ambition is to be the hospital and employer of choice. To achieve this, our 
underpinning vision and values are: 
• Ensuring our clinical processes are patient centred, 
• Attracting and keeping the best staff, 
• Developing strong leaders at every level who practise and encourage 
healthy behaviours, 
• Creating partnerships and improving collaboration with others, 
• Having clear arrangements for the development of policy and strategy, 
• Having clear performance management processes." 
Three guiding principles for implementing the amalgamation of the two Trusts into a 
unified corporate body were adopted - 'services, not sites', devolution, and clinical 
partnership (with management). 
At first glance this first vision statement may appear no different to that of many 
organisations, whether in the NHS or elsewhere except perhaps to say that these are 
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not values per se but strategies for achieving (unspecified) values. However it could be 
argued that this vision focused on the organisation in a self-serving way. There was no 
mention of who are the intended beneficiaries of the Trust's goals, the values to be 
demonstrated in how those beneficiaries are to be treated, or the principles guiding 
decisions whether on a strategic basis or in day to day working. The statement could 
just as be easily be construed as a statement of senior managers' goals to ensure their 
own performance or to ensure the smooth running of the organisation and management 
of staff as anything to do with patients or the provision of healthcare services. 
In 2005 the Trust changed its vision and value statements to: 
"Providing The Best for Our Patients: At Calderdale & Huddersfield NHS Foundation 
Trust our aim is to provide the very best care for patients. This will mean that: 
• We provide safe care in a clean environment, 
• Your care is designed to meet your needs, not ours, and delivered as close 
to your home as possible, 
• Our staff are competent and compassionate, friendly and welcoming, 
• We work together with you, your family and carers to help you take 
responsibility for your health and wellbeing, 
• Our treatments are up to date and we embrace change, innovation and new 
technologies to make sure we remain at the leading edge of care, 
• We are part of the communities we serve, working together to create and 
sustain health and wealth for the future". 
A motto was also adopted "Your Choice, Your Health, Your Care". 
These changes in the vision and values statement of the Trust put the emphasis much 
more squarely on the needs of patients, the values to be demonstrated in caring for 
patients, principles for both guiding strategic and operational decisions, and stating a 
commitment to be part of, and to serve, the local communities. It clearly conveys a 
belief that the Trust exists only to serve the local community through meeting the health 
needs of the citizens, to the best of the staffs ability. When the Director of 
Organisational Development was asked about the rationale for the change (to verify my 
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interpretation of what was being conveyed in the two vision statements), she 
volunteered that the original vision statement was a part of a three year strategy to 
create a new organisation. Towards the end of the three years the Trust undertook an 
extensive (eventually almost two year) consultation with staff about where they wanted 
the organisation to go in future and how they wanted it to represent itself. 
This commitment to patients is amply demonstrated on the Trust website. Its pages 
portray an open and transparent organisation giving considerable thought and attention 
to patient needs. Thus the Trust's website contains explanations for decisions that 
patients might find questionable e.g. visiting hours are not just listed but explanations 
are provided of why visiting hours are restricted. It provides an extensive list of links to 
other health organisations, patient support groups, health advice including nutritional 
advice, organisations providing help for victims of domestic abuse, clinical policies, 
contact details for various government departments and much else. In addition the 
Trust makes various documents available on its web pages regarding its own 
performance and strategies, including its Annual Reports, 'Core and developmental 
standards declaration' to the Healthcare Commission, Board minutes, and Foundation 
Trust and Patient Services Plans. The web site also provides photos of senior 
managers and Board members as well as information about their responsibilities, 
backgrounds and special interests. Detailed information about the structure of each 
division and the services, strategies and key personnel, including all consultants within 
each directorate is also provided. 
One final signal towards the priority of patients' views is that the Trust's management 
has recently decided to abandon efforts within the two local communities to 'rebrand' 
the hospitals as part of an integrated Trust. They have accepted that, although staff 
now tend to see the organisation as one Trust, the communities' loyalties are to their 
local hospitals. Feedback from local groups revealed that attempting to promote the 
Trust above the hospitals caused residents to see the Trust's foci as being managerial 
structures rather than clinical quality and policies rather than people. Since the Trust's 
role organisationally is to facilitate and ensure the provision of care, management 
decided the Trust as an "organisation" could afford to be relatively 'invisible', provided 
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the publics believed that their hospitals were providing high quality care. This strategy 
may come under strain however as the Trust pursues its current reconfiguration and 
delineates service provision between the two sites. 
Performance Review 
The Trust has a history of strong performance in annual performance reviews, receiving 
three stars in 2003, two stars in 2004 and three stars in 2005. In 2006 it attained a 
'good' rating from the Healthcare Commission for both services and use of resources 
and was commended for its strong evidence of high quality performance for at least the 
previous two years. 
Evidence of Commitment to the Coordination and Management of Clinical Work 
The Trust's formal organisational structure provides a clear signal that the management 
of clinical work and its coordination throughout the Trust has always been central to the 
Trust's day to day and strategic operations. From the Trust's establishment, key 
members of the Trust (including the Organisational Development Director) had a keen 
interest in the development of integrated care pathways. With the CEO's support a 
Clinical Governance Support Unit was created to pursue this strategy. This unit is 
based within the Corporate Division as a department of the Medical Directors' Office but 
has teams located within the divisions. Its role is to advance clinical governance, 
promote continuous improvement in service delivery, and support and develop the work 
of the clinical networks. (The Medical Director's Office provides a number of functions, 
which includes clinical audit, integrated care pathways, research and development, 
clinical guidelines.) The CGSU's work was supported by a Trust-wide policy on the 
development, implementation and training for ICPs and included a six step programme 
for progressing ICP development. These teams' work was well coordinated and 
supported throughout the Trust with resources, team and governance structures, staff 
training programmes for those new to ICPs, complete with six-step manuals about how 
to develop and implement new pathways. These structures and teams for developing 
ICPs were already in place at the start of the Clinical Management Development 
project. 
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North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust 
Overview of Services and Location 
North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust (NTH) commenced operations in April 1999 
following the merger of North Tees Health NHS Trust and Hartlepool and East Durham 
NHS Trust. Like CHFT, NTH provided 24-hour acute (general district hospital) services 
on two main sites, the University Hospital of North Tees in Stockton on Tees, Halifax 
(UHNT) and the University Hospital of Hartlepool (UHH) in Hartlepool. (Both hospitals 
were renamed in May 2001 after the Trust was awarded 'University Hospital' status by 
Newcastle University's Medical School). The Trust provides some outpatients services 
at a third site, the Peterlee Community Hospital, in Peterlee to the north of Hartlepool. 
The two main sites lie 14.5 miles apart. There are no significant geographical features 
providing a natural divide between the two sites however the two town districts have 
somewhat different historical loyalties. Hartlepool residents are famous for drawing their 
identity from their seafaring history and the supposed 'lynching' of a monkey as a 
French spy during the Napoleonic Wars. Stocktonians draw their identity from the 
town's association with Robert Stephenson, the Stockton and Darlington railway, 
world's first steam hauled passenger train, and heavy manufacturing industry. 
UHH is approximately one and a half miles north of Hartlepool town centre. In 2005 the 
Trust website described the hospital as serving 147,500 people living in Hartlepool and 
the southern part of East Durham and having 334 beds. (This separation of service 
areas contrasts with the CHFT website which has always given population figures for 
the Trust as a whole.) The hospital opened in 1966 and expanded over the years with 
the addition of various wings and services. The main building has been recently 
refurbished however many of its other buildings are rundown and unsuitable for housing 
patients. The local community however are proud of 'their' hospital which has long had 
a reputation for being innovative and forward thinking, being one of the few hospitals in 
the region to make early investments in day case surgery, open system MRI scanners 
and a Philips CT scanner. 
116 
UHNT is approximately two miles north of Stockton town centre. It first opened in 1966, 
also expanding in the provision of buildings and services since that time. It was/is a 
regional centre for breast screening. In 2005 the Trust website described it as serving 
178,000 people in Stockton and 20,000 people in Sedgefield. It also has many buildings 
in need of refurbishment; the old maternity wing is currently being refurbished to serve 
as Trust headquarters. 
Activity figures for the two sites listed on the website were, until very recently, years out 
of date. Up to and including July 2007 the lastest activity figures posted on the website 
showed that in 2000/2001: 
• UHNT treated over 177,000 patients: 
o 96,518 patients in outpatient clinics 
o 40,920 patients in A&E 
o 25,497 emergency admissions 
o 14,329 elective admissions (9,020 patients as day case patients) and 
o 1 ,819 babies were born at the hospital. 
• UHH treated over 163,000 patients: 
o 85,965 patients in outpatient clinics 
o 41,198 patients in A&E 
o 23,263 emergency admissions 
o 12,918 elective admissions (9,684 as day case patients) and 
o 1,604 babies were born at the hospital 
Peterlee Community Hospital treated 8,245 people in its outpatient clinics. 
These figures are presented here, in part, to show the relative sizes of the constituent 
hospitals. More important, particularly from an organisational analyst's perspective, is 
the impression conveyed by the obsolescence of these and other data on the website. 
In July 2007 the Orthopaedics web page referred to a service award made in 1998, the 
Surgery and Urology web page referred to the introduction of single sex wards in 
advance of the government directive for 2003, the gyneacology webpage announced 
Mo Mowlem's official opening of an extension to the outpatients' department in UHH in 
2001, and so on through the service listings. The corporate information was likewise out 
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of date - in early July 2007 strategy documents for 2002-2003 were still available and 
the organisational chart showed senior staff as they had been in early 2005, including 
staff who had long since left the Trust. A corporate strategy for 2006-2009 was 
available elsewhere on the site. However the retention of obsolescent data and the 
absence of up to date information about how the Trust is structured and managed, 
conveyed an impression that the organisation had lost its way, preferring to look back to 
its 'glory days' rather than anticipating a hopeful future. 
Organisational Governance 
At the time of writing (August 2007), NTH had an unusual managerial structure. Like 
CHFT it is overseen by a Trust Board. Unlike CHFT, its key management team is the 
Trust Directors' Group (TOG) comprised of 22 people. These are the Executive Team 
(the CEO, Deputy CEO/Director of Nursing and Clinical Governance, Deputy 
CEO/Director for Acute Services, Director for Medicine, Director for Finance, Director 
for Human Relations and Operations, and Director for Information and Management 
Technology) and 16 clinical directors (despite having only six clinical divisions). The 
Executive team meets weekly to overview policy and performance, suggest responses 
to performance figures, and set the agenda for the Trust Directors' Group. The TOG 
meets monthly to take decisions on both clinical and financial matters on behalf of the 
Trust as a whole. The preponderance of medical staff on the TOG is intended to 
increase medical participation in decision making on difficult issues facing the Trust. 
Each clinical division is managed by a clinical director (a doctor) who is expected to 
provide leadership within the directorate and a clinical manager whose role is to deliver 
the service. The clinical manager may be drawn from any of the clinical professions but 
is usually a nurse or an allied health professional. In divisions without departments, the 
clinical director and the clinical manager are the only managerial staff. In the divisions 
with departments, the managerial staff will also comprise departmental heads (who may 
be doctors or ward sisters depending on how the department is organised.) The 'extra' 
clinical directors do not have formal responsibility within each directorate; their role is to 
represent the views of the various specialties to the TOG and the views of the TOG to 
their specialist colleagues. 
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This structure was introduced mid 2005 after the appointment of a new CEO and is not 
the structure that governed the Trust's participation in the Clinical Management 
Development project. In August 2007 the most up to date representation of the Trust's 
governance structure (which was then still on the Trust's website) showed the CEO 
position vacant and named executive directors who had left the Trust in early 2005. 
The governance structure in the Trust during the Clinical Management Development 
project comprised an Executive Team which oversaw corporate governance and which 
referred clinical matters to a Clinical Policy Board (CPB). The CPB was comprised of 
the Executive team and the heads of the clinical directorates. The CPB was 
characterised by mistrust and divided between two power bases. The Executive team 
(and the Chairman of the Board) were those of the previous Hartlepool Trust whilst the 
clinical directors were drawn solely from clinicians from the previous North Tees Trust. 
In the main, the Executive team adopted the same approach to management they had 
utilised prior to amalgamation and retained occupancy of their old offices in Hartlepool. 
This, together with the financial strength of the previous Hartlepool Trust (and the 
indebted state of the former North Tees Trust), led staff in North Tees to generally 
regard the amalgamation as a 'takeover' whilst staff in Hartlepool regarded the North 
Tees 'acquisition' as a financial millstone. The only visible strategy to address the 
sense of takeover grievance was the appointment of an executive director with 
responsibility for representing the North Tees site and for community development. This 
position only lasted six months; when the director resigned, the position was abolished. 
Long term staff at Hartlepool suggested that the Hartlepool hospital had a 25 year 
tradition of very strong leadership, possibly to the point of being somewhat overly 
prescriptive. The Hartlepool CEO apparently fitted comfortably within this tradition until 
amalgamation. She was respected for running a 'tight ship' and having a very visible 
presence amongst staff. Several senior staff formerly from Hartlepool Trust commented 
over the period of the CMD project and in the course of this research, that the CEO's 
leadership style changed when the Trust amalgamated with North Tees Trust. 
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During the CMD project staff at various levels of seniority had described her style prior 
to amalgamation as including regular 'tours of the staff. She was known to engage with 
staff, to ask unanticipated questions, and to inquire about processes and progress; this 
engagement provided an incentive for staff to demonstrate competency and initiative. 
After the amalgamation, however, the inspections dwindled on the Hartlepool site and 
never really started on the North Tees site. None who commented about this had an 
explanation for the change. There was some limited and half-hearted speculation that it 
might have been due to the perceived hostility emanating from the North Tees based 
staff; mostly however, staff seemed mystified by it. Hartlepool based staff, however, 
appeared to associate the decreasing visibility of the CEO with a sense of drift within 
the Trust. 
Vision and Values 
The 'vision' statement for the newly amalgamated Trust was "Two Good Hospitals 
Serving Two Local Communities". In conformity with this statement both sites continued 
to operate independently, providing the same services they had previously according to 
ten 'people first values'. This vision statement was presumably adopted in the hope that 
it would allay the fears and resentments associated with the amalgamation. It meant 
however that the North Tees site continued to operate largely as it had previously, 
inherited debt and repeated operating losses notwithstanding. 
Opinions were divided within the Trust about the reasons for this 'non-interference' in 
the operations of the North Tees site. Some staff thought that the Executive team lost 
its nerve in the face of the trenchant hostility from North Tees staff. Others thought that 
it was a pragmatic interim step given the divisions within the Clinical Policy Board, staff 
resentments across the clinical work force, and the first Tees-wide service review (with 
a remit to produce recommendations for health service delivery options well beyond the 
Trust's geographic area). They attributed its continuance to the constraining effect of 
protracted, disputed and repeated service reviews which were widely believed by staff 
to have been initiated by local parliamentarians for short term political gain. (The Trust's 
future was studied in three major reviews of service in eight years - the Teesside, 
Darzi, and the Secretary of State reviews.) 
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The perceived political machinations associated with these reviews undermined their 
credibility amongst staff, creating unwillingness in the Trust at all levels to implement 
recommendations. This created a 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' scenario for 
the Trust Executive. With little internal support for the recommendations, when they 
discussed implementing the recommendations they were portrayed by some staff as 
foolish and 'weak' for not challenging the recommendations. On the other hand, other 
staff (and even, at times, the same staff) regarded the Executive as indecisive, naive, 
even foolish when they indicated that they wanted to challenge 'politically based' 
findings. And all the while the underlying deficit, the operational problems at the North 
Tees site, and the internal tensions especially within the orthopaedics department 
remained unaddressed until the Royal College of Surgeons' 2004 critical review of the 
orthopaedics department. 
Performance 
Until this time, despite internal awareness of problems and conflict, the Trust had 
performed well in inspections. When the Trust formed in 1999, both sites had good 
reputations for the quality of their clinical care. These reputations carried over into the 
amalgamated Trust and for several years it garnered strong results from the 
Commission for Health Improvement and its successor, the Healthcare Commission, 
achieving three stars in 2003 and 2004. In 2005 however the Trust received only two 
stars, due partly to the criticisms by the Royal College of Surgeon's report on the 
orthopaedics department and partly by weak financial performance. In 2006 it attained 
a good rating for the quality of its care but a weak rating for its financial management. 
Until very recently both UHNT and UHH provided the same range of specialist 
emergency and elective care. 
Evidence of Commitment to the Coordination and Management of Clinical Work 
Staff report both 'ends' of the Trust had a strong history in innovatively seeking to 
improve the management of clinical work. The North Tees Trust had been one of the 
original pilot sites for the RMI and the Hartlepool Trust had been keen to learn the 
lessons and adopt new practices to improve care. In both predecessor Trusts in the 
1990s, an alignment of RMI and willingness to try the then newly developing ICPs 
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resulted in the Trusts supporting early experiments in care planning, especially in the 
intensive care units. According to nurses involved in those early care planning efforts, 
however, the enthusiasm for the quality of care innovations was not matched with 
enthusiasm within departments for taking responsibility for budgets nor with overall 
organisational strategies for care improvement. The availability of 'pilot' money, in 
combination with this lack of enthusiasm, meant devolution of autonomy was not 
matched with a transfer of organisational accountability, for either systematic care 
improvement or fiscal responsibility. It also meant that pathways were being developed 
independently in various areas of the Trusts and without overall coherency. 
This enthusiasm for innovation and new care practices, especially those that relied 
upon new IT developments, was severely damaged due to failures to achieve the 
outcomes in care improvement that were expected to follow. The failures were sourced 
in IT problems, specifically the poor technical competency of many IT systems, the lack 
of compatibility between clinical IT systems within the hospitals, the lack of compatibility 
between the GP systems and others, and the resultant difficulties in coordinating 
practice and providing continuity of care. Senior nurses in NTH, who were with the 
Trust(s) at that time, believe that the resulting distrust and cynicism about care planning 
and IT systems greatly impeded subsequent efforts to pursue more systematic 
approaches to care planning. Pockets of enthusiastic care planning persisted over the 
years but, prior to the Clinical Management Development project, these were not 
supported by the wider organisation, systematically supervised, or coordinated within or 
across divisions. The Trust's participation in the CMD project began to change this. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Clinical Management Development Project 
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The CMD Project 
The CMD project was a research-based, interactive and collaborative project which 
aimed to support the modernisation of the NHS in Yorkshire and Northeast England. 
Six local health economies were each represented at the first exploratory workshop by 
about ten staff drawn from primary, secondary and mental health services. The two 
health economies to which the study Trusts belong were well represented at this initial 
meeting. 
The workshop agreed that the project would take three stages. The first two were 
research oriented. There would be an examination of professional subcultures within 
health economies and an examination of how care was actually being provided within 
the health economies for three clinical conditions of significance to all parties (fractured 
neck of femur, COPD and angina). (An examination of HES data to map local activity 
flows within each health economy was added subsequently and conducted concurrent 
with the cultural survey.) The third stage was developmental work aimed at improving 
the provision and management of care for these conditions through the establishment 
of integrated clinical pathways. 
The workshop agreed that responsibilities within the project should be shared: the 
research would be the responsibility of the Centre for Clinical Management 
Development, with assistance from the partners as required, and the developmental 
activity would necessarily be the responsibility of the NHS partners but mediated in part 
through workshops facilitated by staff of the CCMD. These workshops would report and 
discuss the research results of each stage with a view to understanding the 
developmental implications for each organisation and health economy. 
As the project progressed, further support for developmental activities within each 
health economy and component organisation emerged from the interaction of each 
organisation's development plans, the results of the research, and understandings and 
negotiations between the relevant NHS organisations. This support comprised working 
parties attended by various members of the project, internal organisational meetings 
attended by members of CCMD, internal organisational training days, and further 
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workshops as deemed appropriate within each health economy. As far as possible 
these developmental activities were incorporated into the usual Trust meetings. This 
was intended to both to 'normalise' efforts around the improvement of clinical work 
management as being part and parcel of Trusts' day to day work and to minimise the 
strain on staff who often were already feeling the burden of repeated, significant change 
and the pressure of having to meet stringent performance targets. Although six health 
economies initially agreed to participate, only four health economies actually 
commenced the project. 
Early Meetings in the Study Trusts 
The first official meetings between staff from CCMD and individual organisations within the 
health economies in 2002 were small. From the perspective of Centre for Clinical 
Management Development (CCMD) staff, the purpose of the meetings was to introduce 
the CCMD staff to each individual NHS organisation's management and vice versa, and 
for each to gain further understanding of the project and its possibilities in each location. 
From the NHS organisations' perspective however the initial meetings were more about 
the managers deciding whether they still wished to participate in the project given the 
multitudinous mandatory performance targets and pressure for continuous change with 
which they were burdened. Such conversations required considerable frankness about 
Trusts' financial position and existing resource allocations, understanding of activity 
patterns, organisational strategy, internal climate and power relationships within and 
between organisations, and the benefits the CMD project might bring in dealing with these. 
Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust (CHFT) 
The initial meeting in CHFT was attended on the Trust's side by the executive team and 
two divisional directors. The Director for Organisational Development met the CCMD 
staff and escorted them to the Board Room to await the rest of the CHFT senior 
management. The CEO was perhaps the third person from CHFT to enter the room. 
She introduced herself as Diane (no role was given) and asked if she could pour some 
tea. Whilst she was doing so, the rest of the CHFT staff arrived. Everyone took their 
seats and the director for organisational development introduced the Director for 
CCMD, inviting him to make a presentation about the CMD project and its anticipated 
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benefit. Introductions were not made at this point; the director for CCMD simply started 
his presentation, various people asked questions, made suggestions, gave opinions, 
and challenged others' opinions. The conversation was friendly, at times joking, open, 
direct and honest. For at least 30-45 minutes it was not clear to CCMD staff who was 
the CEO. (The CEO had asked some questions, made some comments, but 
contributed much less than several other CHFT staff.) Her position as CEO was only 
revealed when the CHFT team became divided about whether the CMD project would 
merely replicate work already being done in the Trust or would provide an additional 
benefit worth the nominal investment of money. (The actual cost at that point was being 
borne by the Northern and Yorkshire Modernisation Board through top slicing of Trust 
budgets). At that point one of the CHFT team turned to her and asked her opinion as 
CEO. She stated that she was leaning towards continuing the Trusts' initial support for 
the project but wanted further information and time to think. She asked some questions 
about the details of the Trust's existing organisational development (OD) programme, 
and whether and how this programme and the new project could create synergy. She 
then turned the meeting back to other members of her team. At the end of the meeting 
she advised that she had found the whole discussion very stimulating and thought 
provoking; she would discuss it further with her executive team before making a final 
decision. A few days later she invited the director of CCMD to meet, learn more about 
the CHFT existing programme, and explain where he thought the new project added 
extra value. A month or so later the OD director advised CCMD that the Trust would 
participate, the CEO would actively support it, and the OD director would oversee the 
project to ensure that it meshed neatly into other projects and contributed towards the 
Trust's goals. However, if at any time, the CEO believed that the CMD project was 
having minimal effect or was distracting the Trust from its goals, she would withdraw 
her support and the Trust's participation. 
The initial programme of work the OD director organised was primarily around the 
conducting of the staff cultural survey. There was some tension about this within the 
Trust as the CEO thought it might unnecessarily replicate a recently completed Trust 
staff survey. To ensure the survey generated 'added value' the OD director organised a 
series of workshops within the Trust around various aspects of culture, the Australian 
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experience of casemix, and various other topics. After about four months it was agreed 
that a structured programme of regular work would be more effective than ad hoc 
meetings. It was agreed that the director of CCMD would spend three days of every 
month in the health economy, meeting with staff, conducting workshops and providing 
advice to the various organisations involved. Some of these workshops involved staff 
from the PCTs along with staff from the acute Trust; others were solely for PCT staff. 
The first major whole economy workshop, held to discus the results of the surveys and 
the existing pattern of clinical activity within the health economy, took place one year 
into the CMD project. It was attended by executive managers from CHFT, senior 
management and PEC members of the associated PCTs, plus various staff and other 
local health economy organisations whose attendance was considered important. At 
the time CHFT had been in existence for nearly two years; the PCTs however had not 
been in existence for a year and were staffed to a considerable extent by people who 
had previously been employed in the NHS Trust. The attendees were therefore people 
with significant decision-making power within their own organisations, who were 
meeting with their equivalents in the other Trusts, and who knew each other reasonably 
well. 
A sense of anticipation pervaded the workshop and the atmosphere throughout the 
workshop was amiable. Conversation moved relatively quickly from 'sacred', abstracted 
talk about the desire to achieve patient centredness, effectiveness, efficiency and 
individual organisational priorities to acknowledgements that no one organisation 
currently had control over the rates of readmission to secondary care, nor could they in 
the present circumstances, and that this was creating ongoing problems for all of them. 
The rest of the workshop was characterised by 'backstage' conversation i.e. the 
conversations gave explicit recognition to the political dimensions of the matters being 
discussed. This included the likely responses of various groups within the health 
economy to possible future strategies. Concerns were raised about boundary 
management implications in attempting to promote increased collaborative working 
between the NHS Trust and the PCT and between the PCT and the GPs. As a result, it 
was agreed that a common governance structure/steering committee was needed for 
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the project and the Clinical Work Development Project Board was formed. The board, 
attended by senior members of all parties including CCMD, was led by the CHFT 
Divisional Director for Medicine and the Elderly (since retired). This project board met 
every two months for the duration of the CMD project. 
North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust (NTH) 
The initial meeting of the Trust management and CMD project staff from Durham 
University was a meeting of senior healthcare managers in the health economy. It was 
attended by the deputy CEO, medical director and assistant HR director for 
organisational development of NTH, the CEO for Easington Primary Care Trust, the 
acting CEO for the Hartlepool PCT, the acting CEO and Professional Executive 
Committee Director for the North Tees PCT and the four academic staff from Durham 
University. The meeting went extremely well with each participant providing a frank 
account of where they thought their organisations were, the problems each faced, and 
the priorities they were pursuing. Each agreed that they were pursuing individual 
solutions to systems-based problems and achieving only limited improvements from 
major initiatives. The limitations were attributed to the interdependent nature of 
healthcare, lack of control over the patterns of healthcare activity, problems of debt and 
formal leadership in two of the PCTs, and a history of suspicious and combative 
relations between the PCTs and NTH. 
It transpired that this meeting was the first time that senior staff from the various Trusts 
had met to jointly discuss operational issues. Their previous joint meetings had been 
part of Service Level Agreement negotiations which had been characterised by fierce 
argument about changing the provision of care 'at the margins' and the financial 
implications of this. It also transpired that much of the argument arose from the fact that 
no organisation had firm activity data about the level of service being provided by NTH. 
This included the extent to which activity from various categories of patients, especially 
patients with long term conditions, accounted for all hospital activity. The NTH staff 
acknowledged with that they were providing what could be considered 'unnecessary' 
care from an acute care perspective, but argued that the hospital had to do this 
because of problems in primary care. All thought that it was probable that the number of 
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'revolving door' or 'frequent flyer' patients equated to about 8-9% of yearly hospital 
activity and that the amount of 'unnecessary' acute care provided was another 8-9% of 
activity. 
The director of CMD suggested that a way forward would be to jointly analyse and discuss 
NTH's activity data to put some facts around the conjecture. CCMD undertook to do the 
analysis on the Trusts' behalf- it seemed critical for the CMD project and for the Centre for 
Clinical Management Development's obligations to its funder to establish an improved, 
cooperative climate between the parties. It also appeared that the then established pattern 
of care was, in part, an outcome of both the historical provision of care and the prevailing 
organisational and professional cultures within the health economy. The various parties 
met regularly every four-six weeks for eight months to discuss progressive findings from 
the analysis of the activity data, and to determine the next set of desired analyses. 
Meetings were always cordial, and often frank in nature, but attendance, which was initially 
consistent across the partners (including several attendances by relevant staff from local 
social services), became patchy over time. 
The reasons for this were not clear; anecdotally and on reflection, it was perhaps an 
indication of the growing strains between the various organisations. Tensions were 
developing between the PCTs as they struggled to keep an integrated agenda. In private, 
each blamed the other for their problems. There was tension between the two PCTs which 
were struggling to fund desired projects and the third, which had a surfeit of cash but 
found it hard to attract both staff and general practitioners to provide healthcare. There 
were also growing tensions between the PCTs' leadership and the CCMD's leadership 
over appropriate styles of working and speaking. 
The first major health economy-wide workshop (a three day event) to discuss the 
findings and implications of the culture survey and patterns of activity was held 
approximately one year into the project. It was a difficult meeting due in part to a power 
imbalance between the NHS attendees and the PCTs attendees. NTH was well 
represented by its senior management team including the CEO however the PCTs 
were each represented by a small number of middle managers. Further, the staff of the 
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PCTs and NTH had little experience of working together apart form the previously 
mentioned acrimonious SATT/SLA meetings. The workshop was also unsettling in that 
it was the first time most of the CCMD staff had met the NTH CEO. She had not been 
present at any of the activity workshops or other meetings; the newness of the situation 
hindered the previously relatively easy discussions that had developed between the 
staff of CCMD and NTH during the data analyses. 
The atmosphere at the commencement of the survey based workshop was somewhat 
negative and defensive. This resulted from a combination of factors; each participating 
organisation contributed to these in some way. The contributions included: 
• The relatively poor prior relationships between Trusts, 
• The researchers' realisation that they had misinterpreted the extent to which 
'spells' data (one of several ways of measuring inpatient activity) was then 
being used in the NHS and that much of the activity results to be presented 
needed to be revised, 
• Disappointment amongst the NHS Trust's attendees at the poor 
representation by the PCTs, 
• Vulnerability by PCT attendees who felt out numbered and 'out-gunned'. 
Conversation within the workshop was dominated by NTH's interests which added to 
the PCT members' sense of being marginalised. The tension was magnified greatly 
when the NTH CEO offered to transfer £1m to the PCTs to kick-start a focused chronic 
disease management programme in primary care but the offer was not received as well 
as the CEO had hoped. The PCT staff were not at a sufficient level to act on the offer 
and they felt patronised by the manner in which the offer was made. Attempts to 
facilitate constructive dialogue around the offer through an impromptu role play initially 
produced very rational and defensive responses about ensuring 'PCT financial 
soundness', 'compliance to expenditure rules', 'proper administrative processes', and 
monitoring budget time frames. As the role play went on, the refusal/inability of the PCT 
staff to dilute their defensiveness increased the NTH CEO's and the CCMD director's 
frustration. Emotions became inflamed; the language and tone of speech became 
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belittling and aggressive. The role play ended with name calling and the CEO 
threatening to withdraw her offer. 
Frantic work to hold things together during the second evening meant that the 
workshop atmosphere improved noticeably for the final morning. Unfortunately, late in 
the morning another middle ranking member from North Tees PCT joined the 
workshop. Lacking the extensive briefing of the survey results and activity patterns, and 
the (painfully) produced consensus about issues confronting the health economy, this 
staff member also became very defensive about PCTs' capacities and strategies. This 
staff member took issue with the CMD director's manner and the projects' methods, 
kicking the fracas off again. This time it was not possible to soothe tensions and the 
workshop ended on a sour note. 
Several important consequences for the outcome of the project in the local health 
economy resulted from this. Of relevance to this thesis were North Tees PCT effective 
withdrawal from the project (although it did provide some support for the research into 
the organisation of care for COPD and angina) and secondly, and perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly , the NTH CEO, who previously had been lukewarm about the CMD project, 
became more supportive of its objectives. NTH then initiated several workshops 
between the Trust's senior management and CCMD to explore a much more prioritised 
and structured approach to the use of clinical pathways and a reworking of the Trust's 
model of clinical governance. 
During the first of these subsequent workshops, the CEO could see both pros and cons 
for increased clinical management through the use of ICPS and was still somewhat 
undecided about whether to support the development of ICPs more vigorously. After 
discussion with her staff, she decided to put her weight behind the CMD project and a 
Trust-wide approach to ICPs. The establishment of a 'pathways steering committee' 
(PSC) was agreed to which the Director of CCMD, and senior members of PCTs and 
social services were to be invited. At the second workshop between CCMD and the 
CPB, however, the CEO took offence at something that was said by the director of 
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CCMD. It was never clear what caused the offence but further workshops planned for 
that year, whether for the Clinical Policy Board or for clinicians, did not eventuate. 
Participation began to pick up in late 2003 and throughout 2004 due almost solely to 
the efforts of three NTH staff, the assistant director for organisational development, the 
pathways lead, and the medical director. Through their efforts and as a result of the 
DoH's push on chronic disease management, Dr Foster's raising the profile on activity 
data analysis, North Tees PCT involvement in activity analysis around the Evercare 
trials, the North Tees PCT began to re-engage with the CMD project. Within NTH, 
several key consultants in respiratory diseases and orthopaedics engaged with the 
project and workshops were held both within NTH and across the health economy. 
These followed-up the research results and agreed further work to design cross health 
economy pathways for the three clinical conditions for which the organisation of care 
was mapped. Design and implementation of four other orthopaedic ICPs within NTH 
was also agreed. The PSC also came into operation. 
The operation of the PSC was somewhat problematic. Several NTH members were 
very concerned that the revitalisation of clinical work management, through the 
introduction of ICPs and their use for both clinical governance and performance 
management, did not fail. This anxiety was due to their belief that a history of failed 
implementation or abandonment of 'flagship' programmes in the Trust had already 
created clinical resistance and another failure would create a very difficult management 
problem. They therefore were keen to see progression and success and promoted an 
active role for the Trust in pursuing pathways development across the health economy. 
Several PCTs members, however, were resentful that the NHS Trust was leading on 
the pathwaying work as they believed that, with the Shifting the Balance of Care policy 
and the emerging emphasis upon management of long term conditions, the lead on this 
committee should have lain with them. Perhaps as a result, attendance at the PSC was 
patchy, the minutes were perfunctory, and meetings were often cancelled. The CCMD 
director attended the new pathway steering committee once then delegated 
responsibility for the CMD project in NTH to me. 
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Trusts Involvement Over The Course Of The Project 
Once the results for the organisation of care were analysed, presented to the various 
health economies, and future directions were agreed, the responsibility for further 
workshops and effort lay with each health economy and participating Trust. In reality 
how the NHS Trusts approached the project was critical for their health economy's 
participation in the project as a whole and their commitment to invest in developmental 
work around pathways. 
Table 7.1 Sponsored Workshops Held as Part of the Clinical Management 
Development Project, by Health Economy 
Health Economy 
A B c 
2002 4 '12 2 
2003 1 18 1 
2004 0 10 0 
Total 5 40 3 
Health Economy B = Calderdale and Huddersfield health economy 
Health Economy D =North Tees and Hartlepool health economy 
SHAs 
-, 
Project-
0 I' wide 
8 3 '1 
,, 
2 .. 
i3 '1 
16 5 2 
Health Economies A&D =the two (unnamed) health economies which also commenced the CMD project 
Table 7.1 shows two health economies were relatively poorly engaged the start. 
Although the early meetings with health economy A went well, by the end of the first 
year commitment was obviously waning. A variety of reasons were given for this 
however the full reasons for the lack of commitment in this health economy were never 
clear. The initial meetings in health economy C went well however the Trust underwent 
amalgamation early in the project and the new CEO believed the Trust's focus should 
lie elsewhere. 
As discussed above, the North Tees and Hartlepool economy (Health Economy D) was 
reasonably engaged in the first year; these meetings were virtually all joint meetings 
between NTH, the PCTs and CCMD. However there were almost no sponsored 
workshops in 2003; participation was limited mostly to the research function which 
could, and did, proceed with little input from the management of any of the health 
economy Trusts. In contrast, the Calderdale and Huddersfield health economy (health 
economy B), led by the CWO board, was very actively engaged across the lifetime of the 
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project. The CWD board organised health economy wide workshops, workshops for the 
senior managers of each organisation, workshops for clinical governance staff within and 
across organisations, workshops for particular clinical specialities, particular professions 
and multidisciplinary workshops for all staff treating specified clinical conditions. It oversaw 
the coordination, attendance and resourcing of these, and also arranged various meetings 
with staff groups within and across the economy to work on the details on initiatives 
(although the numerical balance was largely in favour of CHFT). 
Clinician Engagement 
Both CHFT and NTH experienced problems ensuring that medical clinicians attended 
workshops to which they had been invited, including those specifically designed for them. 
When challenged, the clinicians often resorted to claiming moral and time priority for their 
professional-client relationships over organisational commitments. Staff in both CHFT and 
NTH worked assiduously to gain secondary care clinicians' support for workshop 
attendance, meeting one-on-one with practitioners, attempting to build reciprocity through 
provision of clinically relevant outcome data, identifying each player's needs and strategic 
priorities, attempting to build goodwill and trust, and making time to unguardedly consider 
the pros and cons of new clinical management techniques. Although these strategies were 
successful in both Trusts, the numbers of clinicians attending workshops and meetings 
was noticeably greater in CHFT. This was perhaps not surprising as a team of people 
were engaged in this in CHFT with strong support from the Executive and the CWD board. 
In NTH, the work fell primarily onto the pathways lead with some support from the medical 
director and the assistant director for organisational development. 
The strategy of relying heavily on one person in NTH was somewhat self-defeating 
given the anxiety of PSC members that the project succeed. For much of the time the 
pathway lead's only support was a part time secretary, paid for over twelve months by a 
donation from a pharmaceutical company. She received weak authorisation and 
support from the PSC, the Clinical Policy Board to whom the PSC reported, and/or the 
Executive team when experiencing difficulties in obtaining clinical engagement. This 
was, in part, due to the belief of the then medical director, who headed the PSC, that an 
authoritative approach would be counterproductive; persuasion was a better approach. 
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Mostly this stance was shared by others, however, it was evident that persuasion was 
ineffective with several key medics. During the third year the ICP lead experienced 
family difficulties. The subsequent work slowed which created further strain in the 
relationship with the PCTs. 
Later Developments 
In the third year of the CMD project a workshop was organised between all parties of the 
CMD project (including those health economies not participating in the developmental 
stage) and the Healthcare Commission. This workshop's purpose was to explore how 
I CPs might be brought within the nexus of the Healthcare Commission's review process of 
the clinical governance function and was very well attended. Even in those health 
economies no longer participating in the CMD project, staff had grasped the possibilities 
that an ICP-based clinical management model had for improving the effectiveness of 
clinical and organisational facets of healthcare (Maxwell, Degeling, Kennedy, and Coyle 
2005). They were also very concerned however that this way of managing work was at 
odds with the way that clinical governance was conceived by the former Commission for 
Healthcare Improvement and how therefore the Healthcare Commission would potentially 
measure and report performance. The workshop produced a remarkable unity amongst 
the health economies about the value of ICPs and a restructured clinical governance 
function centred on them. It also revealed however that, at that time, the Healthcare 
Commission staff did not understand what the Trusts' staff were saying to them. Though 
key staff in CHFT and NTH were frustrated by this, it did not sway them from their support 
for changing their approach to clinical work management. If anything, the arguments in 
favour of it put by members of health economies A & C, (despite their greatly reduced 
involvement in the CMD project) seemed to buoy their enthusiasm. 
Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust 
Joint working between the CHFT and the PCTs on the development of intersectoral 
ICPs proceeded during the project's third year. This work focused on the three clinical 
conditions that were mapped during the second year of CMD project. Difficulties arose 
periodically as the Trusts' efforts to manage the various pressures upon them often 
placed strain upon their ability to work jointly within agreed timeframes. The emphasis 
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upon ICPs as a form of management of clinical work in CHFT nevertheless increased in 
prominence due to the effort devoted to an eighteen months Integrated Service 
Improvement Strategy (ISIS). This review began towards the end of the CMD project. 
The ISIS was initially an internal service reconfiguration activity designed to jointly 
improve the financial and clinical effectiveness of clinical work within the Trust. It was 
prompted by three overlapping needs to i) attain the 18 week target for elective surgery 
ii) transfer services from acute care closer to patients' homes and iii) become 
competitive and remain financially viable under patient choice. Although based upon 
the three guiding principles of services, devolution and partnership, it was quickly 
realised that none of these goals could be achieved without a thorough review of 
patients' journey throughout the Trust and the wider health economy. This renewed 
attention within the health economy on ICPs, both with and across organisations, and 
has led to the development of numerous new ICPs and the review and revitalisation of 
previously existent pathways. The end result will eventually affect all clinical demand 
areas with CRH effectively becoming a women's and children's hospital and an elective 
surgery centre. Though it will retain its A&E department, all trauma related care will be 
relocated to HRI which will become a 'hot' care site with no elective surgery at all.) 
The commitment to prioritise the management of clinical work by CHFT noted in the 
previous chapter is also being deepened in organisational forums and processes more 
distant to traditional spheres of clinical management. At the time that this thesis was 
being written up, the Trust was beginning to examine staffs' job descriptions and annual 
performance review criteria to reflect greater organisational recognition and 
accountability for the patient experience and the coordination and management of 
clinical work. It was also considering means for rewarding high performing 'teams' 
(though not necessarily financially). Thus there are plans to write participation in ICP 
processes into new clinicians' contracts, to ensure that job descriptions clearly indicate 
that all managerial staff (whether general management or clinical) are accountable for 
the outcomes of both populations of patients and organisational outcomes in addition to 
their usual professional accountabilities, and to think creatively about rewarding teams 
through high profile events within the Trust and the community. 
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This does not mean however that the Trust has fully implemented the ICP-based model 
for the management of clinical work which arose out of the CMD nor that progress has 
been without problems. At the beginning of 2006 CGSU staff felt that, with increasing 
devolvement of responsibility for ICPs to the divisions, practices within the divisions 
were no longer aligning well with strategic objectives. Furthermore the CGSU's 
strategic objectives and activities were not well evidenced within the Trust's business 
plan. They believed that the support for ICPs was not being evenly coordinated and 
was becoming inconsistent across the clinical divisions, with patchy engagement and 
utilisation of care pathways emerging. A key member of the CGSU therefore undertook 
a review of outcomes for CHFT as a result of the Clinical Work Development Project 
(CWDP), focusing on both the broader organisational outcomes, as well as outcomes at 
a clinical speciality level (Rudge 2006). As a result of this review the Trust has now 
adopted the 80/20 principle in relation to the use of integrated clinical pathways i.e. the 
Executive Management Board has supported ICPs use for about 80% of its clinical 
work (particularly its inpatient work); the other 20% of clinical work is regarded as being 
too low in volume for ICP use. This is much higher than the percentage recommended 
by the CMD project (three initial pathways, then pathwaying of the top ten HRGs, 
followed by pathwaying of 50-60% of clinical work, depending on the measures of 
activity used.) 
When asked in July 2007 to provide an estimate of the resulting total number of 
pathways in operation in the Trust, the response was that this wasn't centralised 
information. To count ICPs in this way would a) turn them into another activity silo b) 
place the focus on a paper document that could be stacked on shelves and counted off 
and which, in turn, would c) misconstrue the nature of pathways away from a dynamic 
process of continual refinement of the patient journey and quality of care into a static, 
check box exercise. The OD director believed a better indication of the priority given to 
ICPs was the increasing importance being placed upon the reporting of activity for both 
clinical governance and performance management purposes along ICPs lines. This 
type of reporting was occurring within both the medical and surgery divisions (and to 
the Executive committee) for a selection of their pathways with the aim of extending the 
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approach to further clinical conditions as the processes and implications of undertaking 
performance management in this fashion were more understood and honed. 
This 'failure to count' pathways and to provide detailed analysis of their outcomes can 
be viewed in several ways. It can be taken at face value for what it is portrayed to be 
namely, evidence of an ongoing but not yet completed attempt to entrench ICPS 
conceptually as mechanisms for instituting a dynamic process, or as a failure to 
consider quality improvement in structure, process and outcome terms (Donabedian 
1980). Then again, it might be that CHFT staff were thinking along Donabedian lines 
and were seeing the early development of organisational reporting along ICPs lines as 
being in itself an appropriate managerial outcome. Once reporting clinical work in 
accordance with these precepts began to be more deeply established, the trust should 
then be in a position to report on clinical outcome improvements (or lack thereof). 
North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust 
As noted earlier the developmental work on a standardised approach to pathways in 
NTH began with the angina and COPD pathways and five orthopaedic pathways 
including fractured neck of femur. The two medical pathways were intersectoral 
pathways and required the involvement of the PCTs and others. Work on each of these 
seven pathways began well with strong interest and support across the treatment 
community in both primary and secondary care. However the work on each of them 
stumbled significantly over seemingly minor matters, particularly around documentation. 
In the case of the angina and COPD pathways, and despite earlier problems in 
obtaining clinician support, the respiratory physicians in the acute Trust were highly 
motivated and enthusiastic about the work. The pathway work groups (multi-
professional subgroups ranging across the health economy) quickly agreed that the 
pathways should adopt the approach of the cancer network and provide a hand held 
pathway for patients in which each health professional would record patient-
professional interactions. Various concerns about who would 'own' the record, what 
other records should be kept by community nurses, GPs, and hospital staff, and how 
the care accorded patients would be governed were sorted relatively painlessly, 
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although with some effort. A real problem however emerged over what the patient held 
record should look like. There was strong disagreement over the size of the packs 
(pocket sized versus A4), the types of cover they should have (thick card or plastic), 
and how much information they should contain (a very detailed record of each patient's 
treatment regime and clinical status or just a summary). 
These relatively simple matters drew more concern than the ICP coordinator expected 
and were not quickly resolved. Frustrated at the protracted nature of these discussions, 
the acute physicians decided that, as the specialist physicians, they would make the 
decision. Their subsequent announcement that a minimalist record would be adopted 
greatly angered the primary care and community professionals who believed that this 
was, at a minimum, an overstepping of authority by the acute Trust's staff. 
A similar problem arose within the NTH in relation to the orthopaedic pathways. In this 
case the disputes again centred around how much detail the pathways should contain, 
how the theatre and anaesthetic records within the pathways should be highlighted, and 
whether one of these should be more prominently highlighted than the other. Each of 
these matters could, and should, have been settled relatively quickly. The Trust's 
medical records department had standard guidelines on these matters that were, in 
relation to the theatre and anaesthetic dispute, largely informed by legal requirements 
for such records. Regarding the matter of document length, common sense and the 
practices of Trusts elsewhere should have been sufficient guidelines however these 
were not heeded. The ICP lead, tasked with resolving these disputes, did not have the 
status or power to settle the disputes. She was not part of the orthopaedic department, 
she was a nurse, she was a similar grade to the nurse(s) who insisted on lengthy 
documentation formats, and she lacked organisational authority to intervene in disputes 
between medical departments and in disputes between medical departments and the 
medical records department. The then medical director intervened when she requested 
support however his persuasive style meant that recalcitrant parties were never made 
accountable for their refusal to cooperate. His successor in the role agreed with the 
concepts of ICPS but he also failed to challenge the doctors about the processes which 
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they were adopting (or rejecting). This result is that this pathway has rarely been used 
and has never been audited. 
At the beginning of 2005, after repeated requests by the pathway lead, the PSC signed 
off on a new devolved structure supporting pathways and policies regarding their 
implementation. These gave responsibility for overseeing ICP implementation and 
review to PSC, prioritised pathway development according to the top HRGS (for both 
emergency and elective activity), placed the initiative for implementing these pathways 
with the divisions, and provided an approved documentation format for recording the 
pathway structure and data points. Each pathway was to be adopted as a pilot for three 
to six months, audited and reviewed. However the Pathway Steering Committee 
ceased to exist when the CPB was restructured and its role in overseeing pathways 
was not brought into the new TOG. The ICP lead was transferred into a review of 
nursing resources and a new position for implementing a new nursing management 
resourcing strategy and system. She was not replaced in her post as ICP lead 
(although she retained informal association with the role through people's association of 
pathways with her). 
By September 2007, ICPs had been developed for the top ten HRGs however few were 
actually in use, those that were in use had not been audited (with the exception of the 
laparoscopic colesectomy pathway), and the ICP lead role had been withdrawn. 
Discussion 
The disputes in NTH about apparent trivialities in ICP development and operation 
masked more serious points of contention. Each of the disputes was fundamentally, 
though not overtly, about power and status- who got to write where in the record, how 
many pages did they need and in which order, and whose pages looked more important 
than others. These are matters which theoretically and practically should have been 
resolved quickly and convincingly. Similar disputes had arisen in CHFT and resolved 
through an emphasis upon piloting and widespread reportage and praise of successful 
outcomes in particular departments and divisions, which was intended to foster a desire 
by other departments and divisions to achieve similar results. That this did not happen 
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in NTH appears to be the consequence of clinical staff reacting to the perceived 
paralysis and indecision amongst senior management. 
The literature discussion in Chapter Three noted that there has been little study of how 
the effectiveness of the executive 'team' relates to the effectiveness of clinical teams 
and vice versa. The discussions in this and the preceding chapter suggest that 
coherence in the senior management team is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition to 
a Trust achieving a consistent approach to clinical management. Without coherency 
within a team and throughout their decision making, senior managers (and their 
delegates) lack an authoritative conception of clinical work and its performance. They 
also lack the social authority to make the exercise of power visible, accountable, and 
efficient. 
The first senior management structure in NTH was potentially unwieldy and unstable; it 
was well known to contain inbuilt division and it potentially signified a lack of either 
vision or will to make the Trust truly one organisation. The additional 'signals' given by 
the choice of vision statement, the lack of senior management presence, even the 
structure of the web page and its presentation of information, could all suggest, or 
reaffirm, to staff and others that the senior management team was unable or unwilling 
to take hard decisions. The history of NTH post amalgamation is an illustration of how, 
without social authority at the top of an organisation, a power vacuum can develop, 
destabilizing the organisation and undermining its ability to achieve goals and agreed 
policies. Although the literature suggests that destabilisation commonly takes the form 
of a struggle between professions to take the lead in setting the direction and 
operations of Trusts, in NTH it appears destabilisation occurred more through a break 
down of accountability and an associated unwillingness to take hierarchical 
responsibility. As a result, staff who were committed to improving clinical management 
lacked the organisational support and strength to prevail during difficulties. Even with 
the arrival of the new (now departed) CEO, there was a lack of organisational will to 
pursue changes in clinical management. 
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On the other hand, the CHFT amalgamation was characterised by initial actions, 
announcing in word and deed, that the Trust was to become one unified Trust in both 
management and practice. Since that time, the senior management have made 
considerable headway towards their vision of a Trust characterised by robust clinical 
management systems with significant clinical engagement. The transformation of 
institutionalised processes in this Trust has been, and is being, pursued with a high 
degree of coherency in thought and effort by senior management and their 
representatives. It is manifested at all levels by the realignment of organisational 
structures, repeated clarification and reiteration of organisational goals, and by regular 
monitoring of managerial and clinical processes, accountability mechanisms, and 
reward systems for their impact on the reform process. This congruency and 
consistency in visualising a goal, striving towards it, and monitoring progress towards it 
is enabling senior staff to learn from their efforts. It assists them to further disseminate 
their newly gained knowledge in ways which embed changed practices and structures 
into additional Trust arenas, producing yet greater penetration of supportive processes 
for new clinical management practices within the Trust's wider organisational practices. 
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Chapter Eight 
Sub-Professional Stances on Reform Values 
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Introduction 
Chapter Three outlined the importance of culture in both defining and enabling 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviours within any particular societal group. It also 
discussed tensions that may be at play within organisations when subsections of the 
organisation have entrenched cultural differences. This chapter reports the results of a 
survey of 987 survey participants' stances within the study Trusts and associated 
healthcare organisations in relation to various matters pertaining to clinical 
management. The survey was conducted in 2002 at the commencement of the Clinical 
Management Development Project; it therefore reveals the predispositions, values and 
beliefs of important healthcare professional groups prior to the project developmental 
work. 
The participating staff were medical managers, medical clinicians, general managers, 
nurse managers, nurse clinicians, allied health managers and allied health clinicians in 
hospital Trusts; managers including PEC members, community nurse managers and 
clinicians, allied health managers and clinicians in primary care Trusts; and general 
practitioners, practice nurses and practice managers within general practice. They 
were asked for their opinions on many issues relating to the organisation, delivery and 
management of health work and the current reforms. 
Results Summary 
The results showed that the professional sub-groups across the whole of the Clinical 
Management Development Project maintained distinct views about the central aspects 
of the reform agenda. These differences in views held both across health economies 
and between primary and secondary care, with small local variations. That is, when a 
professional group in secondary care manifested a particular view about an aspect of 
the reform agenda, their colleagues in primary care tended to hold similar views. 
Likewise the views of each professional group in primary or secondary care in one local 
health economy were good approximations for the views of the same professional 
groups in another local health economy. The stances of the various professional 
groups (for the study as a whole) are summarised in Table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1 Summary of Professional Groups' Stances on Issues Relevant to 
Modernisation 
Acute Trusts MC MM GM NM NC AHM · AHC 
Accept the interconneciions 
.. >>•' ' 
+ + + +I- + 
}n~nsparenl acc:Ountabillty. +I- + + +I- + 
: SystematLse clinical work +I- +/- +I- +/-
· MIJIIidisdpUnary·Teams +I- + + + 
LEAD GM NM NC GP PN 'PM 
··~ccepdlle intereonnections +I- + + +I- +I-
Transparent accountability. .·. +I- + + + +I-
'Systematise clinical work:'·. 
•.... •··. . . . ... +I- + + + +I- +I-
Multidisciplinar{Teams' +I- +/- + + +I-
Key: MC; Medical Clinician, MM; Medical Manager, GM; General Manager, NM= Nurse Manager. NC; Nurse Clinician, AHM= Allied health 
Manager, AHC= Allied Health Clinician., LC ; Lead Clinician, GP = General Practitioner. PN =Practice Nurse, PM ; Practice Manager 
·-·=disagree,'+'= agree, '+I-'::: equivocal 
The Medical Professions 
The table shows that despite the heterogeneity of doctors with the category 'medical 
clinicians' (surgeons and physicians in secondary care and GPs in primary care), 
doctors tended to oppose all aspects of the reform being sought whereas medical 
managers in secondary care and lead clinicians in primary care were generally 
equivocal about the reforms. This however tended to take different forms. (Lead GPs 
are practicing GPs who either sit on the managerial bodies of PCTs or who have a 
managerial responsibility for the introduction of more protocol driven approaches to 
care for particular conditions within their local primary care fraternity.) 
At the start of the CMDP hospital medical mangers had accepted the interconnections 
between clinical and resource decisions, perhaps because this aspect of the agenda is 
the one that has been 'pushed' determinedly in secondary care for several decades. 
Lead clinicians however were ambivalent about the interconnections between 
resources and clinical decisions. This presumably was due in part to both the newness 
of PCTs and the lead GPs' role and to the then existing funding arrangements 
enforcing a practical separation of clinical and financial aspects of care. Until the 
advent of primary care Trusts (and with that, PCT- and practice- based 
commissioning), the majority of general practitioners, without experience of 
fundholding, had little or no incentive to take responsibility for the financial implications 
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of care they provide. The cost of pharmaceuticals, diagnostic interventions, and staff 
requirements elsewhere in the system were not their concern. 
Both medical managers and lead clinicians were equivocal about the need for more 
transparent accountability, preferring to be accountable to themselves and their 
patients. This was perhaps not surprising given that they sit at the intersection of 
(frequently competing) collegial profession-based accountability and hierarchical 
organisational accountability systems. The tenets, traditions and etiquettes of medical 
professionalism and its legal power bases incline doctors' allegiance towards a system 
of accountability based upon Trust and relatively opaque peer review. Increasingly 
however the public, governments and NHS managers (as the delegated 
representatives of the state) require that medical professionalism is more rigorously 
overseen by the organisations in which doctors are employed. Because of their joint 
roles, doctors with managerial responsibilities could 'see both sides of the fence' 
however this was not a position that sat well with their more purely clinical colleagues. 
Lead clinicians were equivocal about systematised approaches to healthcare provision 
and to sharing power across professions whereas medical managers in secondary care 
tended to object to these features of the modernisation agenda. The reasons for this 
were, and are, not immediately obvious. Lead clinicians often commented anecdotally 
on the tensions inherent in attempting to achieve the mooted benefits in managing 
populations in situations of minimal influence on other GPs, and poor staffing and 
constrained funding within PCTs. Hence these views may be derived from lead 
clinicians' wider responsibilities for populations of patients within the PCT and/or their 
legislated multidisciplinary power structures. 
General Managers 
General managers in both primary and secondary care tended to support all the reform 
directions although they were somewhat ambivalent about the use of multidisciplinary 
teams. The only difference between general managers in the two sectors was that the 
secondary care general managers tended to also be ambivalent about the 
146 
systematisation of clinical work (through the use of integrated care pathways, clinical 
guidelines etc). 
The Nursing Professions 
Nurse managers tended to support all the reform directions although, like general 
managers, secondary care nurse managers were somewhat ambivalent about the 
need to systematise clinical work. Anecdotal evidence suggested that although nursing 
managers often were committed to agreed best practice by all health professionals, 
especially in order to eliminate unjustified and unexplained variations in care, they were 
highly sceptical that doctors would support proposals for this. 
Nurse clinicians were the only professional group whose views about the reform items 
were apparently influenced by their work setting. Nurse clinicians in primary care 
tended to generally support reforms whilst those in secondary care tended to be 
ambivalent. Practice nurses were ambivalent about accepting the resource implications 
of clinical decisions and more systematised approaches to care. They were disinclined 
to support increased transparency in accountability and the power sharing implications 
of teamwork; a finding perhaps understandable given the difficulty of power sharing 
with their employers (the GPs). 
The Allied Health Professions 
Allied health professions were included in the secondary care sample however their 
low (population) numbers meant we were unable to include them with any degree of 
statistical validity. Bearing this caveat in mind, the results for secondary care revealed 
that, despite the fact that these staff usually work more closely with nursing staff than 
medical staff, they tended to hold similar views to medical clinicians. This may reflect 
the high degree of specialisation of many allied health staff and the relative autonomy 
that this gives them in their work. 
Professional Sub Cultures in More Detail 
Disaggregation of each of the aspects of the modernisation agenda described above 
permitted a more in-depth understanding of each professional group's stance. These 
147 
more detailed stances of groups are reported in the following tables and discussion. 
The results for virtually all factors show a statistically significant difference of p<.001. 
Stances on Interconnections between Clinical and Resource Dimensions of Care 
Tables 8.2 & 8.3 (below) show that across both sectors of care only those professional 
groups with managerial responsibilities were prepared to recognise and accept that all 
clinical decisions are also financial decisions. General and medical managers in both 
sectors, especially in secondary care, appeared comfortable with this proposition. 
Nurse managers in secondary care however were close to being equivocal. Although 
secondary care clinicians tended to oppose the proposition , in primary care nurse 
clinicians and GPs were effectively equivocal whilst practice nurses and practice 
managers were inclined to deny and reject it. 
Table 8.2 PCT and General Practice Conceptions of the Interconnections 
between Clinical and Resource Dimensions of Care 
PCT General Practice 
LC GM NM NC GP PN 
Recognise interconnections 
between clinical and the resource .55 .55 .31 -.08 -.04 -.35 
dimensions 
Taking account of resource 
-.17 -.03 .59 .36 -.29 .26 issues enhances autonomy 
Key: LC =Lead Clinician, GM= General Manager, NM= Nurse Manager, NC= Nurse Clinician , GP =General Practitioner, 
PN = Practice Nurse, PM = Practice Manager 
Shaded cells indicate that the stance reported in this cell is in accordance with the desired direction of reform. 
• Practice managers did not answer this question 
PM 
-.44 
. 
Sig. 
.000 
.000 
Table 8.3 Hospital Staffs' Perceptions of the Interconnections between Clinical 
and Resource Dimensions of Care 
MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC 
Recognise 
interconnections between 
-.21 .89 .68 .12 -.65 .14 -.40 
clinical and the resource 
dimensions 
Taking account of 
resource issues enhances -.42 -.15 .07 .18 .22 .07 -.33 
autonomy 
Key: MC= Medical Clinician, MM= Medical Manager, GM= General Manager, NM= Nurse Manager, NC= Nurse Clinician, AHM= Allied 
health Manager, AHC= Allied Health Clinician . 
Shaded cells indicate that the stance reported in this cell is in accordance wi th the desired direction of reform. 
Sig. 
.000 
.000 
Within PCTs and to a lesser extent general practices, nursing staff were inclined to 
believe that taking account of resource issues enhances autonomy, perhaps because 
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many of these staff worked in relatively autonomous teams. However this was not an 
opinion shared by the rest of primary care providers nor is it an opinion that is held 
broadly in secondary care. Again, only nursing staff in secondary care could be 
positively said to hold this view, though only weakly. 
Stances on Accountability 
Table 8.4 (overleaf) shows that there was a significant split in primary care between 
PCT employed staff and staff employed within general practices. With only a few 
exceptions, staff within PCTs were in favour of all propositions relating to increasing 
transparent accountability in the provision of clinical work. All staff rated the need for 
more effective information systems issues as being a higher priority than concerns 
about clinical autonomy, a position consistent with their support for more 
organisationally transparent accountability. Likewise all professional groups tended to 
support the proposition that care providers should be accountable to both their patients 
and the general public for care provided. However only nurse clinicians tended to 
support personalised opaque accountability with any degree of firmness; lead 
clinicians, though supportive of this form of accountability, were close to being 
indifferent about it. The only proposition to which lead clinicians could be fairly said to 
be opposed was the suggestion that the existing clinical accountability systems may be 
inadequate. 
Table 8.4 Primary Care Stances on Accountability 
PCT General Practice 
LC GM NM NC GP PN 
Shortcomings in clinical 
-.25 .38 .13 .05 -.31 .22 accountability 
The importance of information 
systems relative to clinical .29 .60 .17 .01 -.43 -.62 
autonomy issues 
Organisationally transparent 
.05 .28 .31 .23 -.55 .07 
accountability 
Personalised opaque 
.08 -.75 -.26 .37 .41 .46 
accountability 
Public and patient accountability 
.12 .30 .53 .25 -.61 -.31 
Key. LC • Lead Clinician, GM= General Manager. NM= Nurse Manager, NC= Nurse Clinician, GP =General Practitioner. 
PN =Practice Nurse. PM = Practice Manager 
Shaded cells indicate that the stance reported in th is cell is in accordance with the desired direction of reform. 
PM 
.23 
-.12 
.98 
.03 
-.81 
Sig. 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
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In contrast, staff in general practice tended to oppose all propositions relating to 
increased transparent accountability. None of the professional groups within general 
practice believed that the need for information should outweigh the need to protect 
clinical autonomy nor did they support being accountable to patients or the general 
public. Rather they preferred a closed, opaque system of accountability in which they 
were only accountable to themselves and their peers. The only group in general 
practice strongly in favour of organisationally transparent accountability were the 
practice managers. Despite this, practice managers tended to disagree with the 
proposition that shortcomings existed within the current system of clinical 
accountability. This suggests perhaps that practice managers, whilst believing that peer 
based accountability systems were adequate at a purely clinical level, perceived them 
to be inadequate at an organisational level. 
Table 8.5 Secondary Care Stances on Accountability 
MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC Sig. 
Shortcomings in clinical 
·.42 ·.14 .56 .17 .07 ·.02 · .33 .000 
accountability 
The importance of information 
systems relative to clinical ·.04 .62 .70 ·.12 ·.23 .41 · .33 .000 
autonomy issues 
Organisationally transparent 
·.46 ·.16 .26 .20 .18 .28 · .09 .000 
accountability 
Personalised opaque 
.04 ·.01 ·.69 •.22 .27 -.35 ·.09 .000 accountability 
Public and patient accountability .08 .24 .10 .15 .11 -.01 ·.22 .314 
Key: MC= Medical Clinician, MM= Medical Manager. GM= General Manager. NM= Nurse Manager. NC= Nurse Clinician , AHM= Allied health 
Manager. AHC= Allied Health Clinician 
Shaded cells indicate that the stance reported in this cell is in accordance with the desired direction of reform. 
Staff in secondary care Trusts tended to be supportive of the propositions relating to 
the need for increased transparency of care. The two professional groups for whom 
this statement was not generally true were medical clinicians and allied health 
clinicians. General managers in particular were supportive of the propositions in favour 
of increased transparency; overall , allied health managers were also supportive being 
clearly supportive on three of the five propositions and indifferent on two. 
Nurse managers were also supportive of these propositions with the exception that, in 
common with nurse clinicians and medical clinicians, they tended to rank clinical 
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autonomy issues as more important than information system issues. Perhaps 
surprisingly, nurse clinicians tended to be in favour of opaque peer and profession-
based accountability systems whereas medical and allied health clinicians tended to be 
equivocal about this. Medical and allied health clinicians were also generally in 
agreement that clinical accountability systems were functioning appropriately but varied 
between themselves about the relative importance of information system issues and 
organisational needs for transparent autonomy. They also tended to differ on the 
importance of being accountable to patients and the publ ic - medical clinicians were 
generally supportive of this proposition whereas allied health clinicians were not. 
Stances on Systematising Clinical Work 
Table 8.6 Primary Care Stances on Aspects of the Systematising Clinical Work 
PCT General Practice 
Lead GM NM NC 
Increase service integration 
·.19 .24 .71 .44 across acute and primary divide 
Systematisation of clinical work 
.28 .46 .46 .12 
Using care pathways enhances 
.25 -.04 .15 .29 
autonomy 
lnstitu1ional shortcomings as 
cause of clinical practice variation .03 .48 .51 .33 
Shortcomings in education & 
failure to keep up to date as 
·.38 -.19 .06 .34 
cause of practice variation 
Self referenced and generated 
knowledge as a basis for setting .06 ·.60 -.65 -.20 
clinical standards 
Formal evidence as basis for 
-.27 -.07 .14 .27 
setting clinical standards 
Key: LC =lead Cltnlcian. GM= Genera l Manager. NM= Nurse Manager. NC= NLKse ChniCian. GP = General Prad•boner. 
PN : Praclce Nurse, PM "' PractiCe Manager 
Shaded eels IndiCate that the stance reported m thiS ~l •s 10 accordance with the des.-ed dlle<:l 10n of reform 
GP PN 
·.38 .39 
-.56 .03 
-.31 .46 
-.71 .21 
-.12 .66 
.47 .15 
-.41 ·.06 
The 1tem 'Shorlcommgs 1n educatiOn & failure to keep up to date as cause o f practiCe vanaOOn' was not shaded as lh1s 11em, though •nduded wll:hm lh1s bank 
of quesbons, does not relate speciiCally to the systematiSatiOn of cllmcal work 
•• PractiCe managers d1d not answer thiS question 
PM 
.41 
·.18 
.. 
.61 
.31 
·.10 
-.75 
Sig. 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.000 
Table 8.6 shows that general practitioners were consistently opposed to any 
proposition supporting increased systematisation of clinical work, a position at odds 
with most other primary care staff. PCT nurse managers and nurse clinicians were 
most supportive of propositions promoting greater systematisation in the management 
and performance of clinical work. These two groups tended to give strong support to 
calls for increased service integration across the primary/acute divide, considered 
institutional shortcomings to be an important cause of variation in clinical practice, and 
opposed self-generated knowledge as a basis for determining acceptable clinical 
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standards. General mangers of PCTs could also be considered to be weakly supportive 
of increased systematisation of clinical work - they were not effectively opposed to any 
of these propositions and were only indifferent to two of them. 
Lead clinicians, practice nurses and practice managers could perhaps be summarised 
as being ambivalent about increased systematisation of clinical work. Each group 
supported some propositions and rejected others; however the three groups were not 
in general agreement with each other about which propositions were acceptable and 
which were not. Thus lead clinicians and practice nurses supported using integrated 
care pathways for increased systematisation of clinical work, and practice managers 
did not. Lead clinicians tended to oppose increased service integration across primary 
and acute care, practice nurses and practice managers tended towards support for it. 
Lead clinicians were equivocal about self referenced and generated knowledge as a 
basis for setting clinica l standards, practice nurses supported it and practice managers 
opposed it. 
Table 8. 7 Secondary Care Stances on Systematising Clinical Work 
MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC Sig. 
Increase service 
integration across acute -.63 -.56 -.42 -.04 .30 -.09 -.06 .000 
and pnmary divide 
Systematisation of cli nical 
-.45 .21 .21 .21 -.28 .47 .00 .000 
work 
Using care pathways 
enhances autonomy -.18 -.46 -.25 -.02 .12 .21 -.07 .036 
Institutional shortcomings 
as cause of clinical -.63 -.46 .47 .34 -.03 .38 -.15 .000 
practice venation 
Shortcomings in 
education& failure to keep 
-.34 -.86 -.03 .09 .16 -.1 6 -.05 .000 
up to date as cause of 
practice venation 
Self referenced and 
generated knowledge as a 
.45 .03 -.39 .1 4 .07 .00 .23 .000 basis for setting chmcal 
standards 
Formal evidence as basts 
for setting cliniCal -.07 -.08 -.04 .42 .28 .41 .17 .003 
standards 
Key· MC= Medical Cl1ntcoan, MM= Medocal Manager, GM= General Manager, NM= Nurse Manager, NC= Nuose Clonocoan , AHM= Allied heallh 
Manager, A HC= Alloed Heallh Clonocoan 
Shaded cells ond1cate that the stance reported in thos cellos on accordance with the desored directoon of r loom 
• The otam 'Shootcomong In education & faoture to keep up to date as cause of practoce vana to on' was not shaded as thos ol em, though onc luded 
within this bank of questoons, does not relate specifically to the syst ematosat1on of chnocal work. 
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Propositions comprising elements of increased systematisation of clinical work were 
not well supported by any professional group in secondary care nor was there 
significant agreement about the form that systematised clinical work should take. The 
most supportive group were the allied health managers who tended to agree with four 
of the seven positions: these were the general statement that clinical work should be 
more systematised and the more specific statements that using care pathways 
enhances clinicians' autonomy, institutional shortcomings (whether in monitoring 
practice and care processes, establishing robust protocols or effective accountability 
mechanisms) are a cause of clinical practice variation, and that formal evidence should 
be the basis for setting clinical standards. 
Surprisingly, given their common managerial positions, general managers and nurse 
managers jointly agreed with the allied health managers on only two of these 
propositions. These were the general statement in favour of increased systematisation 
and the suggestion that institutional shortcomings are a cause of clinical practice 
variation. General managers tended to oppose using self referenced and generated 
knowledge as a basis for setting clinical standards but, oddly, were equivalent about 
using formal knowledge as an alternative basis for setting clinical standards. Nurse 
managers held exactly the opposite position on these two propositions. Nurse clinicians 
gave general support to three propositions but they were alone in thinking this should 
include greater service integration across acute and primary divide. 
Medical managers and allied health clinicians each supported just one of the 
propositions relating to the systematisation of clinical work. Medical managers 
appeared to support the concept as a generality but did not assent to any specific 
proposition. This perhaps suggests that they had accepted the rhetoric of clinical 
systematisation but, given the opposition of medical clinicians to all propositions 
concerned with clinical work systematisation, found themselves with no acceptable 
means to express this. 
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Stances on Multidisciplinary Team-Based Approaches to Care 
Within primary care two professional groups were very supportive of multidisciplinary 
team-based approaches to the provision of care - these were PCT nurse managers 
and nurse clinicians. Table 8.8 shows that both groups believed team-based 
approaches to the provision of care were the most appropriate basis for undertaking 
effective management of clinical work and that this arrangement improved clinical 
autonomy. They also tended to be strong in their opposition to a medical ascendancy 
model of clinical management. Somewhat surprisingly, they were joined in this by lead 
clinicians and (more understandably) PCT general managers. Despite their stance 
against medical ascendancy in clinical management however, lead clinicians tended 
not to support team-based models of clinical management and did not believe these 
models offered greater autonomy to clinicians. The reasons for this are not clear. 
Table 8.8 Primary Care Staff's Stances on Aspects of the Multidisciplinary Teams 
PCT General Practice 
LC GM NM NC GP PN 
Autonomy effects of team-based 
approaches to clinical 
-.19 -.12 .32 .33 -.48 .32 
management 
Team-based approaches to 
-.11 .28 .37 .27 -.42 -.19 clinical unit management 
Medical ascendancy models of 
•.24 -.97 -.45 -.20 .48 .39 clinical unit management 
Hierarchical, financially driven 
.10 .17 -.36 -.25 -.25 -.07 clinical unit management 
Key: LC = Lead Clinician , GM= General Manager, NM:;; Nurse Manager, NC= Nurse Clinician, GP = General Practitioner, 
PN = Practice Nurse, PM = Practice Manager 
Shaded cells indicate tha t the stance reported in this cell is in accordance wfth the desired direction of reform. 
PM 
.. 
.16 
.49 
.12 
Sig. 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.008 
• The item 'Hierarchical, financially driven dinical uni t management ' was not shaded as it is not clear that the reforms seek either to foster or to 
underrrine this form of management. It may be that teams are compatible with this type of management as well as others - at the very least 1t is a form 
of management which provides greater emphasis on the financial implications of care proVIsion . 
.. Practice managers did not anslNE!r this question 
Multidisciplinary team-based approaches to care were not the preferred method of 
working and managing within general practices. All professions were inclined to agree 
with the general practitioners' stance that care should not be team-based and that 
medical ascendancy is the most appropriate model for effective clinical management. 
The only exceptions to this were practice nurses' agreement with the statement 
positing beneficial autonomy effects in team-based approaches to clinical management 
and practice managers' relatively weak support for team-based approaches. It was 
154 
apparent that both these groups believed clinical management and clinical teams were 
best managed by medical practitioners. Neither of these stances was surprising given 
that both practice nurses and practice managers are employees of general 
practitioners. 
The professions' stances on multidisciplinary team-based approaches to care provision 
in hospitals were similar to the stances in PCTs. Nurse managers supported all 
propositions. General managers were generally supportive but again questioned the 
proposition that team-based approaches to care enhanced clinical autonomy. Nurse 
clinicians appeared to support medically-led team-based approaches whilst doctors 
opposed any resemblance of multidisciplinary team-based approaches to clinical 
management. Secondary care medical managers however joined their more purely 
clinical colleagues in their opposition to multidisciplinary teams. Allied health managers 
were generally supportive of multidisciplinary team-based care but were equivocal 
about their impact on clinical autonomy. The allied health clinicians , in contrast, did 
tend to believe such teams would enhance clinical autonomy but seemed to prefer 
such teams to be led by medical clinicians. 
Table 8.9 Secondary Care Stances on Aspects of the Multidisciplinary Teams 
MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC Sig. 
Autonomy effects of team-based 
approaches to clinical work 
·.31 ·.74 -.10 .41 .35 -.02 .22 .000 
management 
Team-based approaches to 
clinical unit management · .28 ·.23 .04 .16 .12 .15 -.11 .026 
Medical ascendancy models of 
.42 .22 -.64 ·.22 .11 ·.15 .27 .000 clinical unit management 
Hierarchical, financially driven 
clinical unit management .02 -.01 .42 .17 .13 .13 -.16 .047 
-
. Key. MC- Medtcal Cllntoan, MM- Medtcal Manager. GM- General Manager, NM- Nurse Manager, NC- Nurse Cllntaan, AHM- Allred health Manager, 
AHC= Al lied Health Clinician 
Shaded cetls indicale that the stance reported in this cell is in accordance with the desired direction of reform. 
• The item 'Hierarchical, financially driven clinical unit management' was not shaded as it is not clear that the reforms seek either to foster or to undermine 
this form of management. It may be that learns are compatible \!'lith this type of management as well as others -at the very least 1t IS a fonn of 
management which provides greater emphasis on the financial implications of care proV1sion. 
·Key: MC; Med1cal Cl1niaan. MM; Med1cal Manager. GM; General Manager, NM; Nurse Manager, NC; Nurse Chniaan, AHM; AJhed health Manager. 
AHC; Allied Health Climc1an, LC ; Lead Chmc1an. GM; General Manager. NM; Nurse Manager, NC; Nurse ChniCian, GP = General Practitioner, PN = 
Practice Nurse, PM = Practice Manager 
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Graphical Depiction of Results 
Overall 
Statistical analysis revealed that the differences between the professional subgroups 
on aspects of the modernisation reform agenda occurred on six dimensions, two of 
which explained 84% of the variances between all respondents across the Acute 
Trusts, PCTs and General Practices. These two dimensions were: 
• Individualised vs. systematised concepts of clinical work performance 
(50%) and 
• Financial realism with transparent accountability vs. clinical purism with 
opaque accountability (34%). 
Figure 8.1 Stances of Professional Groups across the Study on Issues of 
ce to the Modernisation nda 
Key: MC= Medical Clinician, MM= Medical Manager, GM= General Manager, NM= Nurse Manager, 
NC= Nurse Clinician , AHM= Allied health Manager, AHC= Allied Health Clinician, LC = Lead Clinician , 
GM= General Manager, NM= Nurse Manager, NC= Nurse Clinician , GP = General Practitioner, 
PN = Practice Nurse, PM = Practice Manager 
Scores on axes were generated through the discriminant analysis of factors derived from respondents ' 
Likert scores 
These stances are summarised in Figure 8.1 which provides a visual depiction of the 
stances of each professional group in relation to each other. The stances of secondary 
care staff are depicted by the blue line; those of primary care staff by the yellow. The 
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figure shows several consistencies in relationships within professions and across 
sectors. 
Regardless of the sector in which they worked, medical staff tended toward more 
individualised conceptions of clinical work whereas nursing staff held more collectivist 
conceptions. General managers were similar to nursing staff in holding conceptions of 
clinical work which were more grounded in a systems approach to clinical work. 
However medical managers (and to a lesser extent medical clinicians) were more 
accepting of the financial implications of clinical work than the nursing professions. 
Figure 8.1 also demonstrates that clinical managers (across all professions and both 
sectors) held more systematised conceptions of clinical work than did the individual 
clinicians. Even though, at times, the differences between managers and clinicians 
must produce significant tensions, these differences were primarily differences of 
magnitude rather than of nature. 
(This is not true for allied health staff. Preliminary statistical investigations suggested 
that this may be a partial reflection of the heterogeneity within the allied health 'tribe'. In 
truth, allied health is not a tribe at all but a convenience grouping of very diverse 
professionals just as different from each other as doctors are from nurses, with the 
caveat that allied health staff tend to have a relatively high degree of autonomy. 
However allied health managers probably view clinical work more collectively for the 
same reason that medical and nurse managers do - they are responsible for patients 
on a population basis, even if in small numbers and not a patient-by-patient basis.) 
The figure also shows greater distance in the stances of professions within primary 
care relative to secondary care. GPs and PCT general managers and nurse managers 
held strong, almost mirror opposite conceptions of the nature of clinical work. All non-
medical primary care staff, even the practice nurses who tended to support medical 
dominance, held qualitatively different positions on the nature of clinical work and the 
reform program to the GPs. (Practice managers have been excluded from this diagram 
as they did not answer the survey questions about their understanding of clinical 
autonomy and accountability.) The lead clinicians' 'middle position' between these 
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groups appears to have made them the only professional group (by virtue of both their 
status and moderate views) capable of juggling or spanning the disparate stances of 
the primary care professions. However this may in fact be a tenuous suggestion. 
Though their differences from ordinary GPs were primarily differences of degree, the 
magnitude of the differences was such that, should they have actively pursued a 
boundary spanning role , these differences could quickly become, or be seen to 
become, differences of quality. 
Fi ure 8.2 Professional Stances within Individual Prima 
Key: LC = Lead Clinician , GM= General Manager, NM= Nurse Manager, NC= Nurse Clinician , 
GP = General Practitioner, PN = Practice Nurse, PM = Practice Manager 
Scores on axes were generated through the discriminant analysis of factors derived from respondents' 
Likert scores 
The prospect of this occurring was suggested by Figure 8.2. This shows the distribution 
of professionals' stances by one standard deviation from each mean across the study 
PCTs. Some lead clinicians' responses place them in the systemised, collectivist, 
financially aware and organisationally transparent quadrant. If lead clinicians of this 
persuasion tried to coexist with those general practitioners who fell into the 
individualistic, clinically pure and opaque accountability quadrant, tensions would likely 
to result. Practices nurses may have provided some support for these lead clinicians in 
terms of greater systematisation but it appeared their support would not be forthcoming 
if they suspected systematisation would become a means for increasing organisational 
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accountability rather than patient centredness. The figure suggested that lead clinicians 
of the more collectivist persuasion were at risk of being out of favour with all groups, 
considered not sufficiently supportive of reform by the other PCT managers and not 
sufficiently sympathetic and representative by their general practitioner colleagues. 
This, in fact, was exactly how many lead clinicians' represented their power during 
discussions in the developmental phase. Few suggested that they could easily or 
consistently expect to be willingly heard by their fellow GPs. Rather, they all expressed 
difficulties and a need to work very hard at maintaining the confidence of all their 
colleagues; they were very careful to pick an choose policies and strategies that might 
bring them into conflict with others and would not 'squander' the remaining credibility 
they had with other GPs on matters they did not regard as essential to healthcare 
improvement. 
The figure also suggested that most professional groups in primary care were not as 
cohesive as earlier discussion may have suggested. Of the professional groups within 
primary care, only 67% of general managers and nursing clinicians (equivalent to one 
standard deviation from the mean) lay within one quadrant. The relative consistency 
within these groups is perhaps not surprising; PCTs were relatively immature and their 
general managers, all of whom were appointed under similar conditions with similar job 
descriptions, formed a relatively recent cohort. PCT nurses on the other hand, tended 
to be 'old hands'. They were people with a clear sense of mission who have performed 
the same role through many reorganisations of primary care and formal 
responsibilities(Peckham and Exworthy 2003). What was clear was that in all PCTs, a 
wide disparity existed between the views of staff in the key primary care groups 
(nursing and medical, managerial and clinician). 
Compared with primary care, Figure 8.3 shows a greater internal cohesion within most 
secondary care professional groups at one standard deviation from the mean (67% of 
these professional populations.) At this level, there was no qualitative disparity between 
the majority of medical managers and medical clinicians who tended to favour 
individualistic conceptions of care and to weakly (in the case of clinicians) or more 
strongly (in the case of medical mangers) support organisationally responsible 
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approaches to care, including increased accountability for both the clinical and financial 
outcomes of their work General managers and the bulk of allied health managers held 
qualitatively similar views to each other, supporting more collectivised approaches to care 
with organisational responsibility. Unsurprisingly though general managers were more 
supportive of both these than the allied health managers. Nursing managers showed a 
relatively strong degree of support for coordinated , collectivised organisation and 
provision of care (they did not accept that patient care should be conceptualised on 
individualised bases) however they divided amongst themselves about whether they 
should adopt reforms that carried greater organisational responsibility. Within nursing, the 
most populous of all professional groups, there was tight agreement between the majority 
staff that patient needs should be prioritised above organisational needs; there were some 
(small) differences amongst the nurses about whether a collectivised or individualised 
approach to care was best. Allied health clinicians were virtually alone in their support for 
what is effectively the status quo - individualised approaches to care without 
organisational accountability for its outcomes. 
Key: MC= Medical Clinician, MM= Medical Manager, GM= General Manager, NM= Nurse Manager, 
NC= Nurse Clinician, AHM= Allied health Manager, AHC" Allied Health Clinician 
Scores on axes were generated through the discriminant analysis of factors derived from respondents' 
Likert scores 
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Figure 8.3 also shows that the professional groups' stances in the study Trusts were 
consistent with those of professional groups in other Trusts; small differences did exist 
between the groups' stances in each Trust but these were not statistical significant. 
In summary, the data showed that the views of each professional group tended to be 
consistent across settings. There was greater consistency between each profession's 
culture across the health economy than with other professional groups within their own 
organisation or with government policy. This was true regardless of whether the issue was 
the conception of care (as an individual, even idiosyncratic, activity versus a collective, 
systematised practice) or the governance of care (whether chiefly a private activity 
undertaken by professionals and their peers or a more public activity within the healthcare 
organisations and/or the wider community). 
Discussion 
The analytical technique used in this chapter concentrates on the differences between 
groups. Work on areas of agreement between the various professions (or tribes), 
suggests that they tend to agree on what should not happen rather than what should 
(Bryman, Gillingwater, and McGuinness 1996; Hudson 2001 ). NHS culture (or at least 
culture within and across the study Trusts) at the start of the Clinical Management 
Development project was, and perhaps is in part, a culture based around enclaves and 
lack of consensus, even conflict. 
The graphs of professions' stances within and across Trusts and health economies 
reflect the tenor of much of the literature concerned with reform in general and 
multidisciplinary teamwork in particular (see Chapter Three). A quick review of relevant 
academic databases (or even just a list of contributors to an issue of the Journal of 
lnterprofessional Care) attests to the mutual concern of the non-medical professions 
(principally but not solely in primary care) to understand and improve teams, power 
sharing, leadership, interprofessional training and working, resource sharing 
mechanisms etc. Doctors are notable for their relative absence in these literatures. 
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This absence is perhaps not surprising given the current structure of the health service. 
Under current arrangements, doctors have a high degree of autonomy or 'clinical 
freedom' to self-describe, self-define, and self-evaluate their work (Degeling, Hunter, 
and Dowdeswell 2001; Harrison 1999) and have, to a large extent, successfully 
protected their clinical territory and freedoms against threats arising from the 
professionalisation of nursing, the proliferation of therapy professions, and the advance 
of managerialism (Peckham and Exworthy 2003). GPs have retained a relatively 
independent status vis-a-vis other doctors within the NHS, although this has potentially 
lessened with the devolution of the GMS contracts to PCTs. Further, as 'self-employed 
businessmen' albeit in a monopsonistic market, GPs employ considerable numbers of 
primary care staff, principally practice nurses, practice managers and receptionists A 
range of other health professionals are contracted in or co-located on site depending 
on local circumstances e.g. community nurses, smoking cessation consultants, 
dieticians, and physiotherapists. Thus GPs are not just de facto members of a primary 
healthcare team but its employer and/or leader, thus relegating other health 
professionals to a subordinate position. 
The persistence of these structures arises in part from the legislative power imbalance 
in the doctors' favour (Kappeli 1995). Under legislative authority, doctors have power to 
restrict entry into their profession and to self-discipline themselves via the GMC. 
Although nurses and allied health professionals also have this power, their governing 
bodies lack the political influence of the GMC. Further, nurses and allied health 
professions have traditionally been subordinate to medical authority. Doctors often 
perceive this traditional authority and power as granting them a basis for disputing 
managers' right and/or efficacy to make decisions that affect the provision of care 
(Davies and Harrison 2003; Edwards, Marshall, Mclellan, and Abbasi 2003) and for 
justifying their dislike of teams. It also provides them with a basis for resisting the 
'territorial' conflicts arising from the increasing specialisation and professionalisation of 
healthcare work, for example, between medicine and nurse practitioners (Dean 2002; 
Neale 1999). The traditional separation of responsibilities such that doctors 'cure' while 
nurses 'care' (Baumann, Deber, Silverman, and Mallette 1998) and the culture of 
respect for the medical profession by the general public and other professions 
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(especially nursing and its acceptance of medically led teams and unit management, 
demonstrated in this chapter's results) has so far also assisted doctors in maintaining 
opposition to the modernisation reforms. 
This apparently impregnable position however is weakening due to several factors, 
including adverse publicity and the desire of the public to prevent another Harold 
Shipman or Bristol Royal Infirmary. The generalist nature of GPs' work means that 
much of their work can be delegated to nurse practitioners without loss of quality 
(Hopkins, Solomon, and Abelson 1996; Horrocks, Anderson, and Salisbury 2002; 
Kinnersley, Anderson, Parry, Clement, Archard, Turton, Stainthorpe, Fraser, Butler, 
and Rogers 2000; Spitzer, Sackett, Sibley, Roberts, Gent, Kergin, and al 1974). PCT 
managers, as holders of the GMS and PMS contracts, now have the right (if, perhaps 
presently, not the will) to prescribe contractual obligations upon GPs that will alter the 
skill-mix and authority structures within primary care (Exworthy, Berney, and Powell 
2002). A similar vulnerability exists notionally for doctors within secondary care for, 
although they are self-regulating professionals, they are also employees of the state 
and could theoretically be compelled to act as such. Further erosion of individualised 
expressions of medical power arises from efforts, both intra- and extra-professional, to 
substitute epidemiological and experimental evidence in clinical decision making for 
personalised and case-based evidence for example via the evidence-based practice 
movement and the National Institute for Clinical Excellence respectively. 
Even should doctors accept these change imperatives and begin to act accordingly, by 
themselves these changes will be insufficient to permit successful reorganisation of the 
way clinical work is coordinated and managed, and to ensure implementation of the 
wider NHS Plan. For if medicine accepts less power in the performance and 
management of clinical work within organisations in order to adopt more 
multidisciplinary approaches to care, other professions will need to increase their 
responsibility in participating in, and leading, multidisciplinary teams. The results 
reported here suggest that within nursing, and to a lesser extent amongst general 
managers, in 2002 there was still a relatively strong preference amongst other health 
professions for doctors to lead in multidisciplinary teams and clinical units. Further, the 
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professional cultures in this study appeared to be influenced by an apparent lack of 
coherent conceptual thought about the core elements of clinical work and how these 
should be managed to produce treated patients. 
The various professions differed in the aspects of the reform agenda that they 
accepted or rejected, perhaps for reasons that have been logical and/or traditionally 
supportable. It may be argued that at least each reform has some support somewhere 
in each organisation but this misses the key point that the reform themes do not 
operate in isolation from each other. Although individually identifiable, they are 
interdependent facets of clinical production. For instance, without mechanisms for 
making the components of care and their use transparent, it is impossible to 
realistically trace the financial and resource considerations of delivered care. The effort 
in implementing accountability systems for clinical work performance will be less than 
profitable if the information produced is not used to monitor, review and improve the 
organisation and conduct of care. Conducting reviews of individual aspects of care 
without placing these elements within the context of an overall plan or pathway of care 
does nothing to alleviate the acknowledged systemic problems in care delivery. Finally, 
a refusal to work and manage care in interdisciplinary teams results in an inability to 
evaluate and alter the effectiveness of the entirety of care. 
Finding ways to bridge the key discontinuities and areas of disagreement between the 
professional subcultures of these NHS organisations, and their conceptions of 
professional and clinical work, must be crucial to successfully reconfiguring the 
management and performance of clinical work. Clinical managers, who straddle both 
the clinical and organisational domains of care provision, should be critical to this 
endeavour. However as demonstrated in this chapter and noted elsewhere (Degeling 
2000), medical managers, in particular, hold predominantly individualistic conceptions 
of clinical work which preclude them from focusing on work as collaborative practice. 
This limits their (and others') discussions of health reform to a rhetorical debate; the 
contributions of other professions to health outcomes in these circumstances become 
ancillary to the debate. Degeling and others (Degeling et al. 2004) suggest that building 
discursive and communicative skills and practical legitimacy amongst clinician 
managers will help them find ways to mediate the contradictions and discontinuities 
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within and across professions, in the process building new ways of thinking and doing. 
However this will require determined effort and coherent support from senior 
management committed to the transformation of how clinical work is done and held 
accountable. 
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Chapter Nine 
Staff Perspectives on Performance Improvement 
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Introduction and Overview 
This chapter reports a thematic analysis of the open-ended survey questions about 
how, at the commencement of the Clinical Management Development Project, staff 
viewed clinical work performance, its improvement, and how clinical and organisational 
management could be better undertaken. The questions were deliberately wide and 
rather vague in order to avoid pre-specifying how respondents should structure their 
thinking and/or prioritise their comments. The three questions were headed by the 
words "What would you change?" and asked respondents, in the space provided for 
answering, to: 
• "List changes in funding, organising and/or managing which you believe will 
significantly improve your clinical performance". 
• "List changes in funding, organising and/or managing which you believe will 
significantly improve your experience of work". 
• "Specify any changes you believe need to be made in the focus, funding 
and/or management of acute Trusts to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of your local health economy/community". 
These three questions together were thought to provide an indication of how Trust staff 
viewed the functioning of their organisation, care provision within it, and ways to 
improve these. The responses as a totality were firstly analysed by theme, then 
grouped according to respondents' sub-professions, and reported by Trust. 
The open-ended questions about various aspects of performance improvement 
followed after the close-ended Likert style questions of the cultural survey. It is not 
surprising therefore that the overwhelming majority of these responses were 
unelaborated lists or short, often terse, statements (although some comments were 
more prose-like and detailed). This limited the richness of many responses and, at 
times, posed difficulties for interpreting what was intended by the respondent. 
Respondents were given individual identifying numbers in order to protect their 
anonymity (indicated by subscripts). This was designed to prevent the tenor and 
frequency of comments from especially disenchanted staff or enthusiastic staff from 
colouring the overall results. Responses were then counted according to the member 
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of staff for whom this aspect of organisation and clinical work performance was a 
concern. For example, a staff member concerned about a lack of resources may have 
listed up to eight or nine types of resources ranging from clinical staff to support 
services to beds etc but will have been counted only once. Counting in this way 
indicates the prevalence of concerns within and across staff groups but does not 
indicate the breadth of those concerns which, at times, was extensive. 
The tables provide counts and percentages of staff from each professional subgroup 
participating in the survey commenting on each theme. Although seemingly large 
numbers of various sub-professions commented on a particular theme, support 
amongst staff as a whole for any particular improvement suggestion was often very 
low. This was because more staff did not comment than did. At times the low numbers 
and percentages of staff group members completing these questions raised concerns 
about the extent to which the responses were representative of the subgroup as a 
whole. The low response rate also potentially indicated some organisational 
disengagement. For instance, in NTH nursing clinicians' responses were remarkably 
infrequent compared to other staff groupings with as few as 5% (1/18) of nurse clinician 
respondents answering these questions. 
The results showed that the similarity of stances within professions and the differences 
between professions discussed in the previous chapter were also present in 
respondents' suggestions for service and work life improvement. Medical clinicians 
within the two Trusts by and large focused on the need to improve the internal 
organisation of work and resource availability. The medical managers agreed but were 
less critical of management. They were keen to introduce changes that would allow 
them to better balance the differing responsibilities of their positions and to have a 
stronger information base for decision-making about clinical priorities, service design 
and contractual commitments. General managers were the professional subgroup most 
distinguishable between Trusts. In CHFT they could be characterised as having clear 
organisational goals, an inclusive approach to management, and agreement about how 
to do things differently. In contrast, general managers in NTH, though concerned to 
improve effective team and joint working within both the organisation and within the 
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health economy, seemed to lack ideas for doing so and tended to blame shift on to 
clinicians, external politics, and previous reorganisations of care. Nurse managers took 
a more personal approach to improvement suggestions, focusing on issues of time 
pressure, personal doubts about their (and others') management capability, especially 
in the management of teams. The nurse clinicians were mostly concerned with 
personal aspects of working life especially pay and working conditions (time pressures 
again featured prominently) and having greater access to training opportunities. They 
appeared to be very unhappy with their employment. Allied health managers were 
concerned about how care was organised internally and across each health economy. 
They were also concerned about the interconnections between resource availability, 
the organisation of care, and working conditions. Allied health clinicians tended to 
portray broadly similar views to their managers with additional concerns for increased 
training opportunities and the operation of multidisciplinary teams. 
Support for more patient centred approaches to service improvement was relatively 
weak in both Trusts. There were indications that part explanations for the lack of 
progress in implementing ICPs lay in the sometimes seemingly paradoxical stances 
and differing organisational power and status of staff groups. Individual organisational 
factors were more prominent in the improvement oriented survey questions than in the 
more cultural/reform values sections. For example, staff in NTH at the start of the CMD 
project appeared somewhat more willing to adopt genuinely patient focused 
improvements than staff in CHT and NTH staffs stated values were more in line with 
CMD objectives than CHFT staffs values. However general managers in CHFT were 
more willing to acknowledge their own weaknesses and empower other groups, 
especially the medical profession, to work collaboratively in effecting change. CHFT 
staff were also somewhat distinguishable from NTH staff in the more positive tenor of 
most staff sub-groups' responses. 
A. Staff Ideas for Improving Their Clinical Performance 
Response categories for this question were arranged to flow from external influences to 
internal influences and from more immediately clinically relevant answers to less 
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immediately clinical relevant answers. The response categories identified from the data 
were as follows: 
• Decreased political interference via service reconfigurations and activity 
targets, 
• Improved organisation of clinical work between heath care organisations, 
• Improved organisation of clinical work within the Trust including the 
provision/non-provision of services, use of integrated clinical teams, team 
based incentives, improved clarity in roles and responsibilities between 
clinical staff and between clinical and non-clinical staff, and increased 
opportunities for specialist clinical practitioners within the Trust, 
• Increased access to information both in the type of data available (i.e. 
patient and clinical performance information) and better technology for 
accessing such data (e.g. electronic patient records), 
• Improved education through more training, CPO opportunities, and library 
access, 
• Resolution of non-clinical issues perceived to be relevant to the employment 
and performance of existing clinical staff. This was a very mixed category. It 
included amongst other things: 
Recognising the contribution staff were making to the Trust 
including extra unpaid work (staff weren't necessarily looking for 
monetary reward, simple "thank you's" often appeared to be 
considered enough), 
• Addressing patterns of overwork and taking paperwork home to 
do at nights and on weekends, 
• Providing more promotional opportunities, 
Removing inequalities in pay and power, 
Better appraisal systems, and 
More action taken on completed appraisals. 
• Better organisational management. This took a variety of forms: 
• Clear organisational goals and objectives, 
Better integration between the managerial and clinical domains 
of organisational life, 
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More strategic thinking (including allowing clinicians time to 
participate in organisational strategic thinking or to develop their 
own); and 
Willingness for senior management to trust the clinical staff to 
perform professionally and to be innovative in meeting goals and 
targets. 
• Increased resources whether money, staff numbers, equipment or time. This 
response also included calls for greater freedom to use the resources available 
without burdensome approval structures (though most commonly the emphasis 
was upon volume of available resources). 
• Better facilities (e.g. accommodation for patients). 
The categorisation of responses is, to some extent, subjective and may be debated. 
For example, clinical coding may be considered an administrative/managerial task, 
clinical work that needs increased recognition and reward, or a grey area in which roles 
and responsibilities between clinical staff and between clinical and non-clinical staff 
need to clarified. Each categorisation implies a different conception of the nature of 
clinical work; my categorisation of responses may therefore ignore ambiguities, create 
over-simplifications, and/or mislead the reader about staffs' capacity to appreciate the 
interdependencies and complexities within and between identified issues. Respondents 
often were aware of issue interdependency as the following quote indicates, "Staffing 
levels need to be addressed in order to improve training on new equipment but there is 
no point in installing new equipment to greatly improve service to patients if the old 
values, resources etc are reinstated". Comments such as this were classified according 
to the main themes within them; I recognise however that doing so overlooked the 
respondent's system awareness which some authors e.g. Deming (Deming 1986) and 
Seddon (Seddon 2003) would regard as extremely unfortunate. 
Staff often appeared to conflate two or more different concepts, for example, it was 
apparent that both clinical and managerial staff often regarded clinical audit, research, 
and training as essentially the same thing e.g. "time for audit/research/CME". Perhaps 
for some staff, these activities are all means of improving their clinical practice and, in 
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that sense, interchangeable. These were however disaggregated and counted within 
the categories listed above. 
A 1. Improving Clinical Performance - North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust 
The results for NTH are reported in Table 9.1 over the page. The two most common 
responses were more effective internal organisation of clinical work (35.8% of 
respondents) and increased resources (34.9%). Although these were common themes 
across all subgroups, the frequency of comments about these matters amongst 
medical clinicians pushed them to the forefront of improvement suggestions. Further, 
the number of medical clinicians completing this question and their higher than average 
number of comments meant that the views of doctors tended to dominate the 
responses to this part of the survey. Nurse managers were also in reasonable 
agreement about the importance of these two items however they were equally 
concerned about more effective organisational management. These two items were 
followed in frequency by a cluster that comprised more effective organisational 
management (21.7%), increased training, CPO opportunities, library access (19.6%) 
and access to clinical information and information systems (18.5%). 
The professional groups that had most to say about how the Trust could improve the 
functioning of the health economy were allied health managers (3.7 comments on 
average per person), medical clinicians (3.5) and nurse managers (2.3). (As only three 
nurses commented on this question, their average, 2.6, is somewhat misleading). 
Medical Clinicians (14124) 
As noted above, medical clinicians largely accounted for the first place ranking given to 
improvement of the internal organisation clinical work within the Trust as a means for 
improving individual clinicians' work performance with 100% of doctors completing this 
question mentioning this theme. The third most prevalent improvement suggestion by 
doctors was more effective organisational management. The number and tenor of 
comments around the need for improvements in these two areas conveyed an 
impression that staff believed the Trust was impeded by poor organisation of clinical 
work and services within the organisation. Doctors suggested this, together with poor 
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relationships between clinicians and managers, ineffective wider organisation and a 
lack of information, led to even basic care tasks being problematic at times. 
Many doctors' responses about resources and internal organisation of care were 
crammed with details for example, "More supporting staff - I currently have to spend 
too much time on mundane clerical work, chasing results, filing carrying notes etc. 
Much better IT. Move ward nursing times - ward rounds are much less efficient than in 
the system - I waste time looking for patients/charts/etc. More beds. The 100% + bed 
occupancy that seems to be norm is inefficient as patients have to placed in 'only 
available bed'. Closer links with social works - on the ward. Even better (faster) 
radiology and lab services etc"32 
Overall the comments suggested that doctors and others in NTH were not so much 
concerned with wanting more resources for themselves as desiring a better internal 
organisation of clinical work with more support resources to achieve it. 
Medical Managers (416) 
Medical managers' responses were similarly wide ranging, though for these and other 
staff (for example nurse mangers and allied health staff) clinical performance 
improvement was more a matter of making better use of the resources the Trust 
already had together with appropriate access to clinical information to guide and inform 
service design and delivery. For example, "Influencing referral patients from primary 
care. Delivering more clinical work to extended scope practitioners. Provide an 
effective IT system to capture clinical data, including coding. These will ensure that 
clinicians' time is used to maximum effect, seeing the right patient with shortest walk 
and working in teams"39 Some of the changes desired by the medical managers 
potentially would be highly controversial amongst medical staff, for instance the 
extension of extended scope practitioners, a desire for public league tables of doctors' 
outcomes40 , better evidence of "clinical competence for all health staff (qualified and 
nonqualified)"43 and, perhaps less controversially, "reward and recognition of excellent 
performances to team rather than individual i.e. further investment in services"41 . 
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Table 9.1 NTH Respondents' Suggestions For Clinical Performance Improvement 
NC AHM AHC Total MC MM GM NM (X) 
Numbers of respondents in each 
n= n= n= n= n= n= n= subgroup completing this question as a 14124 n=416 5/14 12/17 3/18 6/10 14/16 58/92 percentage of the subgroup that (58.3%) (666%) (35.7%) (70.5%) (16.6%) (60.0%) (87.5%) (63.0) 
completed the survey as a whole 
%of All 
Respondents 
Number of Professionals Commenting in Each Professional Subgroup Remarking 
on Each 
Issue 
(x/92) 
External influences 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 3.3% 
Improved organisation of clinical work 2 1 1 0 0 6 1 11 12.0% between heath care organisations 
Improved organisation of clinical work 14 4 3 6 1 1 4 33 35.9% intornal to the Trust 
Access to dinical infomnation and 8 1 0 3 0 2 3 17 18.5% information systems 
Increased training, CPD opportunities. 3 2 1 4 2 2 4 18 19.6% library access 
Staff condit1 ons and remuneration 3 1 1 2 2 0 2 11 12.0% 
More effective organisational 5 0 2 6 0 3 4 20 21.7% 
management 
Increased resources (whether £s, staff 14 1 0 6 2 4 5 32 34.8% 
numbers, equipment) 
Better accommodation facilities 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 2.2% 
Total Comments 49 10 8 28 8 21 23 147 
Average number of comments per 3.5 2.5 1.6 2.3 2.6 3.7 1.64 
responding staff in subgroup 
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General Managers (5114) 
Surprisingly few general managers answered this question. No responding general 
manager appeared concerned about the overall level of resources. Instead they 
regarded the reorganisation of internal work as being most likely to contribute to 
improved clinical performance. Most comments were relatively terse listing points of 
action to be implemented across a range of clinically related concerns. Three made 
comments that were effectively about reigning in the power of consultants through a 
variety of mechanisms including "All decision making should be by a cross section of 
integrated clinicians managers and outside interested bodies who are informed by the 
most recent accepted and best practice"51 • 
Nurse Managers (12117) 
It appeared that nurse managers, more than any other staff grouping, regarded clinical 
performance as relating to virtually all aspects of organisational life. They were 
particularly concerned about reciprocity of understanding between management staff 
and clinical staff, "Better training for clinicians to fully understand managerial aspects 
and implications of funding issues"67 , "a role in the balance of power to a more multi 
professional dimension"60, "a management style which allows freedom of choice and 
professional autonomy"59 and "co-ordinate clinicians to understand pressures with 
specialities other than their own"70. 
Nurse Clinicians (3/18) 
Very few nurses answered this question. Those that did tended to see improvement as 
occurring through primarily more training opportunities and resources and sorting out 
anomalies in working conditions between acute staff based in-house and those based 
in the community, "Significant funding to allow staff time off for extra studying. 
Reorganisation of contracts i.e. Whitley and Trust - staff morale very low at present due 
to unequal contracts and conditions. Because of Trust contracts new employees are 
going to other hospitals, therefore there is a lack of staff in all areas of maternity"18 . 
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Allied Health Managers (6/10) 
Allied Health Managers also took a wide view of requirements for improved clinical 
organisation however they were particularly concerned about relationships with 
external bodies, the availability of resources, particularly time (which they felt could be 
achieved either through more staff or the reorganisation of clinical work), and the role of 
the allied health profession within the organisational structure: "Sharing of best practice 
across sites and also with different Trusts"79 and "Organising higher profile - equal 
influence/decision making as doctors and nurses: having a directorate structure. Seat 
on Trust Board for AHPs"85 . 
Allied Health Clinicians (14/16) 
Allied health clinicians were keen for more resources, better training, and improvements 
to both the organisation of clinical work and organisational management. These were 
often seen as inter-related issues, "Staffing levels need to be addressed in order to 
improve training on new equipment. An adequate service can then be provided at all 
times - not dependant on two members of staff only. There is no point in installing new 
equipment to greatly improve service to patients if the old values, resources etc are 
reinstated. Technological advances should be just that- not limited by out of date working 
practices and cost cutting exercises."103 
Some of the most striking comments about ineffective organisation of clinical work were 
about their difficulties in working in 'integrated' teams, "Unfortunately we are managed by 
3 separate organisations NHS Trust/PCT/Social Services. Consequently each 
manager/team leader often have (sic) separate agendas. I am employed by NHS Trust 
but the manager that takes most initiative in team leading is employed by Social Services. 
This gives me less autonomy than I would like to be able to change my own team"93 
Despite these problems, allied health staff, more than any other staff group, still tended to 
regard integrated teams as a key way forward. The above respondent also said "I work as 
part of an integrated care team - greatest strength is that each member of staff 
works/communicates well"93 whilst another said, "Partnership working and team working in 
the true sense would make significant changes in the clinical performance"101 
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Summary 
The overriding impression gained from reading these comments was that the need to 
attend to the organisation and management of clinical work within the Trust was a 
common theme amongst NTH staff. However each staff group tended to emphasise 
different aspects of this, with some groups, especially the medical managers, favouring 
changes that could be controversial. It evoked the possibility that, rather than favouring a 
conservative approach to clinical and organisational management as the discussion in 
Chapters Six and Seven suggested, at least some medical managers would have 
preferred a more adventurous and inclusive approach to management. The responses 
from the other staff groups suggest that they have supported such innovative changes. 
A2. Improving Clinical Performance - Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS 
Foundation Trust 
In Overview 
Table 9.2 overleaf shows that CHFT staffs suggestions for how their individual and 
collective clinical performance may be improved ranged across most improvement 
themes. It indicates that much higher percentages of staff within subgroups and CHFT 
as a whole made suggestions for how clinical performance may be improved than in 
NTH. It also shows that the numbers of suggestions made by individuals was more 
consistent across the professional groups than was the case amongst NTH staff. 
The three sources of clinical performance improvements most frequently mentioned 
were increased resources, improved internal organisation of clinical work, and 
increased education and training opportunities. Although it was primarily nurses and 
allied health clinicians that desired increased training opportunities, after accounting for 
the different numbers of staff in the various subgroups there were relatively few 
distinctions in support between the sub-groups for most clinical improvement themes. 
One of these distinctions concerned the desire for more resources, especially time to 
create space for service planning. Whilst virtually all subgroups within the Trust desired 
increased resources, the general managers did not believe this would provide the 
answer. For general managers, clinical performance would be improved firstly and 
foremostly by them (that is, the general managers) lifting their own game. 
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Table 9.2 CHFT Respondents' Suggestions For Clinical Performance Improvement 
MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC Total (xl 
Numbers of respondents in each 
n= n= n= n= n= n= n= 
subgroup completing this question as a 25135 n=7/9 10/16 11123 31139 17121 17/19 118/162 percentage of the subgroup that (71.4%) (77.8%) (62.5%) (47.8%) (79.5%) (81.0%) (89.5% (72.8%) 
completed the survey as a whole 
%of All 
Respondent 
Number of Professionals Commenting in Each Professional Subgroup Remarking 
on Each 
Issue 
(x/162) 
External influences 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 3.1% 
Improved organisation of clinical work 4 3 1 0 1 2 0 11 6.8% between heath care organisations 
Improved organisation of clinical work 14 1 4 5 8 11 4 47 29.0% internal to the Trust 
Access to clinical information and 4 3 4 1 4 8 4 28 17.3% information systems 
Increased training, CPD opportunities, 1 0 1 2 15 7 14 40 24.7% library access 
Staff conditions and remuneration 4 1 1 3 9 3 6 26 16.0% 
More effective organisational 7 2 7 2 9 7 2 36 22.2% 
management 
Increased resources (whether £s. staff 17 
numbers, equipment) 4 1 5 18 13 10 68 42.0% 
Better accommodation facilities 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 7 4.3% 
Total Comments 55 14 20 19 68 52 41 269 
Average number of comments per 2.2 
responding staff in subgroup 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.2 3.1 2.4 
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Medical Clinicians (25/35) 
The doctors' comments indicated that, in 2002 when this survey was conducted, many 
doctors saw the organisational management strata of the Trust as not involving clinical 
staff in decisions and not following through on decisions once they were made. The 
following comments convey the flavour of the concerns about how clinical work was 
being managed: "Have managers changed into administrators to do the tasks set by 
the clinicians (ie put the horse back in front of the cart)"125. "A whole new style of 
management where important decisions are made following consultation with those 
involved"141 • "An effective management structure which allows rapid decision making 
and action to be taken"140 and "Dramatically reducing the number of meetings which 
consume a lot of time for non-clinical matters" 134 
Medical Managers (719) 
Medical managers wanted the wider organisational management to provide a clearer 
steer on priorities and contractual arrangements especially through the provision of 
clinical information: "The most important single thing is information in order to support 
decision making and also to help benchmark performance"151 , "Clarity around 
contractual arrangements i.e. expectation that unfixed sessions are still meant to be 
within the NHS"157 and "Clearer aims of the organisation"152 
General Managers (10/16) 
As noted above, for general managers, clinical performance improvement was 
dependent upon getting the organisational systems and the prevailing culture right, 
"More performance monitoring - celebrate success - learn from failure" 165 and 
"Performance management and team based working - putting patients rather than 
themselves first"162 (in this case 'themselves' referred to clinicians). There was a desire 
to overhaul the management foci, structure and culture to enable the empowering of 
clinicians, "The development of links between increased clinical performance and 
resource allocation. Reinforce the role of the Clinical Director to support the principal of 
devolved autonomy with transparent accountability. Move to an organisational culture 
in which clinicians are empowered to develop clinical services, supported and guided 
by clinically aware management structure, Introduction of clinical pathways"174 and 
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"Development of leadership skills of clinical staff. Development of team working. 
Supportive environment where staff are encouraged to learn from mistakes/near 
misses"175 . 
Nurse Managers (11123) 
The two categories of response mentioned most often by nurse managers were 
increased resources and improved organisation of clinical work internal to the Trust. 
The desire for extra resources however was often tied to a wise use of these, 
"Accountability for cost + having to provide 'business case' for using certain products -
having to make true evaluation etc"187 and "Improved staffing numbers in clinical areas 
to enable more teaching etc to take place"197 Nurse managers seemed to believe that 
general management's controlling emphases were disproportionate to the need and 
discouraging to front line clinicians: "Lessen management tiers and management as a 
whole. Staff seem to be unaware of who or which manager does what, Staff are aware 
of the fact that managers get performance related pay. Have managers who keep in 
contact with clinical (staff?) setting workload etc. Let go of the purse strings- we are all 
responsible adults that can budget and know better what is important in clinical 
settings"193. They were also supportive of monitoring, organising and conducting clinical 
work in accordance with clinical protocols, guidance and peer review. 
Nurse Clinicians (31139) 
A large percentage of nurses completed this question, focusing primarily on resources 
and more personal needs. Many nurses believed they needed increased training and 
study to increase their clinical performance. For one (apparently very depressed) staff 
member this was seen as a way out of a hellish situation, "My clinical performance 
continues to deteriorate etc. Stress of job affected my memory - am botching things up 
- making some right cock-ups can't think straight and can't form words etc. . ... Am 
applying for study days just to get off the ward - pity the auxiliaries, they don't have that 
luxury- am boxed in by managers etc"212 Although few other nurses showed this level of 
distress, being overworked, not being valued, and not feeling safe in the workplace 
seemed to be a common experience. Two indicative comments in this vein were: "Funding 
for extended roles - nurses not feel cheap source of performing doctors jobs i.e. 
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consultation"209 and "Small dirty poorly furnished staff rooms make staff feel undervalued" 
227
. Continuing in this vein, many nurses wanted to be able to contribute in clinical 
performance in ways that boosted their role, responsibility and self-esteem: "I would like to 
be able to amend disease modifying drug dosage according to patient need"229. and "More 
autonomy in decision making"220 
Allied Health Managers (17/21) 
Allied health managers most often mentioned increased resources (usually 'funding' but 
also time and staff) and the internal organisation of clinical work as means for improving 
clinical performance in the Trust although increased training and access to clinical 
information systems were also mentioned. As with the allied health staff in NTH, 
coordinated approaches to care and multidisciplinary teamwork featured strongly in their 
suggestions. Possible improvements along these lines included using care pathways, 
involving patients and carers in service redesign, and care monitoring. They wanted 
"sufficient staff to enable clinicians to function as part of a known team (as opposed to 
working with different staff members)"246 , service mapping and "multi-professional 
management"260, and "explor(ing) use by different skill mix to enable 'right people' to be 
able to concentrate on tasks they are best able to carry out"250 . 
Echoing other staff groups' comments about the wider organisational management 
needing to foster a different organisational culture were comments about celebrating 
"good practice and innovation, creat(ing) a culture of clinical enquiry, facilitat(ing) whistle 
blowing in a non-blame culture - develop a Trust whistle blowing policy"255, and 
"Better/fairer access to research funding for nurses and PAMS"266. 
Allied Health Clinicians ( 17/19) 
Almost all allied health clinicians participating in the survey completed this question 
(17/19). For allied health clinicians, the factor that was perceived to most likely to 
contribute to their own clinical performance was greater access to CPO and research 
activities, "Opportunities to attend courses without paying for them myself and being 
allowed time off as recompense. Being given time in working day to prepare for 
presenting lectures etc to outside agencies"280 Linked to this was a desire for better 
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access to useful clinical information and improved organisation of clinical work, "Better 
info systems to monitor clinical outcomes with facilities for clinical audit within our own unit 
i.e. pc's/e-mail etc. Admin management seem awash with them but them seem a 'luxury' 
in clinical areas- 'we will get access to one soon' etc"287 • This sense that the conditions 
for allied health staff were relatively poor, particularly in regards promotion, was having an 
impact on both staff numbers and morale, "Need to stop our high turnover of staff 
(because there is no progression)"278 and "Some kind of reward system - a feeling of 
being valued"271 
Summary 
There appeared to be a general agreement between professions within CHFT that clinical 
performance could be improved by increasing the availability of resources and by an 
overall improvement in organisational management. Although the general managers 
clearly did not agree with the need for greater resources, they did appear to agree with 
others' belief that the general managers needed to lift their own game. There were some 
distinctions between professional groups notably the marked negativity amongst some 
nurses and allied health clinicians and the desire by numbers of these subgroups for 
greater access to ongoing training. 
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B. Responses for Improving Staffs' Experience of Work 
81. Improving the Experience of Work North- Tees and Hartlepool Trust 
Staff answers to questions about what would improve their experience of work evoked 
responses along similar lines to those that would improve clinical performance. The 
responses were coded in a similar fashion and the same caveats apply to the following 
interpretation. In total there were only half as many comments for this question as there 
were for the question about improving clinical performance. This was attributable to two 
factors: with the exception of medical mangers, those completing the question across 
all sub professional groups made fewer comments and the percentage of nurse 
managers completing the question fell below 50%. Despite this, it was again apparent 
that doctors tend to elaborate their frustrations and suggestions in greater detail than 
most other professions. 
The two highest rating categories of suggestions for improving NTH's staffs experience 
of work were improvements to the internal organisation of clinical work (30.4% of all 
suggestions) and better pay and conditions (22.8%). However the total number of staff 
commenting along these lines was notably boosted by a particular professional 
subgroup. Despite five of the seven staff groupings' mentioning internal organisation of 
clinical work most or second most frequently, more than a third of staff desiring 
improved internal organisation of clinical work were medical clinicians. In a similar vein, 
42% of comments suggesting strong dissatisfaction about pay and conditions within 
NTH originated in the allied health profession (both mangers and clinicians.) However, 
the next most frequent suggestion for improving staffs experience of work, greater 
effectiveness of organisational management (mentioned by 18.4% of responding staff), 
appeared to be a common concern across all professional subgroups. 
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Table 9.3 NTH Respondents' Suggestions for Improving their Experience of Work 
MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC Total (X) 
Numbers of respondents in each 
n= n= n= n=53/92 
subgroup completing this question as a 15/24 n=4/6 n=4/14 7/17 n=3/18 n=6/10 14/16 (57.6%) percentage of the subgroup that (60.0%) (66.6%) (286%) (41.1%) (16.6%) (60.0%) (87.5%) 
completed the survey as a whole 
%of All 
Respondent 
Number of Professionals Commenting in Each Professional Subgroup Remarking 
on Each 
Issue 
(x/92) 
External influences 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 6 6.5% 
Improved organisation of clinical work 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 3.3% between heath care organisations 
' 
Improved organisation of clinical work 10 3 2 6 0 1 6 28 30.4% internal to the Trust 
Access to clinical information and 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.8% information systems 
Increased training. CPD opportunities. 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 5.4% library access 
Staff conditions and remuneration 5 1 0 2 1 4 8 21 22.8% 
More effective organisational 4 2 1 2 1 2 5 17 18.4% 
management 
Increased resources o_whether £s, staff 9 2 1 2 0 0 1 15 16.3% 
numbers. equipment) 
Better a=ommodation facilities 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 4.3% 
Total Comments 
34 10 6 14 4 9 23 100 
Average number of comments per 2.3 2.5 1.5 2.0 1.3 1.5 1.6 
responding staff in subgroup 
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Medical Clinicians (15125) 
As with the previous question, the impression was conveyed through the comments 
that doctors believed that decision making processes within the Trust were ineffective 
and would have appreciated better organisation of care and more inspirational, focused 
management. There were repeated comments along this line covering most aspects of 
clinical work organisation and organisational decision making. "Conflict resolution to 
improve in directorate. Stronger/more involved management strategy"25, "A clearer 
pathway to agreeing and implementing new services or improvements. It is difficult to 
find out where the final decision rests - difficult to know who has to be persuaded on 
the merits of proposal"32 "A clear job plan. Reorganisation of emergency care by 
people who understand it. Feeling like there is a strategic plan; all we appear to do in 
this Trust is balance bodies"10 and "Evidence that the Board/Exec were leading this 
Trust towards harmonised working (split sites)"33 . Medical clinicians also wanted more 
resources. Suggestions concentrated on more doctors and secretaries. 
Medical Managers (416 
The same four medical managers who answered the question on improving clinical 
work also answered this question. Their primary foci were around the issue of teams 
and time, either directly or indirectly. After stating that s/he needed the Trust to 
"Liberate time for clinicians to communicate effectively with each other and with their 
teams", one medical manager went on to say "I don't know how to encourage clinicians 
to behave as a team rather than an individual"39 . Another wanted "better lead 
management - not having to struggle to have your patients admitted for surgery or 
cancelled. 24 hour support services. Time to keep up to date on paperwork/arrange 
meetings to discuss 'quality' issues"46 . This sense of time poverty was very common 
across all staff groups but was especially acute amongst medical managers and may 
be one explanation for the poor overall survey response amongst medical managers. 
General Managers 
Effective team working was also the route to improved experience of work for some 
general managers with one suggesting that 'team' was being given lip service only, 
"Enhanced teamwork in the real sense of the word"54 It seemed however that the 
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majority of general managers lacked ideas about how to improve the experience of 
work. Very few answered this question and one who did blamed centralised 
performance measuring for poor decision making, "The NHS is over-bureaucratic with 
all afraid of taking risks in case they break a rule. The high degree of central control 
takes authority away from the most suitable positioned to make the right decision"51 
Not all general managers were blaming of the wider dynamics of the NHS. One general 
manager wanted "timeout to reflect, learn, discuss"48 on personal and organisational 
responses to situations. 
Nurse Managers (7116) 
Most nurse managers responding to this question made suggestions about how clinical 
work could be better organised and managed. As with medical managers, nurse 
managers were concerned about the problems of time pressure and their experience of 
teams but also with time and forums for cross-disciplinary and cross directorate 
meetings: "More time/importance placed on discussing issues with team. Integrated 
care pathways - close redress with all disciplines"72. and "I would enjoy having time to 
have staff meetings during the working day and this would enhance team building etc. 
Lack of staff is always a problem, if you do have some staff they are always required 
somewhere else with a higher priority"74 
Nurse Clinicians (3/18) 
A poor response rate from nurses on this question again raises the issue of 
representativeness in their responses. One nurse thought that the extended nature of 
the ongoing service review was having a detrimental effect on his/her experience of 
work. Another nurse felt s/he spoke for others regarding the matter of improved 
management/staff relations, "More integration/discussion between management and 
staff in relation to change/staff moves. Recognition from management that staff may 
want to participate in their own development. Recognition from management that staff 
have their own views/wants and desires about their future within the Trust"19 
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Allied Health Managers (14116) 
In contrast to the other staff groupings in NTH, the allied health profession's responses 
about improving their experience of work were marked by a sense of injustice and 
frustration about their pay and conditions, perceived inferior accommodation, lack of 
involvement and/or an ineffective voice in clinical decision making, and poor access to 
training, "An improved environment - why are therapies neglected and housed in poor 
accommodation on the periphery of the hospital? Recognise the skills of therapists -
stop giving posts to nurses to which therapists are more suited"86 , and "Encourage staff 
and support staff financially to advance their career"81 . Failure to address these issues 
was seen by this respondent as being short-sighted on behalf of the Trust 
management, "Not everyone like me, can be self-financed to complete my course, yet I 
am moving on to another job. Trust loses out again!!"81 . 
Allied Health Clinicians 
The allied health clinicians' responses indicated that they were as unhappy at work as 
their managers however their unhappiness was sourced in the allied health managers, 
particularly their line managers, rather than the wider internal organisation of clinical 
work in the Trust. Two representative comments were: "Dreadful line manager in post 
for years. We manage ourselves"99 and "Don't feel'managed' - come to work - do work 
- no sense of direction. No reward/thanks to staff as a whole. Put a lot into job, time 
money (for courses/training) v. little in return, poor job satisfaction. Unable to discuss 
problems with manager. Poor support mechanisms. Need careers advice/direction. 
Where do I go?"97 . 
A few allied health respondents were more positive, if somewhat frustrated by the 
failure of either their professional or wider management to implement better care 
planning especially in regards to discharge processes, "I currently get good job 
satisfaction with most aspects of my work - although frustrated by poor standards of 
discharge. Doctors often dictate that a patient is medically fit for discharge - nursing 
staff will then plan patients discharge date. Would like there to be a Discharge Co-
ordinator, who had authority to plan the patients' pathway of care!"93 . 
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Summary 
Staff in all groups believed that decision making processes within NTH were ineffective, 
resulting in a lack of strategic direction and poor conflict resolution. The effects of this 
were felt at both organisational and clinical levels of the Trust. As a result, despite 
increasing governmental pressure for more collaborative, innovative and systems-
aware practices in the conduct and organisation of clinical work, staff tended to 
characterise the Trust as bedevilled by poor team management, lacking in cross 
departmental and interagency work skills, division between professions, and by poor 
human relations management. Two troublesome features of the survey were general 
managers' apparent lack of ideas and the relative failure by nurses to contribute their 
views on these matters. Given that nursing is by far the largest professional group in 
the Trust and the strenuous efforts made to include a representative group of nurses in 
the survey, this absence is concerning. It is perhaps silent testimony to a relative 
powerlessness of nurses within NTH in accordance with the discussion in earlier 
chapters. 
82. Improving the Experience of Work - Calderdale and Huddersfield Foundation 
NHS Trust 
Table 9.4 over the page shows that three themes dominated the responses by CHT's 
staff about how their experiences of work might be improved. These were 
improvements in staffs' conditions and renumeration (27.8% of respondents), more 
effective management (28.9%) and increased resources (24.1% ). The high rating for 
the first of these was influenced primarily by nurse clinicians and allied health 
managers. These groups, together with medical clinicians, were also the driving force 
behind the prominence of concerns for increased resources. All staff groups however 
desired more effective organisational management. Staff often saw all three 
suggestions as being interrelated. Amongst nurses and allied health managers, the 
common theme was being overworked and under valued (more pay was not listed as a 
factor that would improve their experience of work). 
As with NTH, the volume of suggestions across all staff groups for improving the staff 
experience of work was lower than that for improving clinical work. The number of 
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comments by nurse managers and allied health clinicians also decreased noticeably. 
Unlike NTH, the average number of comments made by responding staff was relatively 
consistent across the seven professional subgroups. 
Medical Clinicians (24/35) 
Medical clinicians listed improvement suggestions across all categories of possible 
responses however the factor favoured by the largest number of medical clinicians for 
improving their experience of work was increased resources. Increased time was the 
most commonly desired resource (six mentions); it was also a factor in medical 
clinicians' desire for better management and the improved internal organisation of 
clinical work. Perhaps surprisingly, their concerns were often that their face to face 
clinical time was impeding their ability to become involved in management and develop 
clinical services and protocols; there was also concern that the time they did spend in 
management was ineffective due to poor organisational management. The following 
comment was typical e.g. "Less administration and management (illegible) in clinical 
time. Support to approach the broader service providers - to develop joint progress. 
Respect for my time boundaries and not organising meetings which fall always on my 
day off !"140 However some believed that changes had been introduced that had 
benefited junior doctors. 
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Table 9.4 CHFT Staff Suggestions for Improving their Experience of Work 
MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC Total (x) 
Numbers of respondents in each 
n~ n= n= n= n= n= n~ 
subgroup completing this question as a 24135 n=7/9 8/16 9123 29139 16121 6/19 92/162 
.Percentage of the subgroup that (68.6%) (77.8%) (50.0%) (39.1%) (74.4%) (76.2%) (31.6% (56.8%) 
completed the survey as a whole 
%of All 
Respondent 
Number of Professionals Commenting in Each Professional Subgroup Remarking 
on Each 
Issue 
(x/162) 
External influences 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 7 4.3% 
Improved organisation of clinical work 2 0 2 0 0 2 1 7 4.3% between heath care organisations 
••>>>-~--~--N> -~----·-·-~--· ·--···----
,.............. .... ,, ____ . 
----------
Improved organisation of clinical work 7 1 3 1 3 4 7 26 16.0% internal to the Trust 
Access to clinical information and 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 8 4.9% information systems 
Increased training, CPO opportunities. 
:2 0 0 0 6 0 :2 10 6.2% library access 
Staff conditions and remuneration 7 1 2 3 17 11 4 45 27.8% 
More effective organisational 9 3 6 4 10 9 1 42 25.9% I management 
Increased resources (whether£s, staff 10 :2 0 1 14 5 6 38 24.1% 
numbers, equipment) 
Better accommodation facilities 3 1 0 1 2 0 1 8 4.9% 
Total Comments 44 12 15 10 53 33 24 191 
Average number of comments per 1.8 1.7 1.9 1. 1 1.9 2.1 4.2 
responding staff in subgroup 
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Medical Managers (7 19) 
The medical managers' responses echoed their colleagues' comments about time, 
management and organisation of clinical work and work responsibilities. However they 
also recognised that these facets of organisational life were not always the fault of 
managers: "Many of us feeling very pressurised - some by the load of clinical work, 
some by the management work load. Many frustrations arise because of the inability to 
institute changes which we know would lead to better care and more compliance etc. A 
lot of the inertia around politics (local) - yet the adverse publicity from gov, and media 
shows clinicians being resistant to change"157. 
General Managers (8/16) 
CHT general managers' belief they had to improve their own game also extended to 
their assessment of potential improvements in their experience of work. They listed a 
variety of organisational attributes that needed to be improved. These included 
providing clear and sound management leadership, attending to organisational culture, 
being less insular, clearly defining roles and responsibilities, communicating better and 
using appropriate project management tools such as 'PRINCE' to see their projects 
through. They also believed that reducing the influence of some external influences 
would improve their own and others' experience of work. Amongst elements listed were 
a lessening of the number of targets and the target driven culture and reducing public 
and governmental criticism of the NHS. 
Perhaps of more direct importance for changing the way clinical work was organised in 
CHFT was the desire by the majority of responding general managers to enable 
clinicians to lead on clinical management changes. This, it was believed, would impact 
beneficially on both general managers' and clinicians' working life: "Demonstrate that 
clinicians are in the driving seat in terms of improving clinical care outcomes. That they 
will not be left exposed to criticism if managing clinical services. Reduce anxiety and 
fear of being blamed if mistakes are made. Provide sound management leadership"174 . 
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Nurse Managers (9123) 
Better performance on basic management responsibilities and work/pay 
conditions were the two main themes amongst nurse managers. This group 
seemed very disenchanted with their working lives. The following quote is 
representative of comments advocating improved management, "Workshops on 
attitude and leadership development. Team building. Understanding the roles of 
others. Listening to patient experiences. Face to face resolution with complainants 
and a mediator"187 The following comment exemplifies comments made about 
staff pay and conditions, "Dedicated ICU nurse 20years + in NHS - I feel I have 
given a life's work to Trust for very little financial/career reward. Have been 'G' 
Grade since 1989. The role has changed with more managerial responsibility -
less reward more frustration etc"183 . 
Nurse Clinicians (29139) 
As noted above nurse clinicians were vocal about their working conditions. They were 
also keen to have more resources, especially time. They also wanted more responsive 
management however it is possible that their concern was more for their immediate 
managers than the organisational management, "Better communication skills between 
staff/management. Ask the team as a whole their views and opinions regarding 
patients care and change"213 and "Managers need to know what works and what 
doesn't at floor level to boost staff morale if necessary changes to be made etc. Staff 
need to feel rewarded for the extra effort they make when attempting to cover for staff 
shortages. If staff felt more valued it would really make a big difference"237 . 
Allied Health Managers(16/21) 
To a large extent, the tenor of the comments from allied health managers was similar to 
those made by nurse clinicians. For many, the long list of desired changes in resources 
was linked to better working conditions and improved clinical organisation. The desired 
changes included sufficient time to allow clinicians to introduce change, provide clinical 
supervision. developing strong leadership and support amongst clinicians, and get "the 
'hygiene' factors right to improve morale"255 . These were also linked with improved 
managerial performance in resolving issues (apparently in clinical management) arising 
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from the Trust merger, and in vigorously implementing local service agreements in an 
atmosphere of greater corporate stability. 
Allied Health Clinicians (1611 9) 
These respondents focused on improvements in the internal organisation of work, often 
within the context of multidisciplinary and inter-service teams and wider clinical support 
systems. They also wanted increased resources to achieve this and better pay and 
conditions, including role redevelopment. The following two comments indicate the 
general tenor of responses: "Clearer team leader organisation to provide direct clinical 
service developments"273 and "An extended role into proactive occupational health for 
Trust staff and vocational rehabilitation as part of multi-disciplinary team. Greater 
locality focus for my services. Systems of work that enhance the co-ordination of and 
liaison between intermediate care services (e.g. database)"283 
Summary 
Overall, CHFT staff believed increased availability and better management of 
resources, especially time, would improve their experience of working life. This was the 
case throughout the Trust whether at the organisational level, between clinicians and 
general management, or within clinical units and teams. There was an apparent belief 
that better use of time would both enable and sustain both clinical and organaitional 
outcomes. Nursing and allied health professionals gave a strong impression that 
poverty in time, other resources and effective management was disproportionately 
impacting on their experience of work compared with other groups. Many staff in these 
groups expressed strong dissatisfaction with their employment conditions and roles. 
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C. Staff perceptions about the Role, Operation and Management of 
hospitals 
Respondents were asked how they thought the operation of the local health economy 
could be improved by each of the various organisational actors within it however, for 
the purposes of this study, only the question relating to hospitals is relevant. The 
intention, in both the original study and this one, was to gain insights into how hospital 
staff thought about their Trust, its role, operation, and management, in relation to other 
organisations. 
C1. Improving the Health Economy - North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust 
The three most common responses by far within NTH participants were improved 
organisation of clinical work between health care organisations (33.7%), improved 
organisation of clinical work internal to the Trust (33.1%) and more effective 
organisational management (29.3%). Interestingly whilst most professional subgroups 
supported the need for improved organisation of clinical work across the health 
economy, medical mangers did not. 
This was the one free form question in which NTH medical clinicians' propensity to 
criticise and suggest improvement options was relatively subdued (average of 2.4 
comments per answering clinician). The allied health professions, both managers and 
clinicians (2.8 and 2.7 average comments per answering staff member) were more 
forthcoming with suggestions. They were equalled in this suggestion rate by the 
general managers (2.8). 
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Table 9.5 NTH Staff Suggestions For How The Operations Of The Local Health Economy Could Be Improved By The Trust 
MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC Total(x) 
Numbers of respondents in each 
n= n= n= n=51192 subgroup completing this question as a 12124 n=S/6 n=5/14 12117 n=2/18 n=6/1 0 9/16 (55.4%) percentage of the subgroup that (50.0%) (83.3%) (35.7%) (70.6%) (11.1%) (60.0%) (56.3%) 
completed the survey as a whole 
%of All 
Respondent 
Number of Professionals Commenting in Each Professional Subgroup Remarking 
on Each 
Issue 
(x/92) 
External influences 5 1 2 1 0 2 0 11 12.0% 
Improved organisation of clinical work 8 0 6 5 0 9 3 31 33.7% between heath care organisations 
Improved organisation of clinical work 2 3 3 10 0 2 6 26 31.6% internal to the Trust 
Access to clinical information and 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2.2% information systems 
Increased training. CPD opportunities, 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.1% library access 
Staff conditions and remuneration 1 0 0 2 1 0 3 7 7.6% 
More effective organisational 
management 5 3 3 6 0 2 8 27 29.3% 
Increased resources (whether £s, staff 7 0 0 3 1 1 3 15 16.3% 
numbers, equipment) 
Better accommodation facilities 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1.1% 
Total Comments 29 7 14 28 2 17 24 121 
Average number of comments per 2.4 1.4 2.8 2.3 1.0 2.8 2.7 
responding staff in subgroup 
·-
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Medical Clinicians (12124) 
Medical clinicians had a variety of suggestions for better health economy functioning 
and improved functioning of the hospital as part of that. The tenor of their responses 
implied that previous reorganisations had not been handled well by hospital 
management, leading to division amongst clinical staff and impaired provision for 
patients. There was hope by five doctors that the arrival of PCTs might provide a 
means to redress this: "All three groups need to sit down together and develop a 
coherent and sensible plan to provide a good service. Splitting them up is divisive and 
leads to a culture where delays can always be blamed on someone else. There should 
be much more joint working in many areas. Individuals who are working at grass roots 
need to meet each other rather than managers and directors meeting who have little 
understanding of the practice problems involved. To be frank the amalgamation of the 
H'Pool and NTees Acute Trusts has not been helpful and this needs to be sorted out"10, 
"For paediatrics, due to child's ever changing needs, stability and consistency of his 
carers and service providers is very important. I think the concept of GP allocation for a 
family should be extended for general paediatricians and social service team allocation. 
This could be patch-based with corresponding GP areas"6 . 
However medical clinicians also believed that more resources and improved decision 
making about their use (where resources should be held and which organisation should 
make decisions about how those resources should be used) were key. There was 
doubt that the hospital (managers) would be able to ensure the Trust functioned 
decisively and effectively and concern that PCTs would 'inappropriately' drive service 
changes in the hospital, "Although need funding from somewhere PCTs are not the 
answer. PCTs interests lie in Prim.Care, not in emergency or Sec. Care. The budget 
should be developed to the hospital Trust to use as they feel appropriate with dialogue 
regarding services for PCT. Then any reconfigurations will not be spiked by PCTs 
withdrawing funding e.g. from sub-regional specialities (e.g. vascular surgery)"12 . 
Implied or stated mismanagement, especially in resource use and/or a lack of effective 
communication and consultation, and an associated 'skewing' of services towards the 
meeting of external objectives (whether PCT or DoH imposed) was a common theme in 
doctors' responses and provoked some strong comments. As an example, "Introduce 
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'business' + patient focused thinking and more joined up working to reduce waste of 
time/resources. Quality NOT Quantity targets i.e. freedom from dictates from the 
Centre. Debate (with the public) about what can be provided and what cannot/will not 
meet expectations"33 . 
Medical Managers (516) 
Medical managers were concerned for only two areas of action - improved internal 
organisation of clinical work and improved Trust management. Only one medical 
manager was positive about the direction provided by the Trust management but, even 
so, noted there were important service issues to be addressed. Comments ranged from 
simple statements of perceptions about what needed to be done, "24 hour/7 day week 
services, especially for diagnostic tests. Out of hours 'out patient' appointment to meet 
patients needs"40 to rather condemnatory statements about internal management for 
several functional departments, "Listen to people - I could have masses of money if 
common sense rather than political paranoia was used to help decision making"43 and 
"Management of HR, Estates and IT all need reorganisation. The reconfiguration 
indecision is leading to drift and we are losing good staff'42 
General Managers (7114) 
General managers placed most emphasis upon partnership and joint organisational 
working within the health economy, even at times to the point of wanting to subsume 
primary care under the acute Trust's auspices, "The merger of PCTs under the 
umbrella of the local Acute Trust - this will reduce tiers of management and ensure 
better co-operation and management of financial resources reducing camp. for 
finance"53 . Only two of general managers however made comments which could be 
considered as taking proactive ownership of the Trust's management issues, "Must 
meet reconfiguration head on whatever the outcome, take the staff through it and re-
stabilise"54. 
Nurse Managers (12/17) 
Nurse managers' suggestions for how the Trust could contribute to improved health 
economy functioning ranged across most response categories and were primarily lists 
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of aspects of service which apparently were not occurring at that time. They included 
specific service initiatives - one stop diagnostic centres, the use of pathways, patient 
focused care, fast tracking of clients to appropriate care, 24 hour availability of support 
services (pharmacy, investigative labs, OT.s, Physios etc) - and more generic matters 
such as reviewing allied health professionals input and preventing unnecessary 
admissions via A/E. In this sense, nurse managers made the most concrete 
suggestions for improving the organisation of clinical work both within and without the 
Trust. 
Four nurse managers also made comments that were more about the way in which 
clinical work was structured, conducted, managed and rewarded. They suggested that 
reshaping the Trust management structures and developing leadership were ways 
forward, "Capacity planning and management needs to be looked at (balancing 
emergency and planned care) - maybe a review of structures of directorates may 
help"69 , and "More emphasis in the role of the clinical leader- investing in programmes 
such as the RCN Clinical Leadership Programme"72 . 
Nurse Clinicians (2/18) 
Only two of eighteen responding nurses answered this question, which again 
suggested that either nurses did not have any opinions or, more likely, that nurses 
were disenfranchised and disinterested. These responses were restricted to financial 
issues and staff conditions. 
Allied Health Managers(l/10) 
As noted above, most of the allied health managers' comments related to the 
organisation of care across the health economy. The comments concern the full range 
of inter-organisational working including trust, vision, finance and information sharing 
for example, "Proper identification of budgetary requirements, acceptance of 
responsibility and integration of funding required across all 3 orgs"79 and "Cooperation, 
planning between both Trusts. IT Information - between PTCs GPs SSs"s3. The 
remainder of the comments suggested disenchantment with work and/or the way the 
Trust was managed, "Ensure fair distribution of funding, Less change - more stability, 
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Listen to staff of all disciplines, Take notice and acknowledge input of smaller 
professional groups and involve in planning processes"85. 
Allied Health Clinicians (9/16) 
Most AHP respondents were concerned with how care was organised and what they 
regarded as poor management both within the profession and within the hospital rather 
than with health economy-wide concerns, "How much management do we actually 
need? My manager seems to write an excessive number of reports"104 , "Need to feel 
that staff are important, not just managers. Less criticism, more praise"94 , "Better 
communication within teams/managers and also between teams/disciplines"97 One 
allied health clinician felt strongly that efforts to involve patients in Trust and clinical 
decision making was an impediment to effective functioning. The Trust should "make 
patients more aware of their responsibilities to make the most of what they are offered 
by the NHS ... they should adhere to rules"90 . 
Summary 
Staff in NTH (especially doctors) were concerned that previous organisational 
restructuring in pursuit of improved functioning of the local health economy, particularly 
the amalgamation of the two precursor NHS Trusts, had not been well handled. They 
were fearful that additional restructures in primary care would contribute to the resulting 
problems and that NTH management would unable to positively influence the resulting 
organisation of care, either within or across organisations. Hence many suggestions 
were aimed at 'fixing' NTH rather than the health economy. Suggestions to improve 
both included better communication and team work (again within and across 
organisations), strengthening leadership, reorganising Trust management, and 
subsuming primary care activities into the acute care Trust. 
C2. Improving the Health Economy - Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS 
Foundation Trust 
Staff in CHFT were less concerned with joint health economy working than were staff 
in NTH. CHFT tended to favour more effective CHFT management (25.3% of 
respondents) as the best means to contribute to the improved working of the health 
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economy, followed by improved internal organisational of work (20.4%) and then 
improved organisation between health care organisations (17.9%). 
This question was answered by less than half of CHFT respondents. The only 
professional subgroups in which more than 50% of respondents completed the question 
were general managers (56.8%) and nurse clinicians (53.8%). Only general managers 
appeared to have multiple ideas each (2.9 average) about how the hospital could 
contribute to the health economy however, whilst they did provide suggestions for 
improving clinical work organisation across the health economy, they were more 
inclined to the Trust's contribution lying in the realm of improvements to its own internal 
management. In general, the responses which were made in answer to this question 
were less sub-profession specific than NTH staffs' responses. 
Medical Clinicians (15135) 
Only 43% of medical clinicians in Calderdale Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust who 
completed the questionnaire completed this question. Though the doctors' comments 
ranged across a variety of possibilities, suggestions focused primarily upon improving 
management's capability to deliver good internal clinical and organisational 
management. Medical clinicians wanted less time spent on nationally determined 
targets and more on identified local needs, "Management to listen to local clinicians and 
facilitate local clinical issues rather than work towards centrally dictated targets"130 and 
"Empower the clinicians- involve them in discussing finances, targets etc. Tell them the 
figures, don't assume it's too complex for you, and don't plan changes without 
consultation"125 
They were not 'precious' about their own services. Amongst the suggested specific 
service development initiatives were "Plug the gap in the clinical need area e.g. 
radiology and pathology. Establish non-trauma GP centres to reduce pressure on A&E 
Departments"130 and "Review pathways into acute care and have better integrated care 
pathways between primary and secondary care"1H One doctor felt the hospital should 
look extra-nationally for ensuring that the hospital contributed effectively to the local 
health economy, "I feel all three services should have a unified management and 
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budget as in Northern Ireland. We should also look at the French model of health care 
delivery"138 . 
Medical Managers ( 419) 
Three of the four medical managers answering this question commented on the need 
for complementarity and clarity between the primary and secondary care sectors, "Clear 
aims and roles in primary and secondary care"152 . In more detail, "Reconfiguration of 
services needs to happen. Demand needs to be managed by primary care- the impact 
of NHS Direct has been to take pressure off primary but has sent more to A&E -
therefore needs to be looked at"157. The fourth medical manager simply noted that the 
Trust required "Adequate staffing and information technology"154 . Internal management 
was not seen to be an impediment to the achievement of these. 
General Managers (9/16) 
General managers' responses to this question were wide ranging and at times, almost 
visionary, "Complete redesign of service provision, we can do things differently and 
provide a good, if not better, service to patients. Work with partner /organisation/the 
broader health community to improve service across the patch" 168 and "Local autonomy 
on performance - becoming a 'foundation system'. Average European funding"167 A 
third of general management respondents thought that the Trust should focus upon 
improving collaborative working within the Trust, particularly in terms of marrying 
financial and clinical matters and introducing a more patient oriented approach, "Clear 
financial personnel clinical framework within which clinicians can lead and develop 
services. Demonstrate that funding will follow patients wishes/choice tin the future. This 
will enable a more proactive clinical attitude to service delivery to develop"174 and 
"Change emphasis from looking at budget variances to value for money analysis. 
Emphasise good performance - encourage people to try different approaches to service 
delivery and measure outcome etc etc. Patient led services not staff led"165 One 
general manager however was doubtful, "I'm not convinced that the current 
reforms/structure will have the devised effect in enhancing overall patient care"163. 
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Table 9.6 CHFT Staff Suggestions For How The Operations Of The Local Health Economy Could Be Improved By The Trust 
MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC Total (x) 
Numbers of respondents in each 
n= n= n= n= n= n= n= 
subgroup completing this question as a 15135 n=4/9 9/16 10123 21139 9/21 7/19 75/162 percentage of the subgroup that (42.9%) (44.4%) (56.3%) (43.5%) (53.8%) (42.9%) (36.8% (46.3%) 
completed the survey as a whole 
%of All 
Respondent 
Number of Professionals Commenting in Each Professional Subgroup Remarking 
on Each 
Issue 
(x/162) 
External influences 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1.2% 
Improved organisation of clinical work 5 3 7 3 3 5 3 29 17.9% between heath care organisations 
Improved organisation of clinical work 7 0 3 6 8 5 4 33 20.4% internal to the Trust 
Access to clinical Information and 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 4 2.5% information systems 
Increased training, CPO opportunities, 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 4 2.5% library access 
Staff conditions and remuneration 2 0 2 2 3 0 0 9 5.6% 
More effective organisational 8 0 9 6 
management 12 4 2 41 25.3% 
Increased resources (whether £s, staff 3 1 2 3 
numbers, equipment) 6 1 1 17 10.5% 
Better accommodation facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Comments 26 5 26 20 34 18 10 139 
Average number of comments per 1.73 1.3 2.9 
responding staff in subgroup 
2.0 1.6 2.0 1.4 
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Nurse Managers (10/23) 
Though less than half of responding nurse managers answered this question, those 
that did also focused primarily upon the internal restructuring of clinical services and 
organisational management. There were suggestions that restructuring services should 
entail changed working conditions for doctors and nurses alike with an implied criticism 
of the dissimilarity between the two professions' status and working conditions, "Strong 
leadership in all levels but a flat structure without hierarchy e.g. doctors are taken more 
notice of than other professionals"187 and "More flexible ways of working. Better use of 
surgery time. Round the clock working (A lot of time is lost at BHs, weekends etc). 
Doctors to work shifts like nursing staff."183• More flexible working across the 
professions was thought to work to patients' benefit, "Outpatient clinic to be in the 
evenings or Saturday morning. Keeping to a rigid system for appointment times doesn't 
help patients"194 . Three nurse managers thought undervaluing of staff led to problems 
with commitment which led to problems with the provision of care within and across 
organisations, "Strongly believe that all problems in NHS eventually stem back to poor 
pay & undervaluing of all NHS staff (nurses, doctors, PAM's, scientists etc) & will not be 
resolved until this is addressed. Understaffing impacts on all factors from amount of 
hospital acquired infection to lack of time for education, clinical governance etc. to poor 
quality care"197 . 
Nurse Clinicians (20/39) 
In contrast with NTH in which nurses' voices were largely absent, CHFT nurses 
responded relatively freely to this question. The nurses' comments indicated their 
assessment of how improvements could be made was similar to those of their 
managers. The comments emphasised service improvement possibilities - there were 
surprisingly few comments about more resources. Some nurses demonstrated strategic 
thinking, "Good assessment of existing services identifying the gaps & short term 
objectives/goals before a long term strategy is planned"236 whilst others had innovative 
ideas about what could change. 
The tenor of several nurses' comments however was more negative than those from 
nurse managers. Several nurses were critical of management initiatives including 
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attempts to involve clinicians in management, "The Acute Trust needs to look critically 
at the management structure and evaluate. Look at how many managers the Trust 
actually needs. Putting clinicians in management roles without adequate support and 
training does not always produce good managers"208 and "Management - clinical 
effectiveness meetings - relationships between management and basic staff are points 
of concern"209 . Strain was evident in several nurses' responses. For example, "We are 
running scared of litigation, unrequired treatments are pursued for fear of missing 
something never present. We need a degree of protection from legal vultures and the 
public need to stop being fed stories re Allitt and Shipman. We work in the NHS to help 
people, or the vast majority do"217 
Allied Health Managers ( 11/21) 
Though allied health managers commented on a number of areas, they were very 
aware of how hospital care fitted into the wider care picture, what could be done to 
improve that fit and, with it, care delivery for patients across the health economy as a 
whole, "Focus on what they (hospitals) do well - secondary care. Understand primary 
care wishes better and work more harmoniously with the community at large"255 , "Liaise 
better with GPs re chronic care of patients - pass long term patients back to PCTs -
give more to CMOs. Liaise better with tertiary centres - communication is poor and 
often therapists are the communication route"252 . It was evident that allied health 
managers felt few in the hospital understood the contribution they and their staff could 
make in this regard: "Use our service appropriately. Understand our role and policies -
not to just fill in referrals for the patient. ... We are not running a beauty service but they 
do use us that way!!!"249 Perceived inequities/poor uses of NHS staff resource were not 
limited to the Trust - services "Should be equitable across the country e.g. access to 
???/pulmonary rehabilitation"256 and efforts should be made to ensure that "Consultants 
that work for the NHS do just that and not use NHS time for private work! It still goes 
on" 264. 
Allied Health Clinicians (6/1 9) 
Allied health clinicians' comments were essentially divided between what the Trust 
needed to do internally and what it needed to do in conjunction with other organisations 
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in the health economy. Innovative, strategic and capable thinking was desired, 
"Preparedness and capability to negotiate appropriate service provision with other 
stakeholders in a locality and transparent willingness to think outside the box! 
Organisational stability so as to generate the confidence to achieve the above" and 
"shared care"283 . Such thinking was not just about the types of service provision but 
how it might be funded. "It (local health economy functioning) may be better if there 
were not competition between services i.e. if funding was from one source for all so that 
the patients needs could be addressed without the question 'who pays for it'. The 
interfaces need addressing between services- perhaps some more funds like joint 
contingency funding that can be used etc"288 . 
Summary 
On the whole all staff subgroups showed an awareness of the Trust's role and linkages 
within the wider health economy. The greatest contribution staff thought CHFT could 
make to the functioning of the wider health economy however was via improvements to 
its own internal management and functioning. Staff from all groups demonstrated a 
capacity to think both innovatively and strategically in seeking these improvements 
although there was also concern amongst all groups about whether the Trust 
management could provide adequate support to innovative programmes and work 
practice changes. 
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D. Comparative Overview of Professional Subgroups 
Chapter Eight suggested that there were consistent patterns of difference in values and 
conceptions of clinical work between the various professional subcultures such that 
there is greater similarity between the same subgroups across sectors than there is 
amongst subgroups within the same sector. This being so, it could be expected that the 
professional subgroups in the two study Trusts would show would show similarities in 
their thinking about the priority of needs and suggested improvements. Alternatively, 
part of the explanation for the different outcomes between the two Trusts may lie in 
attitudinal differences between the two Trusts' staff. 
Table 9.7 uses a thematic approach to summarise the professional subgroups' stances 
in some detail. It shows that the medical clinicians within the two Trusts by and large 
took similar stances about the need to improve the internal organisation of work and 
resource availability, with some differences in emphasis in between the two groups. 
Both staff groups doubted management's ability to deliver required changes; in NTH 
the doubts were appeared strengthened by poor experiences of past amalgamations 
and decision making processes. 
Medical managers echoed the medical clinicians in both Trusts however they were less 
critical of management and seemingly 'reversed' the medical clinicians' emphasis upon 
health economy concerns. They were keen to introduce changes that would allow them 
to better balance the differing responsibilities of their positions and to have a stronger 
information base for decision-making about clinical priorities, service design and 
contractual commitments. They differed primarily in their emphasis upon teams and 
team working and the effect of local politics upon internal decision making and reform. 
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Table 9.7 Summary of Sub-Professional Stances on Improvement Strategies Within and Between Trusts 
North Tees and Hartlepool NTH Trust Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust 
Emphasis on: Emphasis on: 
• Improvement of the internal organisation of clinical work • Increased resources 
within the Trust • Improved internal organisation of clinical work 
• Increased resources and improved decision making about 
their use 
• More effective organisational management 
Comments were wide ranging over all categories of possible 
Despite this comments were wide ranging over the various responses however the resource in highest demand was time. 
Medical categories of responses. Believed: 
Clinicians Believed: • Management should empower the clinicians 
• Decision making processes within the Trust were ineffective • More focus was required on identified local needs 
• Past amalgamations had been poorly handled 
Would have appreciated: 
Would have appreciated: • Improvements in management's capability to deliver good 
• More inspirational and foci.:Jsed management internal clinical and organisational management 
• Better health economy functioning 
Appeared to doubt that: 
• The hospital (managers) would be able to ensure the Trust 
functioned decisively and effectively in new health economy 
environment 
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Emphasis on: Emphasis on: 
• Improvement of the internal organisation of clinical work • Organisational management to provide a clearer steer on 
within the Trust priorities and contractual arrangements 
Medical 
• This was a matter of making better use of the resources the Managers Trust already had. Would have appreciated: 
• More time for both clinical work and management activities 
Would have appreciated: • Better access to clinical information to guide and inform 
• More time for both clinical work and management activities priorities and contractual arrangements 
• Better access to clinical information to guide and inform • Greater complementarity and clarity between the primary 
service design and delivery and secondary care sectors 
• Greater emphasis upon teams 
• Greater skills development of team management and team Concerned about: 
working • Inertia resulting from local politics 
Emphasis on: Emphasis on: 
• Reorganisation of internal work • Getting the organisational systems and the prevailing 
culture right 
• Empowering and enabling clinicians to take the lead 
Concerned to: Concerned to: 
• Rein in power of the consultants • Improve their own game 
General 
Would have appreciated: Would have appreciated: 
• Effective team working within organisation Reducing the influence of some external influences Managers • 
• Partnership and joint organisational working within the health 
economy 
Characterised at times by: Characterised by: 
• Some blame shifting to DoH, clinicians • Criticism of own performance 
• Apparent lack of ideas to resolve difficulties • Listing a variety of organisational attributes that needed to 
be improved 
Redesign of health economy organisation of care strongly 
• Absence of blame on clinicians 
supported - even to point of subsuming aspects of primary care 
under the acute Trust's auspices Redesign of service provision within health economy less of a 
focus- would have preferred focusing on developing 
collaborative working within the Trust 
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Emphasis on: Emphasis on: 
• How clinical work could be better organised and managed • Increased resources 
• Improved organisation of clinical work internal to the Trust 
Believed: Believed: 
• Clinical performance outcomes were related to virtually all • General management's controlling emphases were 
aspects of organisational life. This extended to cross disproportionate to the need and discouraging to front line 
organisational performance as well. clinicians 
Nurse • Undervaluing of staff led to problems with commitment 
Managers Concerned about: Concerned about: 
• Time pressures • Their own and general management's ability to undertake 
• Lacks in experience in working in and leading teams, forums basic management responsibilities 
for cross-disciplinary and cross directorate meetings 
• Work/pay conditions 
Would have appreciated: 
• Efforts to reshape the Trust management structures and Would have appreciated: 
developing leadership 
• Internal restructuring of clinical services and organisational 
Characterised by: 
management 
• Associated changed working conditions for doctors and 
• Concrete suggestions (i.e. Not abstracted ideas) for new nurses alike 
service developments 
Emphasis on: Emphasis on: 
• Pay and staff conditions • More resources, especially time 
• Working conditions 
• Service improvement possibilities 
Concerned about: Concerned about: Nurse 
• Accessing more training opportunities Personal needs especially increased training and study • Clinicians 
• Sorting out anomalies in working conditions 
• Poor managemenUstaff relations Characterised by: 
• Apparent strong discontent with their immediate managers, 
Characterised by: more so than the organisational management 
• Extremely low response rate • Negativity within comments; 
• Appeared disengaged with organisation; emphasis upon • Evident strain; two appeared close to suicidal 
personal development and needs 
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Emphasis on: Emphasis on: 
• The organisation's relationships with external bodies • Increased resources (usually 'funding' but also time and staff) 
• Organisational requirements for improved clinical and the internal organisation of clinical work 
organisation (on which they had wide ranging views) • How hospital care fitted into the wider care picture, what 
could be done to improve that fit 
Believed: Believed: 
• The availability of resources was important , particularly time • Issues of resource availability were also linked to issues 
Allied which they felt could be achieved either through more staff or about improved clinical organisation and better working 
Health the reorganisation of clinical work conditions 
Managers Concerned about: Concerned about: 
• The role of the allied health profession within the • Developing more coordinated approaches to care 
organisational structure • Developing multidisciplinary teamwork 
• Lack of involvement and/or an ineffective voice in clinical 
decision making Would have appreciated: 
• Pay and conditions • Improved managerial performance in resolving issues 
• Perceived inferior accommodation (apparently in clinical management) arising from the Trust 
• Poor access to training merger 
• Organisational management fostering a different 
Would have appreciated: organisational culture 
• More organisational focus and effort on the full range of inter-
organisational working including trust, vision, finance and 
Characterised by: information sharing 
• Concern about the wider organisation of care 
Characterised by: 
• Disenchantment with work and the way the Trust was 
managed 
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Emphasis on: Emphasis on: 
• Better access to training • Internal organisation of work 
• Improvements to both the organisation of clinical work and • Poor conditions particularly in regards promotion 
organisational management 
• More resources 
Allied Concerned about: 
Concerned about: 
Health • Difficulties in working in 'integrated' teams (although supportive • Greater access and fairness to training, CPD and research 
Clinicians of these) activities I I 
• Poor management both within the profession and within the • The context of multidisciplinary and inter-service teams 
hospital rather than with health economy-wide concerns • Clinical support systems 
• Better care planning especially in regards to discharge 
processes 
· Characterised by: 
Characterised by: • Equal concern for what the Trust needed to do internally 
• Deep unhappiness with their allied health line managers, and what it needed to do in conjunction with other 
particularly their managers organisations in the health economy 
• Innovative, strategic and capable thinking about improving 
cross disciplinary and intersectoral work 
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General managers were the professional subgroup that demonstrated the greatest 
difference between the Trusts. General managers in CHFT could be characterised as 
having clear organisational goals, agreement about the desired culture within the Trust 
and ideas about how to do things differently. They were seeking a much more inclusive 
approach to management, wanting to empower clinicians in 'leading' design of services 
and clinical management systems. They agreed with other professions about their 
failings and emphasised their need to lift their own game. In contrast, general 
managers in NTH, though concerned to improve effective team and joint working within 
both the organisation and within the health economy, seemed to lack ideas for doing so 
and tended to blame shift on to clinicians, external politics, and previous 
reorganisations of care. 
Nurse managers in both Trusts emphasised the organisation and management of care 
in their responses. NTH nurse managers however widened their concern to take in the 
local health economy, making many concrete suggestions about how care provision 
could be improved. Time pressures were a common concern amongst the Trusts' 
nurses as were doubts about abilities to undertake management functions, especially 
in teams. Nurse managers in NTH would have appreciated greater efforts being made 
to restructure senior management and develop leadership throughout the Trust. Nurse 
managers in CHT desired restructuring that led to change and more equivalent working 
conditions between nurses and medical professionals. 
The nurse clinicians seemed to have similar concerns between Trusts though the very 
low response rate by nurse clinicians in NTH meant any generalisation about their 
views is, at best, tentative. Nurses were mostly concerned with personal aspects of 
working life especially pay and working conditions (time pressures again featured 
prominently) and having greater access to training opportunities. Both groups of nurses 
appeared to be very unhappy with their employment. In CHT this was manifested in 
particular unhappiness with their immediate line managers; in NTH it appeared to 
manifest in complete disengagement. 
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Allied health managers in both Trusts were concerned about how care was organised 
internally and how this related to the organisation of care across each health economy. 
They were also concerned about the interconnections between resource availability, 
the organisation of care, and working conditions. Both groups would have appreciated 
changes in organisational culture and improvements in managerial performance 
however allied health managers in NTH were particularly disenchanted with how the 
profession was viewed within the Trust. 
Allied health clinicians tended to portray broadly similar views to their managers with 
additional concerns for increased training opportunities and the operation of 
multidisciplinary teams. The groups differed in their attitudes and outlook however. 
Allied health clinicians in NTH were very negative and pessimistic about the Trust's and 
their own immediate managers. Their counterparts in CHFT were more optimistic about 
the future and were innovative and strategic in their ideas for future change. 
Summary 
In general, the results appeared to support the previous chapter's finding of sub-
professional differences in priorities and concerns. At times this extended to sub-
professional differences in emotional outlooks. These differences were related, in part, 
to their organisational role and focus. The groups seemingly most disaffected and 
despondent were the nursing and allied health professionals who, as broad groupings, 
saw themselves as disadvantaged in their access to the training and professional 
development opportunities that would bolster their confidence and contributions to their 
Trusts. Several staff in these groups in both Trusts displayed a hopelessness and 
despair that suggested they were clinically depressed. There were however differences 
between the Trusts in the sources and severity of the unhappiness. The group that 
showed most dissimilarity in concerns and outlooks between the two Trusts were the 
general managers. General managers in CHFT seemed to be characterised by a 
realistic assessment of their previous and current performance and by an inclusive and 
perhaps optimistic outlook about what could be achieved within the Trust, particularly 
through empowering clinicians to lead. General managers in NTH in contrast were 
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much less self-critical, more negative about clinical staff and seemingly lacking in ideas 
about how to move forward. 
E. Comparative Overview of Trusts 
E1. North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust 
Table 9.8 provides a comparative summary of the percentage of staff supporting 
particular improvement strategies in each Trust and ranks improvement strategies in 
terms of percentage support. (It does not however portray attitudinal outlook). It shows 
that in NTH the most common amongst staff was improvement to the internal 
organisation of work. A third of responding NTH staff supported improvements to the 
internal organisation of clinical work. This was 41% more than the number of staff 
supporting better management and increased resources, the next two most popular 
responses. Improved working within the health economy and addressing external 
influences upon the Trust were rated in the top four concerns in NTH (they were 
amongst the lowest four in CHFT). Staff ranked support for improved pay/working 
conditions in the mid range and put least emphasis upon accommodation issues. 
Perhaps somewhat surprising, given the concerns for improved organisation of work 
and more effective management, was the relatively little support by staff for better 
access to clinical data, information systems and training opportunities. 
The table cannot however depict differences in organisational 'flavour' between the 
Trusts. The previous sections' discussions suggest that NTH staff tended to be more 
negative than staff from CHFT. This was apparently associated with a belief that 
previous organisational restructuring in pursuit of improved local health economy 
functioning, and especially the amalgamation of the two precursor NHS Trusts, had not 
been well handled. Staff assessed the Trust as lacking internal strategic direction and 
having poor conflict resolution mechanisms hence it would have experienced difficulty 
resolving any tensions that may have arisen from the disparate stances each staff 
group adopted over ways forward. Perhaps not surprisingly, staff were apparently 
fearful that additional restructures would add to existing problems in the organisation of 
clinical work, organisational decision making and internal communication. These fears 
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may not have been irrational given that NTH general managers' apparently lacked 
ideas to address these problems. 
E2. Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Foundation Trust 
Table 9.8 shows that staff in CHFT saw the Trust's best way forward as lying in the 
increased availability of resources, especially time, and an overall improvement in 
organisational management's effectiveness. Though many staff had suggested innovative 
ways forward, there was concern that management would be unable to implement and 
support the suggested improvements. In CHFT the improvement strategies drawing 
most staff support were increased resources and better organisational management. 
These were followed by improvements to the internal organisation of clinical work, 
better pay and conditions, and better training opportunities. Improvements originating in 
external factors received relatively little support in CHFT. As with NTH staff, CHFT staff 
ranked support for improved pay/working conditions midrange also rated better access 
to clinical data, information systems and training opportunities. 
Despite the highly negative, even suicidal outlooks, amongst nurse clinicians in CHFT, 
overall the various staff groupings within this organisation portrayed more positive 
outlooks than staff in NTH with numbers of staff in each group, even those usually 
considered relatively powerless, offering a range of innovative suggestions and 
thoughtful comments. The prevalence of these comments throughout the staff 
suggested that, though there ware clearly problems to be addressed and some doubt 
about the Trust management's capacity to achieve it, hope and vision persisted 
throughout the organisation. The general managers' willingness to involve front line 
clinicians and to confront their own weaknesses and poor performance suggested that 
the doubt about management's capacity may have been misfounded. 
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Table 9.8 Comparison of Percentage Frequency of Comments between Trusts, by Category 
NTH CHT 
Percentage of all respondents mentioning Item Percentage of all respondents mentioning Item 
each item as a means of performance Rank each item as a means of performance Rank 
improvement for each question Overall improvement for each question Overall 
Aver Average Cl1nical Expof Health over 3 Clinical Exp of Health 
over 3 Perf work Econ Qns Perf work Econ Qns 
External influences 3.3% 6.5% 12.0% 10.8 6 3.1% 4.3% 1.2% 4.3 8 
Improved organisation of clinical work 12.0% 3.3% 33.7% 16.3 4 6.8% 4.3% 17.9% 9.7 6 between heath care organisations 
Improved organisation of clinical work 35.9% 30.4% 31.6% 32.6 1 29.0% 16.0% 20.4% 21.8 3 internal to the Trust 
Access to clinical information and 18.5% 1 .8% 2.2'% 7.5 s 17.3% 4.9% 2.5% 8.3 7 information systems 
Increased training, CPO opportunities, 19.6% 5.4% 1.1% 8.7 7 24.7% 6.2% 2.5% 11.1 5 library access 
Staff conditions and remuneration 12.0% 22.8% 7.6% 14.1 5 16.0% 27.8% 5.6% 16.5 4 
More effective organisational 
management 21.7% 18.4% 29.3% 23.1 2 22.2% 25.9% 25.3% 24.5 2 
Increased resources (whether £s, staff 34.8% 16.3% 16.3% 22.5 3 42.0% 24.1% 10.5% 25.6 1 
numbers. equipment) 
Better accommodation facilities 2.2% 4.3% 1.1% 2.5 9 4.3% 4.9% 0 3.1 9 
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Table 9.9 Percentage of Staff in Each Trust Advocating Patient and Team Focus Across All Three Questions 
Total Total MC MM GM NM NC AHM AHC Numbers Respondents (%) 
NTH (% staff) 
Patient Focus 1.9 2.9 1.9 3.8 0 2.9 1.9 16 15.2 
Improved Patient care 
(without mention of patient 2.9 1.9 0 0.9 0.9 1.9 3.8 13 12.3 
involvement) 
Integrated Clinical Pathways 0 0 0 2.0 0 0.9 0.9 5 4.8 
Teams/Multidisciplinary/Joint 5 3.9 3 8 0 1.9 2.9 24 22.6 
working 
CHT (%staff) 
Patient Focus 1.8 0 4.2 1.2 1.8 1.8 1.2 21 12.9 
Improved Patient care 
(without mention of patient 6.0 0.6 0.6 2.0 7.8 1.2 4.2 37 22.7 
involvement) 
Integrated Clinical Pathways 1.2 0 0.6 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 6 6.1 
T earns/Multidisciplinary/ Joint 3.6 0 2.4 1.8 3.0 1.8 2.4 25 15.3 
_vvorking 
-- -
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F. Patient Inclusion in More Planned Ways of Working 
Table 9.9 shows that within both Trusts the desire to increase the patient focus of the 
organisation was relatively weak. In total, over all three questions, at most only 15% of 
surveyed staff (and that in NTH) thought greater prominence should be given to patient 
perceptions of need and priorities as a means towards service improvement. This was 
particularly the case in CHFT where 25% more staff preferred to define what they 
thought were acceptable services for patients rather than to suggest including patients' 
in those decisions. Staff were more supportive of multidisciplinary team based working 
as a means to improve services and experience of work (22.6% in NTH and 15.3% in 
CHFT) however at most only 6% of staff (and that in CHFT) viewed integrated clinical 
pathways as a mechanism for achieving this. Thus one of the most supported methods 
in the professional literature for introducing more patient focused and multidisciplinary 
approaches to the coordination and delivery of care had relatively little support within 
both organisations. This is not to say that other approaches were being considered but, 
if they were, it was not evident in the staffs' responses. 
If staff in this study were representative of staff elsewhere in the NHS and/or other 
western healthcare systems, it would appear that one reason why patients and carers 
experienced the disjointed care described in Chapter One is that few staff saw the 
need to focus upon the patients' desires for more 'joined up' care. Further, allied health 
staff who were the professional group most passionate about more integrated patient 
care, saw themselves as being relatively powerless within their organisations, poorly 
managed and/or lacking adequate training to fulfil their roles. On the other hand, in 
CHT the highest percentage of responding staff suggesting integrated care pathways 
as a way forward were medical staff. ICP support was also mingled throughout other 
staff subgroups including the general managers. Such support was not forthcoming 
from either group in NTH. This suggests that though ICP supporters were numerically 
small in CHT at the start of the CMD project, if I CPs were to be successfully introduced 
in either Trust, it would have been more likely to occur within CHFT. 
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Discussion 
The results in this chapter yielded some surprises whilst others conformed to 
expectations. Overall the support for more patient centred approaches to service 
improvement was relatively weak in both Trusts. Staff in NTH appeared somewhat 
more willing to adopt genuinely patient focused improvements than staff in CHFT. The 
similarity of stances on reform issues within professions, irrespective of organisation, 
discussed in Chapter Eight was also present in the suggestions and priorities provided 
for service and work life improvement, though organisational specific responses were 
more noticeable in the improvement questions. Some indications or part explanations 
for the lack of progress in implementing ICPs as a means for greater coordination in 
the care for patients were provided in the, at times, seemingly paradoxical stances and 
organisational locations of staff groups. For example, across all three questions doctors 
in both Trusts highlighted the need to improve the internal organisation of work yet their 
responses to questions about culture and reform values showed that they held the 
most highly individualistic conceptions of clinical work. Further doctors showed 
themselves to be plentiful in critical comments yet were frequently unwilling to trust and 
collaborate with others in order to find a solution. Other groups e.g. the nurse 
managers and the allied health professionals, who were mostly supportive of 
collaborative approaches to clinical work, believed themselves as being relatively 
powerless to affect change. 
The results indicate that the start of the CMD project, its objectives and goals for the 
changing organisation of work within and across health economies, introducing 
multidisciplinary and patient focused approached to care management, were more 
probably in tune with staffs stated values in NTH compared to CHT. These results also 
suggest possible explanations for why, by the end of the project, ICPs and more 
integrated working across the health economy were more embedded in CHT than they 
were in NTH. 
The answers lie, in part, in the greater willingness of managers in CHFT to 
acknowledge their own weaknesses and empower other groups, especially the medical 
profession, to work collaboratively. Despite doubts about management's capacity to 
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effect change and some highly negative outlooks amongst nurses, most staff groups in 
CHFT were reasonably positive about the possibilities for service improvement and 
consistently provided innovative and systems-aware suggestions for improvement. In 
NTH, in contrast, despite some suggestions for innovative, even sweeping change, the 
tenor of comments by staff suggested a pattern of fear and blame shifting amongst 
staff, including general managers who appeared to lack creative ideas for change and 
wanted to disempower clinicians. 
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Chapter Ten 
Emergent Themes in the Interview Data 
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Introduction 
Previous chapters have shown that historical, policy and sub-cultural factors work to 
fragment activities within hospitals and across the NHS to the detriment of patients' 
experience and the delivery of coordinated care, and that the two study Trusts were not 
immune to these effects. Yet it was also evident from the outcomes of the Clinical Work 
Development Project that important differences existed between the Trusts. This 
chapter provides a thematic review of interview discussions with senior staff in the two 
Trusts designed to provide insight into the senior managers' perceptions of their 
organisation and factors affecting their approach to both clinical and wider 
organisational management. 
In summary, at the time the interviews were given, the two Trusts were very different in 
their focus, strategy, and internal dynamics. Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Trust's 
senior managers had clear ideas about the goals and priorities of the Trust over and 
above the vagaries of Departmental policy, a common understanding of the term "the 
management of clinical work" and the Trust's strategy for improving this, and 
consistency in their assessment of the Trust's strengths and impediments in achieving 
these. There was a clearly identifiable vocabulary in use amongst the senior 
management with noticeable repetition of 'catch phrases' between interviewees. Each 
believed they had made significant progress towards achieving their goals and were 
keen to keep going. In essence the managers conveyed an impression of being clear 
minded, purposeful and proactive, and enthusiastic. 
In contrast, North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust's senior managers were more 
reactive to the agendas of the Department of Health and the politics of the local area. 
They were just beginning to work towards the development of a clear identity and 
mission for the Trust. There was a diversity of opinion amongst them about the Trust's 
strengths, few shared phrasings, and a culture that seemingly reflected the political 
environment of the local electorate and community. 
Taken together, the interviews suggested that leadership context has a significant 
influence upon the working of Trusts and their wider organisational outcomes. These, 
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in turn, have a considerable effect upon efforts to change conceptions about how 
clinical work should be planned and conducted. 
Calderdale and Huddersfield NHS Trust 
Goals 
Five recurring themes were evident in the interviews regarding the goals and purpose 
of the Trust. These themes were patients' experience, service redesign across the two 
sites within the Trust and within the wider health community, financial balance, the 
interrelationships between these, and the integrated governance of activities within 
these themes. The provision of excellent patient experience was more than just a 
theme however. It was the overarching goal, motivation and priority within CHFT. Its 
pre-eminence was evident across a gamut of matters, ranging from the ethos of the 
organisation as a whole to the interviewees' aspirations for themselves and the Trust. It 
was the energising force behind staff who the interviewees nominated as people who 
have made an excellent contribution to both the management of clinical work and the 
Trust as an organisation. And it was consistent with the CEO's view of the Trusts' goals 
as being about doing the very best for patients, the people who serve patients, and the 
local communities. In her words, "When you meet these, everything else falls into 
place." 
This commitment to the pursuit of excellence in patient experience was common to all 
interviewees, even the finance director (Fin Dir) who saw himself as being somewhat 
different in his thinking to most other finance directors, "Number one priority for me 
would be about service quality in our various divisions, and ensuring financial balance 
at the same time. Third would be national access targets .... I do think I'm a bit more 
worried about the patients. I say things that actually got the heart of what the finance is 
about and not really (what people are) looking at me to say ... So going back to the 
example ... I was the one saying it makes no sense delaying the patients. Treat the 
patients anyway and show the PCTS what they're doing, and then we'll get the money 
in April anyway ... " 
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Other goals and objectives discussed by interviewees were more specific to their role 
and specific responsibilities, examples included development of an integrated service 
strategy across Trust sites, attaining Foundation Trust status, achieving the 18 week 
waiting time from diagnosis to surgery within the Trust and other national access 
targets, better management of supply chains and inventory, an examination of HRG 
castings, and pursuit of improved clinical information provision. However all the 
interviewees discussed, at some point of the interview, the need for organisational 
planning and accountability systems to recognise, account for, and integrate the 
interconnection between clinical and resource dimensions of care. 
These other objectives however were almost always discussed within the context of the 
primary themes and were usually seen as either expressions of the principal goals or a 
means to achieve these. For instance, in response to a question about whether she 
would change the emphasis upon the achievement of an 18 week waiting time target 
from diagnosis to surgery and similar externally sourced targets, the clinical 
governance manager said she would not "as long as people understand the priorities 
within them- that they are frameworks for delivering other business that need(s) to be 
delivered". She went on to say that "there's always the worry when we've got centrally 
led priorities ... that people become so wrapped up in delivering against them. Then 
(our response) is around, 'Wouldn't we be doing that anyway because aren't we an 
organisation that looks to deliver excellent services?' ... because that's what we do 
around here and that's our culture and that's what the organisation is about. As long as 
people don't just speak about an 18 week target, they talk about ... delivering a 
service ... " 
The organisational development director (OD Dir) discussed using the Foundation 
Trust initiative to drive improvements in patient experience through various initiatives 
designed to make the patients' experience and organisational costs more immediately 
relevant to the staff. To this end she had instituted 'mystery shoppers' (patients who 
were selected to provide staff with immediate 'customer feedback' at the end of their 
treatment), staff role plays e.g. sitting staff in an A&E waiting room for more than four 
hours with a leg in a temporary brace and wearing something to impair their capacity 
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for self-help e.g. spectacles to distort vision, and detailed performance data provision 
on such things as wait times, complaints received, costs of the alternative treatment 
plans, service design alternatives etc. 
Interviewees were aware of these and numerous other activities in pursuit of the Trust 
goals. These included: 
• An evaluation of the independent sector provision and its potential 
market, 
• The introduction of new technologies and with that service redesign e.g. 
moving hysteroscopy from inpatient to day case to outpatient procedure 
over 18 months, 
• Redesign of cancer services, 
• Improvement of A&E access via the introduction of an medical 
assessment unit, 
• Various work on implementing the modernisation agency's ten high 
impact changes through service mapping, integrated care pathway 
development, revision of elective and emergency surgery, examination 
of follow-up rates for appointments and outpatient clinic routines, 
• Investigation of lean methodology, and 
• Establishment of locality-based groups to develop a 'year of care' 
approach to pathways for long term conditions. 
Much of this work conceptually and practically linked across several strategies, for 
example, the work on appropriate delivery modes for long term conditions was linked to 
the 18 week wait target and work on appropriate diagnostic technology and service 
redesign. 
The Management of Clinical Work 
At core, all these initiatives were linked conceptually firstly by a common understanding 
of the meaning of the term "the management of clinical work" and its functionality in 
achieving the improved patient care and experience outlined above and secondly by an 
explicit policy of pursuing the systematisation of healthcare in ways that deliberately 
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integrated service redesign, efficiency concerns, and accountability structures via 
integrated pathways. 
The senior management were unanimous in their presentation of the management of 
clinical work as being effective operational management. "Managing clinical work to me 
means precisely that, you know, managing it in a very controlled and clear way in 
which we understand the processes and the system in which that's delivered ... it's 
definitely 'product' management .... (but) we don't like that word here"1cP Lead, 
"Managing the clinical process. So what are the inputs that make up the process ... in 
terms of managing them - what is appropriate and timely and prioritised"0 oN "As a 
consultant it's about making the best use of the resources you have for patient care, 
managing staff, clinical time, operating theatres; as a manager it's managing the 
working practices of consultants, directing, leading and influencing other people to 
achieve clinical care of the patient"Med Dir The CEO agreed: clinical management was 
about clinical systems and processes, "Having the right things in the right place at the 
right time doing the right things". 
Each interviewee agreed with the strategies being used to implement such clinical 
management systems. They were also generally agreed about what more needed to 
be done to institutionalise these within the Trust and were determined to use external 
imperatives as 'levers', 'incentives' and 'tools' for achieving what the Trust had already 
decided to do. The necessity to achieve various government targets ensured 'bite' and 
the 'hard edge' needed to obtain 'buy in' from people who'd always thought of 
pathways as "soft and fluffy"00 Dir "There has to be the 18 week so we're using that as 
the organisational driver for prioritising the process redesign and the effectiveness and 
the efficiency work, but we are pulling it together hopefully and we are doing it through 
pathways"1cP Lead. Pathways were also being used as a means to develop another 
strand of work relating to external imperatives: integrating contestability, patient choice 
and the Payment by Results tariffs in pursuit of an integrated accountability, quality and 
governance arrangement framework. Furthermore, workshops and training 
programmes to deepen staff's understanding of ICP variation measurement and 
analysis were widespread, clinical champions were given divisional projects to 
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implement pathways or facets of work associated with pathways, recently 'converted' 
staff were encouraged to utilise their skills and enthusiasm in communication and 
training roles, and more informed decision making was being pursued through 
improved data provision. 
The CEO was intending to increase the extent of systematisation in the management of 
clinical work and was actively seeking to remove impediments, "For that we need some 
more robust data and hopefully we'll have more activity data that we can utilise and its 
then around you know, taking models that exist elsewhere and applying them locally. I 
just don't think we are systematised in terms of how we address some of our clinical 
processes and we let personalities get in the way." 
Externally, the Trust was seeking to harness the commissioning power of the PCTs to 
drive service redesign, change service delivery modes, 'naturalise' process 
management of care and change governance structures. At the time of interviews it 
was seeking to add further weight to these efforts by reorganising the previous Clinical 
Work Development Project steering group into a locality Board with responsibility for 
developing and overseeing a health community wide framework for pathways 
development. 
This approach and strategy is consistent with the CEO's elucidation of the Trust goals 
and method as she saw them. From her perspective the three goals of the Trust were 
to put patients at the heart of services (via modernisation and pathways), to look after 
staff (via 00 work and other investments in staff) and to look after the local 
communities of which the Trust is part (through demonstrated effort and commitment to 
corporate and social responsibilities). In her words, 'deliver on those and you deliver all 
the rest'. 
When asked whether there were things that could be done to further pursue the Trust's 
goals but which weren't being done, all bar one interviewee suggested that the current 
processes and strategies be pursued more intentionally and to a greater depth 
(although there was recognition from two interviewees that "what can be done with the 
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available resources is being done). For example, the Director of Nursing thought that 
the Trust should be more systematic in approach and challenge clinical processes 
more especially in changing traditional working practices in elective surgical activity to 
drive greater efficiency, "Once a strong challenge had been made, the senior 
management should make sure that the challenge is followed up and momentum isn't 
lost by pursuing performance reviews, asking what's happening and, if something isn't 
working, asking what staff members what they are going to do as an alternative." The 
medical director believed the Trust executive needed to be more vocal in making the 
arguments externally in support of this strategy and method, telling the government to 
"back off', providing a service provider's perspective in the papers and thereby 
ensuring operational understanding becomes part of the local and national debates 
about the NHS. For the clinical governance manager it was introducing clinical 
improvement methodology into the pathways as an operational norm. (When 
introducing pathways they had limited the conceptual and practice changes around 
pathways to what were necessary to get clinicians on board but she believed they now 
needed to expand this.) "We're getting there with it. .. We've got a huge investment in 
the Trust in leadership and organisational development support ... What you then create 
is that culture in which the whole lot of strategy in a number of areas comes together." 
And for the finance director it was "Work(ing) better with the commissioners. I'd be very 
embarrassed if members of the public sat and watched debates and meetings and 
things. Members of the public don't care if you work for the Trust or the PCT or 
whatever, you work for the health service, you are supposed to be making the services 
better as a whole ... we suffer because of our relationships." 
Trust's Strengths 
The interview questions sought enlightenment on the Trust's strengths in pursuing 
change in the way that clinical work was managed in the Trust through a variety of 
questions, some direct and some seemingly 'left field'. Again however the interviewees 
were remarkably consistent in their perspectives, understandings and interpretations of 
the Trust and its operations. 
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Overall Strengths 
The Trust's overall strengths in achieving its goals were characterised as being its staff, 
leadership, 'organisational architecture', and culture. Though some interviewees 
described these as independent factors, most interviews recognised them as being 
largely interdependent. 
Staff 
Each interviewee was asked to think about specific people within the Trust that the 
interviewees thought had contributed to a successful clinical management activity 
within the Trust. The selected individuals included clinical staff, clinical managers and 
general managers, including the CEO. Each interviewee was then asked about the 
personal attributes of the selected individual and also of people at various levels of 
organisational support, the immediate team, divisional and senior management levels 
(when distinct) that facilitated and contributed to the individual's achievement. 
The selected staff were described as usually quite charismatic individuals with a real 
determination to see things through; personally able to make, and take, a lot of 
challenge; having a high degree of integrity; able to negotiate, with an ability to 
influence; persistent and resilient; able to lead strategically and operationally; and to 
bring experience to bear in developing strategy. They were motivated by a fundamental 
desire or passion to make things better for patients or the health service. 
The qualities of the teams and the people in the immediate teams that most contributed 
to the selected individual's success were described as: having a common goal and 
world view, strong relationships and joint working supported by good facilitation skills 
and cooperation, a willingness to challenge and to invite healthy challenge and allowing 
individuals time to pursue their chosen project. 
Similar qualities were listed for those at divisional and senior management levels with 
the addition of the facilitating influences of the leadership by the CEO and others 
throughout the upper echelons of the Trust and the coherency between the 
organisational architecture of the Trust's devolved structure and support processes. 
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Leadership 
Leadership at all organisational levels was referred to extensively by all the 
interviewees as being a key strength of the Trust. The emphasis upon, and 
development of, this strength was attributed by three interviewees to the CEO. During 
her interview, the CEO discussed her leadership approach in considerable detail. She 
began describing her role as being "around system leadership. I don't manage the 
business of the Trust, I manage the culture." She elaborated that she saw her role as 
being the organisational look out, scanning the horizon, warning, shepherding, and 
advising of what lay ahead though it was the role of others to Uointly) develop and 
implement strategy to successfully navigate the choppy NHS waters, " You need the 
vision within all of that, the ability to scan the environment, to interpret the environment, 
then translate that into what are the right tactical and strategic responses for the 
organisation and then there is how you then describe that in a way that is meaningful 
both to your organisation but also about how you describe those changes to the 
community when that's, you know, quite a difficult thing for them to do when actually 
they are technically losing services or they perceive that they are losing services ... I 
think there is the need for strategic leadership, you need a strong clinical leadership 
within all of that in terms of the clinical team." 
She described a distributed leadership system (Gronn 2002, Mintzberg 1999,) that 
harmonised with her personality and values. "I believe you need strong leaders at 
every level. But you need leaders who speak with a common voice, who are all signed 
up to the direction of travel, who are all signed up to how that journey will be made in 
terms of the values and behaviours that are needed to make that journey a successful 
one. I do believe that people lead by example within organisations and so I'd go for the 
distributed model. I do though think that there is something about, I do believe that 
organisations, the most successful ones that I have seen and I speak from experience, 
not through what I have read in books, but I do think that the most successful 
organisations tend to be an extension of the Chief Executives personality .... I do think 
there is something you generate through your own behaviour as a CEO and it goes 
with the territory you know, the feel of your organisation and you set the standards, you 
set the behavioural standards. In a distributed leadership model others will pick the ball 
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up and run with it and I don't believe you can lead these large organisations from the 
top unless you have competent effective leadership at every level." 
Thus, although every interviewee commented on the importance of the CEO whether 
as a visionary, as being influential in attracting and keeping staff, in providing stability 
(the CEO had been in place at that time for the four years in the amalgamated Trust 
and had been CEO of one of the constituent Trusts for the four years previous to that 
and stated she had no intention of moving on), as significant in determining the 
structure and processes of the Trust, and as someone who inspired loyalty and trust, 
she described herself (and others reiterated) as being relatively low profile within the 
Trust, "My visibility in an organisation like this is minimal, you know, because I am 
expected to do community leadership. I am expected to do system leadership. I don't, 
as I have said before, I don't run this organisation, I tweak it." 
The transmission of goals, beliefs and values, and the strategies, structures and 
processes that would achieve those, were the responsibility of her executive team and 
the teams for which they, in turn, were responsible etc. This strategy was, as described 
above, to focus upon improving the experience of the entire care process for all 
concerned within an appropriately supportive structure and culture. 
Organisational Architecture and Processes 
As noted in Chapter Six the Trust is structured into five divisions, four of which are 
structured along clinical directorate lines. Its is a highly devolved structure in which 
support functions such as finance and clinical governance, traditionally organised in 
individual departments, are placed as close as possible to the clinicians whom they are 
supporting. Thus business managers, IT specialists and others become part of the 
'team' managing the overall clinical work. In the words of the finance director, "We are 
devolved in everything we do here a devolved organisational structure. But for the 
finance department, we are a central team here and then we have a team of finance 
staff out in each of the divisions. So the surgical division will have their own assistant 
director of finance as part of the team in each division. So where there is work around 
you know, changing care pathways so that the ISS integrated services strategy works, 
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where clinicians have fitted into clinical networks and doing work around there, 
depending of which area and who it is, you know, changing the care around long term 
conditions, it will be for the finance staff who work it. Medical division looks after their 
own specialities. Finance people get involved in the process whereby they are 
changing the pathway. They are looking at where the costs are going to change and 
then look at the same work: is it more efficient? less efficient? Whether we need to free 
up resources to invest or not etc." Thus in Calderdale and Huddersfield Trust the 
traditional functional silos discussed in Chapter Four have been eroded. 
The OD director attributed some of the devolved structures and more integrated 
working practices between the clinicians and general mangers to Department of Health 
initiatives twenty years earlier, though she acknowledged this was somewhat of a two 
edged sword. "When the first sort of clinical audit formed, that was cool. I think that 
started it .... That taught about clinicians in management, didn't it? It moved away from 
the sort of usual stuff in general management and very much put doctors at the heart of 
management. We were a pilot site for the Resource Management Initiative, as I've told 
you before, and I think we've been building on that really ever since, to be honest. ... It 
went really well for a least a year but it started to peter out because the technology 
wasn't as good as it is now and we couldn't get the clinical performance information 
they wanted when they needed it, and they got frustrated and disillusioned .... I try to 
get them that passion again but it's difficult when they've gotten so 'What's the point? 
They always screw you in the end.' So it's important that we don't let this go and not 
see it through. But they also know that I won't be going anywhere else so ... " 
Culture 
Culture is a symbolic concept that encompasses a synthesis of 'characteristic ideology, 
language, dress codes, behaviour patterns, signs of status and authority, modes of 
deference and misbehaviour, rituals, myths and stories, prevailing beliefs, values, and 
unspoken assumptions' of a group (Scott, Manion, Davies, and Marshall 2003), p1 ). 
The Trust's culture was described as "an enabling culture that is more open and 
transparent, where people want to give, a culture that has attracted good staff, created 
friends out there in the system" em, a culture of "achievement" DoN; of initiative, 
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experimentation and permission, "freedom to experiment, developmental, the whole 
approach"1cP Lead; and "(emotional) maturity .... can handle dilemmas and difficulties 
without falling out all the time" 00 Dir. 
This was encapsulated within the advice the interviewees said they would give to their 
nephews and nieces if they were to join the organisation, particularly the advice to work 
hard, use their initiative and not to be afraid to challenge and be challenged. With the 
exception of the CEO (who would advise that new staff members should "Smile a lot. 
Don't argue, just listen"), the majority of the other interviewees gave advice along these 
lines, "Do your job and do it well, never be frightened to ask for support. If you have an 
idea share it, don't be afraid to take it forward, Just go for it really, don't wait for 
opportunities to come to you, you can ask for it here" ICP Lead, "Put your head above the 
parapet, take risks, do more than expected of you, look to how you can help other 
people achieve their goals" 00 o;r and "Be open to new ideas and challenge the status 
quo" DoN_ 
It was also evident in the common language, particularly the catch phrases, used by 
the interviewees. Common terms peppering the interviews included 'patients', 
'passion', 'systematisation', 'pathways', 'integration', 'leadership', 'think out of the box', 
'have a go', 'don't ask for permission, ask for forgiveness', 'loyalty', 'respect', 'integrity', 
and 'challenge'. 
Perhaps it is not surprising then that all the senior staff agreed they liked their jobs and 
the people they worked with and that, for some, this was intense, "It's very forward 
thinking, it's supportive and it's got a fantastic culture. I feel like it fits like a glove, it's a 
very comfortable place to be, it fits my personality. Very, open supportive ... some 
people wouldn't like it. ... 1 have fantastic job in a fantastic organisation, it lets me 
expand my role portfolio ... this organisation lets you be whatever, within reason, it 
develops you' ICP Lead. "I work for this Trust because I am passionate about it" cEo and 
"Its the best place I can make a contribution to the people of Calderdale and 
Huddersfield" 00 o;r. 
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Impediments to Trust's Goals 
Despite this enthusiasm for the organisation, the work that it does and their roles within 
it, the senior managers were clear eyed, very aware of the difficulties and impediments 
the Trust faced in pursuing its goals. These impediments were seen to be sourced in 
three key areas, the Trust's external environment, its own Trust's strengths and its 
past. Specific external hindrances were, "Politicians who don't understand service 
issues Med Dirn, the pace at which changed is imposed from central authorities and the 
impact that has on relationships between organisations, "I don't think it's the pace of 
how it happens because we can respond to pace really quickly; it's the confusion of the 
reforms that it creates in our partner organisations, I think .... and then our ability to 
adjust the relationship" and, along with that, the antagonism of the communities to 
service change, "We spent a lot of effort merging the Trust internally but didn't put the 
same effort into bringing the local communities along with it" 00 Dir 
Although the CEO saw the Trust's culture as being a strong facilitating factor in 
meeting its goals, she also acknowledged that it had its difficulties, "I think that the 
biggest thing is around the hearts and minds job. I think at the moment it's keeping a 
positive attitude within the NHS. I mean the NHS is in complete chaos at the moment 
and you know, it is like a rudderless ship, big gaps in leadership at every level, there is 
no leadership at the top at the moment you know, in terms of the Department of Health, 
it's chaotic and all the anchor points of the system have gone so therefore the issue for 
us is about how we keep this organisation on track in a system that doesn't know 
where its going? ... It's not the negative aspect of the (Trust organisational) culture 
itself. I think its ability to respond to how the NHS is changing is changing at the 
moment. Because what is being valued is not what we articulate and so that's going to 
be interesting for us. Because on a very practical level, the people get in the way. It's 
the people, everything else is just window dressing." 
This was also the concern of the OD director though she expressed it differently. For 
her the 'problem' of the Trust culture manifested in the struggle to meet "Foundation 
Trust requirements without destroying something, without redundancies ... we're an 
evolutionary place, not a revolutionary place ... that will knock us, if we have to do 
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something like that". As noted earlier, the OD director was also concerned not to repeat 
the failure of the 1989 efforts to empower clinicians in taking on traditional 
management practices. She noted that a repetition of doctors' previous disillusion 
around the design and costing of their own services would have dire consequences for 
future efforts to engage clinicians in the integration of managerial and clinical functions 
within the Trust. 
Although the ICP lead didn't think "any of the historical or external stuff will stop it 
happening because they're happy to wade through some of those traditional 
impediments", the Director of Nursing was very concerned. "I think there is something 
about the way we have worked in terms of our structure. It's very much in business 
units, in essence, and although we describe some cross cutting work that actually 
follows the patients rather than the business unit, the business unit is stronger than the 
cross cutting work. I think we are, I think at this point in time, that we are starting to 
redress that balance but at the moment it is still a very strong link, almost the silo 
business unit. ... One of the reasons I think the business units are so strong is that 
money is delivered via that route and I think there is some potential (for countering this 
by) putting monies into networks and managing the resource differently and I think that 
would strengthen some areas ... Payment by Results is going to strengthen those units, 
that delivery of the money in that way I think." She was also concerned that "some 
professional groups have been much, much stronger around traditional practices than 
others .... I think some groups have been forgotten because they are not in the front 
line, for example Laboratory staff and things like that and therefore many of their 
practices have been embedded and not been challenged." She was especially 
concerned that management and staff did not become complacent about their 
successes thus far but pressed on persistently towards their goals. 
North Tees and Hartlepool NHS Trust 
Goals 
The NTH interviewees did not convey a sense of the Trust setting goals independently 
of the prevailing policy paradigm; rather their responses indicated a more reactive 
approach to goal and priority setting. Fundamentally, all interviewees defined and 
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prioritised the goals of the Trust in accordance within the prevailing Department of 
Health priorities, describing the Trust as doing 'what it was told'. Prior to the change in 
the Department's stance most interviewees saw achieving activity targets as the Trust's 
first goal and priority. However by the time of the interviews, all interviewees saw 
financial balance as being the primary concern of the Department and the primary goal 
of the Trust. They were unanimous that significant pressure to address financial issues 
as a first priority was being exerted by the Department of Health through the Strategic 
Health Authority and indirectly through the financial balance requisite for both 
Foundation Trust status and strong Healthcare Commission ratings. Some staff also 
suggested that the Healthcare Commission and the Foundation Trust processes further 
contributed to the separation of financial and clinical aspects of hospitals performance 
and the secondary priority given to strategy and service redesign within the Trust. 
Senior staff were divided about the impact of this goal prioritisation. The CEO was very 
clear that attaining financial balance was of a different order to corporate strategic 
function, "Aside from that (finances and quality health care), we move into a different 
object because the next major objective is that we actually have a clear view of how we 
develop our services going forward .... I'm very comfortable, I think, with priorities which 
say that we run an organisation that is in a financially balanced position ... " The Deputy 
CEO/Director of Nursing appeared to accept this stating, "the prime drivers are 
financial recovery, unfortunately because we'd like them to be something else (laughs), 
like enhancement, but. .. ". 
The priority given to finances was felt in all areas of the Trust primarily through the 
stringent vacancy freeze which had led to several new initiatives, financially led service 
redesign, centralised waiting list controls, and a significant focus upon redesigning the 
nursing function (as this was the largest single cost item in the Trust budget). There 
was, at times, a grudging agreement that some of this had been effective in identifying 
better management of clinical product turning net product losses to net profits (in spinal 
surgery for example), eliminating wasteful practices, particularly in the use of nursing 
resource, and streamlining specialist services (again in nursing) however there was 
also a concern that redesign efforts generally, and especially in ITU and HDU, were 
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either missing important opportunities for service improvement or were threatening the 
quality of care. There was a common acknowledgement that "in some ways, again, the 
main motive behind these is really financial or not reaching targets, rather than 
genuine ... looking at the service objectively and saying lets improve conditions. In fact, 
to some degree, the things we were doing on that basis have been put on hold while 
people are diverted into meeting (other) priorities" Former Med Dir 
Several staff members were keen to see operational and strategic aspects of the Trust 
considered simultaneously through a coherent 'product based' strategic approach. 
They expressed concern that the importance of this was being overlooked and 
suspected that financial primacy would impede the achievement or scope of other 
goals. "I can't rate first three listed as hierarchy because they are simultaneous goals. 
First priority for achieving these goals is understanding the whole care process - we 
can't achieve the others without this. At the moment the emphasis is on financial 
balance by cutting posts, but not necessarily in the right places .... You can't look at the 
organisation as if it has a life of its own, independent of those products. If we want to 
be leaner and slicker, we have to be leaner and slicker in doing those product 
processes. We cannot do it simply by having less staff doing the same processes or 
cheaper staff doing the same processes" 00 o;r "In an ideal world the Trust priorities 
should be to provide the best clinical services in the best configuration .... Ideally what 
we want to do is rationalise our services, increase the efficiency and reduce our costs. I 
think that should, you know in an ideal world, that's what I would like to see 
happening"Former Med Dir "I think it has to be strategy, it's about getting corporate vision 
and taking all of the key stakeholders in the same direction that we want to take this 
Trust. The Trust needs to be commercially run, it's the way that the pay reforms are 
leading us and really we have to try and put in the tools and techniques. I think clinical 
service development around innovative ways of providing patient care is in there as 
well. .. we've been challenged by other issues that have taken our eye off what we are 
here to do, if that makes sense" IMT o;r 'The best value group- their priority should be 
service redesign necessary to improve quality of patient care and delivery of that. 
However they are doing it the opposite way around - how can we save money? What 
can we redesign to save money? And then they say, 'Right, I'll come and redesign that 
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to save that money.' It's like everything else, they do everything else back side round" 
ICP Lead 
Both the financial and service design pressures were exacerbated by the imperative to 
implement the Darzi service review, widely regarded amongst senior staff as a blatant 
piece of electioneering imposed without proper regard for the financial and clinical 
implications for the Trust and its local communities. Several interviewees commented 
on the negative impact of this review, "The Chief Executive has said that finance is the 
top priority, but we've got Darzi, which is being imposed upon us, which works against 
that priority because a lot of the things we want to do to achieve financial balance, like 
centralising services, Darzi stops us doing"00 o;r and "We are producing a lot of things 
twice, you know you're buying two lots of x-ray machines, two lots of theatre kits, we're 
paying for two lots of junior doctors rota's, we're running a full emergency service on 
both sites where we could have one site emergency. We could save many millions of 
pounds .... instead of the review's outcome being based purely on clinical service 
grounds, a lot of it is bitten into by politics which go against the logic of clinical service. 
Unfortunately I think that some of the gains we could have got we'll lose because of 
political interference" Former Med Dir 
The interviewees' personal goals reflected their desires for the organisation's goals, 
amongst other things. Whilst the CEO was upbeat about the hospital being the best run 
and the best deliverers in their local area, others were aware of the difficulties in getting 
there, "to achieve the necessary financial balance with minimal disruption. I think that, I 
wouldn't say that they were fire fighting, but it's definitely an organisation for fighting 
fires at the moment" Deputy CEO/DoN. The OD director wanted "to get absolute clarity about 
who's responsible for managing clinical care. I'm not really bothered about what the 
decision is, as long as we have that clarity.'' The former medical director was 
concerned to "bring up the quality, I don't think we work with maximum efficiency and 
effectiveness and I would like us to do that". There were also some personal goals that 
were much related to the interviewees' professional niche. For example, the ICP Lead 
wanted to complete the variance analysis database, the deputy CEO also Director of 
Nursing) wanted to raise the profile and influence of the nursing profession and the 
238 
Director for Information Management and Technology wanted to see the full 
implementation of an electronic care record. 
Trust's Strengths 
Interestingly, there was little, if any, coherency between the interviewees about the 
Trust's strengths for meeting these organisational and personal goals. The CEO 
suggested these lay in the Trust's clinical strengths, clinical governance mechanisms, 
and its reputation for both of these within health and amongst the community. This 
seemed somewhat odd as it is not obvious that the local community had a good 
understanding of the Trust's clinical governance mechanisms and their relevance and 
no evidence for this assertion was provided. The Deputy CEO (also the director of 
nursing and clinical governance) thought it was the 'clinical buy-in' and 'the propensity 
to change (that) is there because people are willing to change' - something which other 
interviewees thought was missing, and which even he said he thought was lessening 
due to the central control associated with the financial regime. 
The former medical director believed the Trust's strength was the stability and loyalty of 
the workforce from the local area though he admitted this did not apply to doctors. The 
IMT director thought it was the strong leadership and good alliance between executive 
and clinical directors, although the ICP lead and others spoke of the difficulty in getting 
clinical directors to provide leadership, particularly amongst doctors. The pathways 
coordinator thought the Trust was "forward thinking and it does try, and it tries to make 
it multi-disciplinary, like, everybody has an opinion, it's not hierarchical" despite also 
saying that she didn't know anything about a strategic plan. The organisational 
development director, with perhaps greater realism about the Trust's position at that 
time and honesty about his own uncertainty about its operational direction, suggested it 
may be the fact that, at that time, the Trust was "facing collapse. I think survival is a 
great motivator. We have a new chief exec, we have a new chairman, we've got a new 
director of acute services and we're about to have a new director of finance so more 
than half of the exec team has changed. We've got a new medical director as well. So I 
think that in itself prepares the organisation; it's not just going to carry on ... (the 
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situation) is forcing people to focus on our efficiency and clinical care and if it's costing 
us more, we have to do something." 
The Management of Clinical Work 
In the light of the above it was not surprising that, although there was a common 
agreement within the Trust about what was meant by the term 'managing clinical work', 
there was less agreement about what was required to achieve it. All interviewees, in 
greater or lesser detail, observed that managing clinical work meant insuring that the 
activities of clinicians deliver quality care for patients and delivering the organisation's 
objectives. However, unlike CHFT, there were few suggestions about how this might be 
taken forward in NTH. 
Several staff believed that achieving effective management of clinical work required 
adopting new, more appropriate management structures and processes. For the OD 
director managing clinical work was about "managing what happens to a patient who's 
coming in, going out, that whole journey, not just specific elements of it. Not somebody 
managing the outpatient elements and somebody managing the nursing element and 
somebody managing the therapists and somebody else managing the doctors. It's just, 
whatever the condition is, it's managing it right across ... which necessitates a matrix 
type organisation. You can't do it any other way." And he believed that 'Nobody is 
managing that'. The ICP lead likewise believed that effective clinical management 
required "having structure so that we know what we are doing is what we're supposed 
to be doing, what's expected of us, and ensuring that we have continuity, and I think 
that's what pathways gives .... That means having a clinical management structure for 
everybody with whom you work, not just yourself." These beliefs however ran directly 
counter to the CEO's belief that clinical management required "a framework within 
which individuals should largely be atomised and self managed unless they step out of 
line, in which case they should be helped to get back on line for appraisal of necessary 
management." 
240 
Identified Impediments to Trust's Goals 
There was agreement, though not unanimity, between senior management about the 
impediments the Trust faced in meeting its goals. These were identified as, firstly, 
internal problems with clinical engagement and, secondly, the processes of various 
external bodies and machinations by the local politicians, especially in regard to 
repeated and protracted service reviews. Problems around clinical engagement were 
expounded upon, often at length, by all but the CEO. These expositions revealed that 
clinical disengagement was both long standing and multiple rooted. Some roots are 
located in the nature and history of the wider NHS; others however were associated 
with previous Trust management practices. 
Front line staff were believed to be unable to see the bigger picture or to think out of 
their own box, doctors (especially consultants) were believed to have insular and 
entrenched positions as 'artisans' and 'craftsmen' within their own specialties and the 
wider organisation, and to be resistant to new skill sets and techniques whose 
introduction would create shifts in power. This was exacerbated by consultants' 
financial and performance security relative to other staff but also by the fact that staff, 
especially consultants but not exclusively, had been allowed over time to "get away 
with doing what they want" ICP Lead & IMT Dir. 
Interviewees with a longer history of employment in the Trust believed that the previous 
history, over many years, of initiatives failing through poor management practices at 
both strategic and operational levels had had a considerable effect in further 
entrenching clinical disengagement and resistance. Strategic failures listed by 
interviewees included failures by the Board to ensure clear role definition between 
themselves and the senior management and, with that, transparent, consistent decision 
making; and failure by the previous CEO and the Clinical Policy Board to provide clear 
leadership, to develop appropriate and consistent strategy, and to both consult with 
Clinical Directors and ensure that they acted as organisational managers. Poor 
operational management processes listed included failure to align roles, responsibilities 
and structures throughout entire the organisation, to provide clear role definition 
especially for the Clinical Directors, to properly authorise staff tasked with implementing 
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new initiatives, to ensure that allocated responsibilities were being properly fulfilled, 
and that underperforming and recalcitrant staff were identified and either encouraged 
or disciplined. 
The new CEO was commended by other senior staff for beginning to address several 
of these issues through various initiatives. These included being more transparent 
about decision making, seeking to involve the clinical directors more in decision 
making, disbanding the Clinical Policy Board and replacing it with a new body (the 
Trust Directors' Group), and attempting to limit the power of the consultants. The CEO 
repeatedly emphasised throughout the interview that the Trust was "only just starting" 
in these initiatives, to develop a strategy, and address the Trust's underlying problems. 
He was forthright that the Trust had had a history of 'an absence of strategy', still 
lacked strategic goals and strategies beyond financial balance, and that much more 
could (and would be) done to address operational problems. Interviewees were 
concerned however that several key issues were not being addressed and that this 
was undermining the potential effectiveness of those listed above. Of particular 
concern were that the Finance Director simply made announcements in the Trust 
Directors' Group without consultation, that the Clinical Directors were not expressing 
their disquiet about this, and that their silence in this forum was taken as acceptance. 
There was also concern that the clinical directors' roles remained vague and uncertain. 
As a result they were not competently managing their staff and directorates to address 
the wider organisational implications of clinical work and were avoiding cultivating 
careful education, consultation and partnership with their staff in these matters. Instead 
they were tending to impose budget cuts and the vacancy freeze, seemingly without a 
creditable rationale, thereby counterproductively generating further resentment and 
resistance. As a result, consultants still did not see that they have an important role to 
play in influencing and redesigning operational processes to the simultaneous benefit 
of clinical outcomes, patient experience and financial success. 
This resentment towards management was aggravated by what doctors and other staff 
saw as the false economy and insensitivity of the 'draconian' vacancy freeze and the 
pettiness of other decisions, for instance, the doubling of the staff parking fees and the 
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ending of sandwich provision at lunchtime meetings. As a result, consultants and 
nurses were dismissive of Trust policy decisions and were continuing to make 
countermanding and unilateral decisions about resources, especially nursing and 
support staff resources. 
Culture 
'Delivering' on projects, targets, finance and Trust policy with a 'can do' attitude was 
the most commonly named value said to be admired in the Trust. Good leadership, 
vision, clarity of goals, honesty, integrity and teamwork were each mentioned in more 
than one interview; there was also some recognition that what people valued depended 
in part on their role and expectations. Front line staff, for example, valued "people who 
are good clinicians who they admire for their skill. Who provide and can supervise a 
good clinical service, can motivate the staff and include them in the decision making ... 
as opposed to somebody who's dictatorial who's telling them what to do" Former Med Dir 
These were also the characteristics attributed to people named as having made a 
significant contribution to the management of clinical work. Virtually all named staff 
were described as being strongly motivated by patient care, able to make conceptual 
links between ideas, initiatives and practice, identify what they had to do to make 
change happen, and do that with personal integrity. They were often described as 
'forthright', 'passionate', 'can do' people whom others respected for their competency. 
Unfortunately most interviewees also either commented directly or alluded to an 
absence of many of these values in the Trust. 
Whilst the CEO listed all the above values as important, also including "an ability to 
relate what you're doing to why you're doing it and how it fits in with the overall purpose 
of the organisation", he repeatedly admitted that, beyond achieving financial balance, 
the Trust didn't have a clearly defined purpose. The lack of good leadership and vision 
("we don't have too many visionaries" IMT o;r) led to the staff "screaming out for direction 
and leadership" 00 o;r. "There is not a lot of direction given within the Trust ... it's fire 
fighting. And stumbling around" ICP Lead 
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The stumbling around was compounded by the earlier mentioned failure to ensure that 
responsibilities were being properly fulfilled and that underperforming staff were 
identified and dealt with. "You're given goals, they don't follow up on them, because 
then they go off on tangents. There is no follow through and no review. No reflective 
viewing, what worked and what didn't. As long as you're producing they don't want to 
know how you're doing it or how you did it, as long as you get from a to b. And they'll 
give you c, d, e, f and g in the mean time and still expect you to get to b" ICP Lead She 
and others gave examples of various staff - nurse managers, clinical directors, 
consultants, even the medical director - who were not following through on their roles 
and responsibilities, some of them in open defiance of directives, and who were not 
being managed in this. The prevalence of this was indirectly confirmed by the CEO 
who noted that there was an as yet unmet need to "challenge people where they are 
not meeting those expectations because they either think they aren't important or don't 
think they need to be accountable". 
The pattern of a lack of follow through was attributed in part to an assumption within 
the Trust that words equal action, 'Because I'd said it, it will happen' and in part to be 
conscious choice by some, "xxxx's a master at that and I think it's a purposeful strategy 
for him because I think if he doesn't ask, he doesn't need to do anything about the non 
achievers. It sounds cynical I know .. .''00 Dir. It may also be related to staff training in 
performance appraisals and team/staff management, "There's a lot of lip service to 
reflection, KPis, appraisals. I shouldn't say that, but, it's true! Appraisal meetings are, 
"What have you done? And while you're at it, can you do all this now as well? There's 
no 'How's it going, what problems are you having, what do you need help with?"' ICP Lead 
Indeed, the CEO thought improved programme interviewing was one of the things that 
could be done to support better clinical management that was not yet being done. 
The perception of 'lip service' with it's undertones of dishonesty seemed to be 
widespread. Senior managers were aware that the Trust staff did not believe that 
honesty and integrity were values that would be relied upon. "It was microbiology, and 
they were given the usual spiel. ... you know, you've got to make these savings, staying 
the way you are is not an option ..... and somebody said 'you know if you're just honest 
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with us we'll do it' and by and large that's fairly true, I mean staff aren't stupid .... No, 
they all think somehow there's a hidden agenda there, I mean you talk to many of them 
and you talk to many senior managers and they will not accept that we're in the 
financial straits that we're in. They'll say things like 'Oh, we hear this every year' and 
you know they are just virtually lying to make us toe the line and what have you" 00 Dir 
Such comments about lip service and perceived dishonesty could be dismissed as 
mere semantics or as just typical of the sorts of things that might be said by front line 
staff confronting the differing priorities and cultures of managerial staff. However the 
interview evidence suggests that the managers did have a tendency to speak, if not in 
double speak, then with an equivocality designed to sugar coaUshelter the truth. The 
CEO's comments about the Trust purpose quoted previously are an example, as are 
"the role is to achieve the necessary financial balance with minimal disruption. I think 
that, I wouldn't say that they were fire fighting, but it's definitely an organisation for 
fighting fires at the moment" cEo and "And I don't think we have that - not an overriding 
strategy. We have lots of little strategies. But I would imagine we have got an over-
riding strategy. But if we have, I ain't seen it" ICP Lead. 
From this perspective the CEO's repeated emphasis on 'starting' to address problems 
(12 times throughout the interview) could be seen as both confronting reality (many 
initiatives truly were just beginning to address problems) and avoiding saying anything 
about what wasn't done previously, for how long, and why. Such careful and/or 
convoluted use of words, hiding some things and foregrounding others, is a tactical 
move used by everyone at times, often for well-intentioned reasons and with good 
outcome. When used frequently or indiscriminately however the practice can easily be 
construed as deceptive. In this case, it appears that the Trust executive had, 
unwittingly or otherwise, adopted as a working norm a practice associated with the 
external environment of the Trust. 
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Wider Hindrances 
Other interviewees were more explicit about what was not being said by the CEO, 
attributing paralysis in the Trust to four (apparently interrelated) phenomena. These 
were the: 
• Indecisive leadership style of the previous CEO, 
• Repeated and protracted external reviews associated with the political 
gamesmanship of a previous local member of parliament, 
• Highly politicised nature of the local electorates, 
• Unresolved cultural differences and resentments between the two 
hospital sites arising from the amalgamation of the two previous hospital 
Trusts. 
The various reviews to which the Trust had been subjected, especially the often quoted 
Darzi review, were widely believed to have been initiated outside of due process by the 
then incumbent local member of parliament for Hartlepool. This parliamentarian had a 
reputation for 'fixing' things, was a prominent Government minister who left the ministry 
and Parliament in circumstances which undermined his reputation for probity, and is 
currently an EU Commissioner. The majority of incumbent electoral representatives in 
other local electorates were/are also senior ministers or influential figures in the 
national government. Their pervasive influence and power locally were believed to 
have created highly parochial approaches to major issues, reinforced by a highly 
vociferous local press dedicated to preserving local interests. This parochialism could 
perhaps even be termed 'a siege mentality' - not surprising in an area that had known 
widespread decline and significant deprivation over many decades. It is perhaps not 
surprising then that the reviews were regarded internally as blatantly political 
machinations with a predetermined outcome, not premised upon any underlying clinical 
or financial reality. 
The highly contentious political environment predated the amalgamation of the two 
predecessor Trusts and contributed to the tensions inherent in the amalgamation. It 
was always likely to be a difficult amalgamation in that there were fifteen miles between 
the hospital sites, distinct local differences and rivalries between the two towns (despite 
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the wider political and economic circumstances), distinct cultures within the hospitals 
(the Hartlepool hospital was, and is, seen by staff who travel between the two sites as 
more integral with the community and to be a friendlier, more socially integrated 
worksite), different work practices between clinical sites, and the Stockton Trust carried 
a significant deficit into the amalgamation. The financially sound Hartlepool Trust saw 
itself as being forced to 'bail out' the Stockton Trust to the detriment of its own services 
and staff. Significant clinical staff in some departments, especially orthopaedics in 
Stockton, refused to travel between sites (a practice that still continues). The resilient 
animosity to the amalgamation between significant sections of staff in the two sites 
appears to have both fed off, and to have added to, the Trust's highly politicised 
environment. 
Most Trust staff were, and are, long term local residents. Senior staff were well aware 
of the blurred lines of authority between the Trust Executive and Board; were and are 
required to regularly interact officially at various levels within the community; and have 
been 'burnt' repeatedly by the (vociferous) local press. It appears that members of the 
Trust have learnt to play the political game themselves, however wittingly or 
unwittingly, in order to deal with the external environment's impact on the Trust's 
strategic and operational matters. This could provide a partial explanation for several 
troubling aspects of the Trust's culture- the use of obfuscating language, the selective 
attention to problems and people, the fudged lines of authority, and the lack of 
independent goal setting behaviours. In this environment it is not surprising that, 
regardless of her personal style or ability, the previous CEO may have found it difficult 
to provide decisive leadership. It is also not surprising that this, in turn, was seen by 
some interviewees as exacerbating the Trust's difficulties with staff resistance. 
To some extent these behaviours could be regarded as expected outcomes of the 
longstanding and unresolved tensions in the wider NHS, the recent history of repeated 
seismic policy shifts within the Department of Health (discussed in earlier chapters), 
and the repeated reconfigurations of associated NHS organisations. However the 
prevalence of these behaviours in NTH staff contrasted with the comparative lack of 
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them in CHFT, which was operating in the same national policy context and had an 
outwardly similar organisational history. 
The impact of these behaviours was evident in the advice the interviewees said they 
would give to a nephew or niece starting work in the Trust tomorrow. Several 
interviewees' first response was that they would tell them to take another job 
elsewhere. All offered advice that entailed trying to keep clear of the negative aspects 
of the Trust's culture. This included "Understand what you are here to achieve in terms 
of your own role. Understand and be able to work with the other professions, teams ... 
Understand the expectations of the organisation as a whole. Whether you should 
challenge those expectations or go with them"cEo. "Understand the dynamics of the 
NHS and the reasons why it's in the position it's in, I think that's critical that you 
appreciate the history and then look for opportunities to influence change" IMT Dir and 
"Make no assumptions and always check what you're doing is what is needed .... 
because you'll never be told otherwise" 00 Dir_ 
Despite the difficulties, the interviewees did believe, as the CEO emphasised, that 
things were beginning to change. There was recognition amongst senior staff that 
things couldn't continue as they were; strategic vision and goals are necessary and 
important and the newer executive staff had brought a fresh way of thinking of things. 
There was a belief that the emphasis upon pathways and the earlier Clinical 
Management Development project had increased awareness of the interrelation of 
effectiveness and efficiency amongst clinical staff, and that the 'saving' of spinal 
services through an effectiveness and efficiency review was providing a kind of 
spearhead for entrenching such thinking and practice within the Trust. 
Discussion 
Three key though subtle issues run through the interview narratives within the Trusts. 
These are the longevity, 'localness', and style of the CEO and staff and the influence 
for better or worse these have in achieving change (or not). The CEOs in these Trusts 
at the time of the Clinical Management Development project differed in expected 
longevity and style. The contrasting sense of stability that one 'felt' rather than 
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'evidenced' in the interviews in the two Trusts was palpable - and consistent with 
impressions gained during the conduct of the Clinical Management Development 
project. 
In a period of relative turmoil within the wider NHS, the CHFT's CEO's intention to be 
there for the long haul despite the pressures in the NHS system, and the sense of 
stability this has engendered amongst staff, appears to have provided staff with a 
buoyancy and optimism. This buoyancy is complimented by the long term employment 
history and expected continued longevity of key senior staff such as the Organisational 
Development Director. As the OD Director noted on several occasions during the CMD 
project and throughout the interview, 'They (the doctors) know they can't wait me out 
and they know they can't pull the wool over my eyes; I've been through the same pains 
they have and I'm not going anyway". 
The expected longevity of the then current NTH CEO was not mentioned in interviews, 
either by himself or by others. This was perhaps an important omission. His personal 
background indicated someone who has changed career directions and positions 
relatively frequently. His conversation was peppered with 'We are starting to ... ". In 
discussion about why he worked for the Trust he answered that he was attracted by the 
challenge and the risk, adding that "Well if the worse comes to the worst, you do 
something else, don't you?" In itself, this demonstrates personal courage, resilience 
and an acknowledgement that not everything goes to plan. However from the 
perspective of the acknowledged need to achieve sustained change during a period of 
turbulence, any suspicion or belief by staff that the CEO is only in it for the short term, 
could undermine the very thing he, and other Trust staff, were striving for. The need to 
feel secure in the long term direction of the Trust also appears to be important in 
achieving the support and participation of staff, particularly to long term NTH staff who 
have seen repeated failures to complete flagship initiatives. 
The issues of longevity of staff, localness of knowledge, and freshness of vision 
introduce a need for careful judgment in selecting new staff. It appears essential that a 
Trust balances active local recruitment and retention with attracting people from non-
249 
local and non-NHS backgrounds into strategic and operational positions. The CEO in 
CHFT has created a community development post and staffed it with a (locally born) 
senior staff member who has proven herself adept at seizing new investment 
opportunities and dealing with politically difficult situations. She also supported some 
staff (the finance director for example) working in commercial, non-health fields for 
short periods of time (up to two years). CHFT also appears anecdotally to have had 
relative success in attracting staff from outside the region. The introduction of new 
ideas associated with these processes is perhaps more important than initially may be 
recognised. Change needs to be envisioned before it can be pursued. Habits of 
thought and deed need to be broken and new ones established but with careful regard 
for the histories of previous success and failure. 
NTH senior managers recognised that, apart from doctors, they have had difficulty in 
recruiting and retaining staff from outside the region; and they do not practice 
'contracting out' staff for training elsewhere. (Even the new CEO was not 'new' in the 
sense that he had had previous role in the region and one of the predecessor Trusts.) 
These weaknesses appear to have impeded the Trust's ability to innovate and think 
strategically in difficult circumstances. Nor do the Trusts managers actively promote 
community engagement roles to creatively manage the pervasive politicking, 
parochialism and passion in the local community. These differences in the two study 
Trusts in managing change suggest that the need to have a thorough understanding of 
the local conditions and Trust's history (including previous failures) has to be held in 
tandem with the need for freshness in perspective and ideas if a Trust is to overcome a 
legacy of distrust and create a positive dynamic amongst its staff. 
The style of leadership appears to be important in balancing these tensions and 
dynamics. The CHFT CEO presents herself and her management team as inclusive, 
approachable, far sighted, clear minded, reasonable and stable. Her style is to ensure 
any tension or conflict is cognitive, based around ideas of what could and should be 
done to promote the long term benefit of the Trust. She sees herself as being mostly a 
'horizon scanner', looking out for what's about to come over the hill, and strategising 
how to use it to further Trust goals or to minimise its destabilising potential. She trusts 
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her staff to do their jobs well and encourages innovation, managing the additional risks 
by holding people to account for their progress towards goals, supporting them in 
difficulties, and rewarding success. All senior staff appeared to expect to submit 
regularly to 'reasonable' review; this was viewed as being both fair and advantageous 
for themselves, their credibility, and the wider Trust. This contrasted with the sense of 
unpredictability and inconsistent accountability, and the attendant defensiveness and 
demoralisation, that seemed a part of life in NTH. 
These findings imply that efforts to change an organisation's clinical work practices, 
and the organisation and management of these, cannot be divorced from the wider 
management of a healthcare organisation. This, in turn, cannot be divorced from either 
the specifics of the internal dynamics of the organisation or its local community context. 
Despite outward similarities in the histories and policy contexts of the two study Trusts 
(see earlier chapters), local factors had significant impacts. The most important of 
these appeared to be the clarity of vision within the organisation about its purpose, 
goals, strategies and strengths; awareness and care in managing the local political 
environment; corporate ability to be purposeful and disciplined in pursing these goals; 
and leadership wisdom in balancing stability with innovation, and 'localness' and 
longevity with freshness and energy. 
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Chapter Eleven 
Conclusions 
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Raison d'etre 
This thesis' genesis lies in the inconvenience and frustration often experienced by 
recurrent users of health services, especially families with intellectually disabled 
members. Its foundational themes emerged from the difficulties encountered by the 
author when working with service providers to restructure clinical work and to 
implement more organised, multidisciplinary approaches to care management. The 
need to understand the impact contextual factors have, both in sustaining the status 
quo and in supporting the institution of new ideas and practices, provided the 
motivation and momentum for its undertaking. Recognising that studying the 
coordination of care within and across the related sectors of health, social care and 
education was an enormous undertaking, I narrowed my focus and more tightly defined 
my research question. Strategic and logistic considerations (i.e. what could make a real 
contribution to knowledge and be manageable within the required time frame given my 
personal circumstances and time availability?) led me to focus upon the coordination of 
care in one sector and specifically upon ICPs as one example of various putative 
means for coordinating and delivering care. Thus my thesis comprises an examination 
of the differing contexts and outcomes of efforts to institutionalise ICPs for organising 
and coordinating clinical work in two Trusts in Yorkshire and northeast England. 
This chapter draws the emergent themes and findings of this investigation together, 
discusses how the research could have been improved, and suggests where further 
research may fruitfully be undertaken. 
Final Discussion of Findings 
Reviews of Wider Contexts 
The Department of Health's role is, broadly speaking, to manage the English health 
care sector. It does this through a plethora of structures, policies and guidance. 
Together these activities shape the highly specified operational framework for the NHS 
as a whole. The Department intervenes in the wider healthcare sector through the 
manipulation of market structures and/or local health organisations boundaries and 
roles. It sets the wider operational context through a variety of means, including 
statutory bodies and governance mechanisms. NICE and NSFs outline national 
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healthcare priorities and minimum national clinical, safety and technical standards that 
all NHS organisations are required to meet. The Department endeavours to ensure that 
these required standards are met through the activities of inspection bodies such as 
such the Healthcare Commission and Monitor. It also has legislative authority to alter 
professional organisations, their oversight of healthcare professionals, and professional 
remuneration rates. 
The Department of Health does not, however, specify how clinical work is done at the 
'shop floor' level. It has always delegated responsibility for the practice and 
management of clinical work to the health professionals working locally in provider 
organisations. As health professionals traditionally were accountable only to their own 
professional bodies, the organisation and oversight of care in hospitals and other 
healthcare organisations has been historically characterised by a fragmentation of care 
activities between the medical, nursing and allied professions. For, although each 
profession historically self-governed its 'bit' of the care process, no one profession or 
individual was charged explicitly with the coordination and management of care into a 
coherent whole. Care responsibility was simultaneously "everyone's and no-one's". 
Patients, by and large, were and often still are, left to their own initiative in navigating 
the resulting vagaries of care provision. Some managed well but others were known to 
fall through the cracks, often creating an even greater need for public service 
assistance, whether from health or social care or other government functions. 
The lack of accountability for overall performance in public sector health care provision 
began to change with the Thatcher government's drive towards its better economic 
performance. This government promoted a more managerialist oversight of 
organisations and sub-units, emphasising hierarchical responsibility and accountability 
for corporate performance. The incoming Labour government continued the drive for 
accountability, widening CEOs' accountability within healthcare to include clinical 
processes and outcomes as well as corporate responsibilities, instituting new 
mandatory clinical governance mechanisms at local organisational levels. 
Simultaneously, however, the Labour government also placed heavy emphasis upon 
newer and more collaborative ways of working. This dual thrust permeated health 
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policy documents and has been incorporated into inspection bodies' more recent 
approaches, for instance, in the Healthcare Commission's adoption of more integrated 
standards. Despite this, the working out within NHS organisations of the changing 
responsibilities for care processes and their outcomes has been largely left to local 
discretion. Senior managerial and health professionals are expected to freely exercise 
their professional skills, expertise, judgement and autonomy in integrating the 
organisational and clinical dimensions of care to patient and organisational benefit. 
This policy of pursuing strong organisational regulation at the executive levels of Trusts 
whilst upholding relative clinical freedom (and predominantly self-regulation) on the 
shop floor has, however, created a disjunction between the new Departmental central 
diktat and established local and professional norms. Such norms and cultures are very 
difficult to change. People who grow up in only one locality tend to 'become' the 
community; they are predisposed to accept its assumptions, absorb its values and, in 
their communal attitudes and activities, enact a distinctive way of doing things. 
Employing predominantly local staff in NHS organisations, especially in localities that 
have experienced relatively little influx and social change, therefore embeds local 
history, outlooks, politics and 'ways of doing things' into a supposedly 'national' 
organisation. It is virtually impossible to insulate constituent NHS organisations from 
such local influences; thus 'rollouts' of central policy initiatives are rarely as 
unproblematic as national governments, and the departments that act in their stead, 
like to portray. 
Moreover, research has shown that the cultures, values and practices within 
professions are equally resilient to change. Discipline-specific educational, professional 
socialisation, legislated power differentials, and public expectations all tend to entrench 
historic, more uni-professional values and arrangements into the organisation and 
delivery of care. The existing arrangements focus attention on the separate 
components of care for individual patients, and the practices of the individual 
professionals who provide those components of care, rather than a collaborative and 
coordinated approach to meeting the intertwined needs of patients, families and carers. 
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The final outcomes of national or regional improvement programmes, therefore, are 
liable to be as dependent upon what is, and what is not, acceptable to the local 
community as they are upon the intrinsic rationale and coherency of the national policy. 
For this reason, national rollouts would appear predisposed to producing a 
geographical medley of relative successes and failures, with successes likely to have 
somewhat different 'look and feel' between localities. 
Research into More Immediate Contexts 
This thesis demonstrated that central diktat alone will not achieve more coordinated 
care for people requiring ongoing care across professions, health sub-sectors and 
social services. Success is likely to be hard won and will require very careful 
construction of organisations and composite systems of care sensitive to local 
conditions and constraints. 
The activities of Trusts in and around the Clinical Management Development project 
provide evidence in support of this. The CMD project was a regional response to the 
national policy of NHS 'modernisation'; its purpose was the modernisation of the 
management of clinical work through more collaborative and coordinative processes. 
Neither CH FT nor NTH have been completely successful in empowering health 
professionals to work and make decisions collaboratively and in institutionalising 
collaborative approaches to clinical work, particularly ICPs. The evidence suggests, 
however, that CHFT is much further down the road to this than is NTH. The evidence 
also suggests that a multiplicity of factors must be taken into account in constructing an 
effective change approach, many of which, though not all, are in the control of 
management. Central here are organisational legacy, environmental context, an 
agreed understanding of the management of clinical work and how it should be 
pursued within and across local organisations, and careful designation of strategy and 
implementation of structures and processes in the light of these. 
Organisational legacy is rarely in the control of management, but how senior managers 
work with that legacy is in their control, and this is probably a more determining factor 
for future outcomes. CHFT and NTH inherited similar legacies as newly amalgamated 
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Trusts. Both Trusts had a mixed lineage, both resulted from an unwanted 
amalgamation, both were comprised of a previously financially encumbered Trust 
supposedly 'taken over' by a more strongly performing one. Both consequently began 
operations with replicated facilities, division amongst staff, and resentment and distrust 
towards management. The Trust managements' handling of these legacies, however, 
was very different. 
The management of CHFT sought to both confront its legacy directly and to support the 
staff through that process. The CEO and the Trust board set in place an organisational 
architecture that ensured the Trust would be managed as an integrated entity. They 
populated senior management with respected staff from both predecessor Trusts, 
moved them out of their comfort zones, and expected them to work with the 'other' 
(whether the 'other' were sites or professions). The new senior management team 
worked assiduously from the start to address the inherited debt problems, to improve 
clinical performance, and to integrate clinical and organisational activities. Working on 
the principles of services not sites, devolution, and partnership between clinicians and 
management, they also worked to understand staff's perceptions of the new 
arrangements, listen to staffs' concerns about organisational weaknesses, and identify 
and pursue staffs' hopes and desires for the Trust in the future. They acknowledged 
staffs' emotions throughout the amalgamation process and accepted responsibility for 
faults. 
In comparison, the process of amalgamation in NTH took a less directive approach. 
Perhaps in the belief that a gradual pursuit of amalgamated identity and practice would 
minimise disruption, the new CEO and board adopted structures and stances at 
amalgamation which effectively signalled that, at least for the interim, the Trust would 
operate as one in name only. The initial organisational architecture and the pattern of 
recruitment of staff into senior positions, however, created a sense of 'us and them' 
within the senior management. Senior management was divided between staff from 
Hartlepool and staff from North Tees, and between staff with clinical responsibilities 
and staff without these. The divisions significantly weakened the social and hierarchical 
authority of the CEO and the executive team, and appear to have engendered a sense 
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of alienation and instability throughout the Trust. Over time, fewer and fewer clinical 
staff seemed willing to cooperate with management and fewer and fewer managers 
seemed able to impel them to do so. Furthermore, fewer managers, whether 
organisational or clinical, seemed willing to implement standard accountability 
mechanisms. The motivations for this situation are unclear and may have been 
multifactorial - a reluctance to cause further tension, the pressure to meet the ambitious 
Department of Health targets, the consequence of a wider political strategy, or a 
combination of these. The interlaced effect of the organisational architecture and the 
stances of staff, however, was a spiralling attenuation of hierarchical and relational 
authority. 
As organisational studies' writers have noted, over time founding CEOs' personal 
styles tend to fashion each organisation's internal dynamics and emotional climate. The 
founding NTH CEO's personal style, and the reported repeated reversals in decisions 
and staff relations that accompanied it, may have cause a diminution of authority in the 
Trust and created a defensive atmosphere. Additionally, staff based in Hartlepool, who 
previously had been governed by strong and highly visible leadership, may have 
become disoriented by the change in leadership style. The perception of a less 
consistent and less visible leadership probably created a sense of drift and instability 
within the organisation. Staff were uncertain about what was required at any given time 
and, anticipating little managerial 'follow through' on new projects and responsibilities, 
became reluctant to commit to new initiatives. 
The influence of the CEO upon each organisation's emotional climate and ethos was 
also apparent in the differing emotional tones in the two Trusts' survey and interview 
data. The overall tone of staff's comments, inclinations towards empowering or 
disempowering staff, a sense (or lack) of hope, and the proffering of suggestions for 
how things might be done differently within the Trusts, conveyed an almost indefinable 
sense of lingering presence, almost as if someone wearing distinctive perfume had left 
the room. Aspects of this infusion of values and approach into an organisation over 
time were observed in the two Trusts during the CMD project and alluded to by staff 
during the research. The infusion occurs as staff accept and interact with a CEO's 
258 
style, personality and strategic functioning. When the CEO projects a desirable future 
and confidence in achieving it, staff are apt to look for signs of positive change, be 
encouraged by indications of progress and success, affirm the CEO and his/her 
leadership style, replicate associated behaviours and attitudes, and further embed 
these in the organisational psyche. This is all the more so as staff see the general 
management 'walking the talk', demonstrating a willingness to make personally costly 
changes, and accepting responsibility. However, if the CEO is negative and/or blame 
shifting, a destructive mindset can take hold in the organisation, fuelling demoralisation 
and self-protection amongst both senior management and staff. 
A second important aspect of leadership that emerged from the research was the 
perceived likely longevity of the CEO. In 2004 a perceived lack of authority and 
uncertainty in NTH was more apparent, accentuated when the CEO took extended 
leave shortly around the time of unfavourable reports from external inspection bodies 
and a restructuring of regional NHS financial mechanisms. The appointment of a new 
CEO brought hope that the Trust's financial woes could be reversed but some believed 
this post would be short term and would not lead to substantial change in fundamental 
facets of the organisation. And, in fact, the Trust culture in this regard remained 
effectively unchallenged and care practices continued largely unchanged. In contrast, 
in CFHT staff knew that the CEO and the executive team intended to stay long term, 
were determined to see significant change in the management of clinical work, and 
intended the institutionalisation of these changes to spearhead the Trust's long term 
performance and reputation. 
Local political and social dynamics contributed additional qualities to the organisational 
emotional climates and behavioural characteristics. Staff regarded the two NTH 
hospitals as being used to further local parliamentarians' ambitions; some staff may 
have been also using local politicians' desire for greater position to seek professional 
and site specific advantage. Perhaps in order to survive in this climate of self-interest, 
some staff had seemingly adopted smoke and mirrors manoeuvres and/or 'spin' 
approaches to issues that are often associated with national politics. Thus, the negative 
qualities inherent in local politics and the divisive dynamics created in NTH at 
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amalgamation appear to have become entangled, creating a sense of powerlessness 
amongst many staff and rendering effective change extremely difficult. 
The wider politics around amalgamation were similar (if less powerful} in CHFT, 
however, the CEO and her management team approached local politics differently. 
They actively promoted the benefits of a united Trust in the local communities, 
appointed staff to develop positive community engagement, and looked for innovative 
ways to invest in, and contribute to, the communities. When it became apparent that 
they could not overcome politics and loyalties, they adapted their approach. Reasoning 
that the public were/are more concerned about the quality of the local hospitals and 
their care provision than who managed them, the senior managers ceased to promote 
the Trust, emphasising instead the professionalism and competence of the hospitals' 
staff and of the quality of the care. This outward proclamation of inner competence and 
coherency may have provided additional motivation for staff overcome their 
professional differences and to make a reality of joint working for patient benefit. 
Given the tensions and cultural differences between the various professions in 
healthcare, such an effect should only have been beneficial in the drive towards greater 
patient involvement and focus in service provision. The chapters on the stances of sub-
professional groups on various aspects of reform and performance improvement 
revealed that, though all groups supported some requirements for reorganising care, 
subgroups differed in the values they support, the power relations they normalised, the 
reforms they accepted, and the innovations they prioritised. These stances were, at 
times, paradoxical, within the professions as well as between them. The health 
literature demonstrates that considerable thought has been given to understanding and 
resolving tensions between medicine and general managers, and to a lesser extent, 
between nursing and medicine. However there has been relatively little attention paid 
to tensions between the full range of front line clinical professions, and between these 
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clinicians and their more office-immersed professional colleagues, that is, the clinical 
managers. 
Furthermore, although staff often used 'the patient benefit' as justification and incentive 
for practice change, the research suggested that many staff still believed that 
professionals can define and pursue this without patient involvement. The literature 
review noted that this reluctance to involve patients in decision-making arises, at least 
in part, from a concern that including patients and their families in decision processes 
can have a destabilising impact within clinical teams. It may also partially be due to the 
increasing pressure on professional identities and boundaries. These pressures have 
multiple sources; key amongst them are medical advances and the proliferation of 
subspecialties, the increasing professionalisation agenda amongst staff with nursing 
and allied health backgrounds, and repeated governmental calls for role redefinition 
and more flexible ways of working. Such factors suggest that underlying systemic 
complexities and personal vulnerabilities need to be carefully managed when pursuing 
more coordinated and flexible approaches to care. 
In Essence 
This thesis has argued that entrenched differences in local and professional identities, 
values, and practices hinder wholesale change in the way that care is coordinated, 
conducted and managed. It also argued that significant and sustained change is 
unlikely to be brought about by people who are deeply immersed in local community 
and professional cultures. However, change programmes that ignore local history and 
values are also unlikely to succeed. Hence programmes that seek to challenge NHS 
and organisational norms in the management and performance of clinical work, and 
institutionalise new ones, cannot just be carefully constructed, comprehensive in 
coverage, and culturally sensitive. CEOs and senior managers must bring clarity of 
vision within the organisation about its goals, strategies and strengths, maintain 
stability in the midst of innovation, and balance 'localness' with freshness and energy. 
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Success depends as much as on the personnel and the 'personal' as it does on the 
programme. 
Representativeness and Generalisability of the Conclusions 
The applicability of these findings and conclusions to other organisational settings in 
the NHS depends, to a large degree, on the extent to which the depictions of the study 
Trusts, and their progress in institutionalising ICPs as 'the way of clinical work is done', 
adequately represent the 'real life' of the Trusts. It further depends on the extent to 
which the study Trusts are representative of Trusts elsewhere. 
The degree of compliance between reality and depiction will always be debateable for 
the very terms 'organisation', Trust', 'profession', 'management', 'community' etc are 
abstract nouns, conceptualisations of things that are perceived to exist but cannot ever 
be proved. They are also reifications, condensations of fluid and informal group 
activities into a kind of congealed and objective whole (Wenger 1998)p. 61 ). As such, 
they can only ever be partial expressions of 'truth'. The question of representativeness 
then becomes one about the degree to which the thesis' depictions of the two Trusts 
'resonate' with people familiar with these organisations and accord with depictions of 
other NHS organisations described by other researchers. 
Whilst I cannot vouch for the first, I argue that the patterns of behaviours and values by 
staff, the leadership approaches described here, and the effect organisational 
architectures can have upon organisational functionality and outcomes, accord with the 
literature, historical and policy reviews discussed in the thesis. As such, my 
representations of the Trusts can be considered to be valid depictions of activity and 
organisational life in other NHS Trusts. I would therefore argue that the conclusions 
presented here are generally applicable to the wider NHS and to future national 
programmes that may seek to influence the organisation, coordination and 
management of clinical work, particularly any which might seek to reorient these more 
closely around the needs of specific patient groups. 
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Limitations of the Research Design 
Had my research activity within the Trusts been more extensive, the findings may have 
diverged somewhat from those presented here. This includes findings about 
managerial and leadership competencies, the competing interests of professions, and 
the degrees of institutionalisation of the use of I CPs and support for more collaborative 
forms of working. Examples of possible extensions to the interview data collection 
include interviewing senior members of the Trust who had retired or otherwise left the 
Trusts, staff at different levels of the Trusts, and staff with differing degrees of 
managerial involvement. Utilising additional and/or alternative research techniques may 
also have produced somewhat differing data and conclusions. Examples of possible 
complementary research techniques include: 
o Ethnographic research into the actual working practices of clinicians, 
o Observational studies of clinical management meetings, 
o A stakeholder analysis of change, and 
o Semiotics and linguistic analysis. 
The first three of these techniques may have led to a greater emphasis upon themes of 
conflict and power; the latter may have given greater insight into the linguistic and 
symbolic moves in the Trusts which helped or hindered progress towards the Trust 
goals in relation to the management of clinical work. A review of different literatures 
may well have identified different questions and themes which would have required 
alternative approach and method. 
Defence of the Methods 
In response to any charges that I interviewed too few people, I would argue that, as far 
as senior managements' perspectives were concerned, the majority of the executive 
team in both Trusts were interviewed. It was not appropriate under privacy and 
confidentiality legislation for Trusts to reveal the contact details of previous members of 
staff, especially those now retired and therefore without public roles. An initial attempt 
to recruit the clinical directors into the study received a very poor response. Whilst it 
may have been useful to pursue this more vigorously, interviewing the clinical directors 
in both Trusts would have weighted the balance of interviews towards NTH. Moreover, 
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the degree of tension between the senior executive and the clinical directors in NTH, 
and the difficulties experienced in both Trusts in obtaining senior clinicians' 
participation in CMD project workshops, suggested that requests for their time would 
have received short shrift, being regarded as detracting from, rather than continuing to, 
their work outcomes. 
My choice of research methods was guided by my research question and the themes 
and issues identified from the literature review. As the list of relevant contextual factors 
in the coordination and management of care is potentially infinite, themes' apparent a· 
priori importance, and the practicality of researching these, played a significant part in 
my choice of research method. These included ideas about how to best understand 
healthcare as a system and the Trusts as organisations, a sense of what could 
practicably achieved in the relevant time span, and minimising research time spent 
away from my disabled son and my daughter (particularly important for me as a single 
parent). The realisation that this thesis is the start of a journey, not the end, 
encouraged me to accept both its limitations and its strengths as indicators of work that 
is yet to be done. 
Future Research 
Several areas for future research are suggested by the results and conclusions of this 
thesis. The first, and most immediately relevant, would seek to remedy one of the 
weaknesses of this study, namely a lack of understanding about how well the views of 
staff at various levels of each Trust, particularly in CHFT, accord with senior 
management's views about the meaning and importance of clinical work management. 
Though probably difficult to undertake (in terms of recruiting interview subjects), this 
would identify how staff experience discontinuities in understandings and priorities 
about how clinical work should be managed and, in so doing, provide background 
information to inform the second area of research. 
The second possibility is an action research project to identify how the professional 
socialisations of clinicians and (professional and organisational) managers manifest 
during interactions between staff members, particularly in change programmes in NHS 
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organisations oriented towards greater collaboration in the provision and management 
of care for specific patient groups. As results emerge about discursive stances which 
may lead to misunderstandings, these can be fed back iteratively to participants. This 
should advance self-awareness and reflection, shared discursive and communicative 
skills, and mutual understanding in mediating the contradictions and discontinuities in 
stances that exist within and across professions. 
The third area of research is similar to the second but incorporates patients and their 
families into the planning and decision making processes within NHS organisations. 
The thesis revealed that only a small percentage of staff in the study Trusts were keen 
to see more patient oriented services, and an even smaller percentage of staff wanted 
to include patients in key decision processes. As government policy is increasingly 
oriented to a patient-led NHS, an action research programme could, firstly, foster 
greater mutual understanding, better interpersonal communication, and improved 
relational skills. It could then use these attributes to develop shared approaches to 
patient inclusive decision-making, joint responsibility between patients and 
professionals for clinical outcomes, more effective team working and management, and 
newer managerial competencies centred on these. 
A fourth research area concerns the extent to which the various research projects 
discussed above, and their outcomes in different Trusts, are influenced by locality 
specific factors and how these might be best managed. Such research could take 
various forms and/or use various research techniques e.g. action research, 
ethnographic approaches, observational studies, and discourse analysis. As the impact 
of locality specific factors is subtle and difficult to measure, a mix of approaches should 
provide greater wealth of insight and understanding than projects that rely on a single 
method. 
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The aim of this questionnaire is to obtain your views about current moves to 
extend clinicians' involvement in management. 
Involving clinicians more directly in management is a prominent issue in health policy 
circles. There are very few studies however which have examined what this might mean 
for the people who will be most affected. We therefore seek your opinion on a broad 
range of factors such as: the issues which face the health care system and the strategies 
that are appropriate for addressing them; the attributes which characterise different 
professional groupings; what you value about your work; how you perceive your 
professional autonomy and accountability; the factors that you believe affect clinical 
practice; your perceptions of how your clinical service and/or units should be managed; 
your assessment of how you are being managed and of the goals being pursued by your 
NHS Tmst. 
We realise that the task we are asking you to perform is demanding. Equally the process 
of involving clinicians in management is complex, and ultimately depends on how 
people like you respond. By sharing your views about matters such as those mentioned 
above you will give us a better understanding of how current changes in organising and 
managing health care services are affecting people such as yourself, and how you 
perceive and evaluate these changes. 
Some additionai poonts 
I. We give an assurance that individuals responding to this questionnaire will not be 
identifiable in any reports of the findings. 
2. You may interpret some of the statements in the questionnaire as contentious. They 
are included in the survey so that you can express your views about them. 
3. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions we ask. We are simply 
interested in your views. 
Thank you for giving us some of your valuable and hard-pressed time. 
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Personal Details 
We would like to know a few of your personal details. We will use this information 
when we analyse your responses to the rest of the questionnaire. 
Please indicate the response which most closely describes you and your work situation by 
ticking the appropriate box. 
Gender: Male 0 
Female 0 
Age: 20-29 0 
30-39 D 
40-49 0 
50-59 0 
60 and over 0 
Your Occupation/Position 
Please tick a box to identifi• your occupation. In the space provided indicate your specialisation 
and your status/grade. 
Medicine: 0 
Specialisation 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Status/Grade 
-------------------------------------------------------------
(eg, consultant, registrar etc.) 
Nursing: 0 
Specialisation 
Status/Grade 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Professions Allied to Medicine 0 
Specialisation 
Status/Grade 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Other not noted above 
--~---------------------------------------------------
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Percentage of Time Spent on: Direct Patient Care_% 
Administration/Management 
Length of Time in 
Current Role: 
Terms of Your Employment: 
Highest Professional 
Qualification: 
Highest Academic Qualification: 
Highest Qualification in 
Management: 
Teaching (excluding patient education) 
Research 
Less than I year 
1-4 years 
5-9 years 
10-19 years 
More than 20 years 
Full-time salaried staff 
Part -time salaried staff 
Joint appointment with university 
Other (Please specify) 
Fellowship of College 
Membership of College 
Other (please specify): 
Postgraduate Degree 
Postgraduate Diploma 
Undergraduate Degree 
Diploma 
Certificate 
Postgraduate Degree 
Postgraduate Diploma 
Undergraduate Degree 
Diploma 
Certificate 
In-house Short Course 
None 
0/o 
% 
% 
tOO% 
D 
D 
0 
D 
0 
D 
D 
D 
0 
D 
0 
0 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
0 
0 
D 
D 
D 
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Health Care Hssu.es 
There are two parts to this section. Please answer both parts. 
PART I. 
We are interested in your views on some issues that are said to 
face the health care system. 
Note: By health professionals we mean all staff involved in direct patient care eg doctors, nurses and 
professions allied to medicine. 
Rank the issues listed below from I to 6 according to your view of their relative importance. 
Place the numeral "I" next to the issue that you think is most important. Then place the numeral "2" 
next to the issue that you think is next most important and so on, through to "6", for the issue that you 
think is least important. 
In ranking the issues, do not use the same rank more than once. 
In order of their importance in health care rel(mn. I rank the issues listed below as follows: 
• the increasing pressure on health professionals to base their clinical 
decisions on financial rather than strictly clinical grounds 
o the unwillingness of health professionals to consider the cost implications 
of their clinical practices 
• significant shortcomings in the accountability of health professionals 
• the increasing erosion of clinical autonomy by management 
o the inability of current information systems to monitor the clinical 
outcomes of clinical decision making 
• the inability of current infonnation systems to monitor the cost 
implications of clinical decision making. 
(Rank) 
] 
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PART2. 
1 'We are interested in the importance that you give to a number of strategies for addressing 
1'. ; .· .·.. f resource issues that confront the health care sector. 
For each of the strategies listed below, indicate your sense of its priority by circling the response on the 
scale provided which most closely corresponds with your view. 
High priority 
2 Middle order priority 
3 Low priority 
4 Not appropriate 
To address resource issues that confront the health care sector, health 
authorities should: 
• increase government funding to health care 
• implement quality management methodologies 
• guide and support patients with chronic conditions to self manage their care 
• stimulate public debate about the resource limits that should be placed on 
the acute care component of the health care system 
• improve the ability of infonnation systems to monitor clinical work 
• require professional colleges to develop and implement care pathways 
• charge local authorities for patients in hospital beds who are on waiting 
lists for nursing home and/or residential care services. 
• establish structures and processes in clinical settings which reinforce the 
team based nature of service provision 
• fund and manage high volume services on the basis of Integrated Care 
Pathways 
o redirect resource flows from acute care to p1imary and secondary 
prevention 
• stimulate public debate about the ethical limits of medical interventions 
• develop services in primary care settings which enable more patients to be 
treated without resort to hospital inpatient services 
• require Primary Care Trusts to take over responsibilities from local 
authorities for all aspects of social service delivery i.e. clients, budgets and 
starr. 
l 
l 
1 
l 
1 
l 
1 
1 
I 
l 
l 
2 3 4 
2 3· 4 
2 3 4 
:' 
2 3 40 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3~ 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2: 3 4 
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Work Values 
we. are interested in your beliefs about social relationships within organisations generally. 
Indicate the extent to which you 'agree' or 'disagree' with each of the statements listed below, by 
circling the response on the scale provided which most closely corresponds with your views. 
Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Undecided 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
o To get ahead at work you should never disagree with your 
supenors. 
l. 2 3 4 5 
o In one's work, actions involving risk or chance should be 1 2 3 4 5 
avoided. 
o It is best not to break the organisation's rules even when you 1 2 3 4 5 
think it may be in the organisation's best interest. 
o The most effective manager is one who makes it clear who is the 1 2 3 4 5 
boss. 
o It is right for people in positions of power to have some 1 2 3 4 5 
privileges. 
o Be it at work or in the family, everyone should show respect to 1 2 3 4 5 
their authority figures 
• One's work and private life should never mix. • 1 2 3 4 5 
• Decisions made by individuals are better than decisions made by 1 2 3 4 5 
groups. 
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Your Perception of 
Clinical Governance 
There are two parts to this question. Please answer both parts. 
PART l. 
We are interested in your views about the likely clinical outcomes of effective Clinical 
Governance. 
Indicate the extent to which you 'agree' or 'disagree' with each of the statements listed below, by 
circling the response on the scale provided which most closely corresponds with your views. 
l Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Undecided 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
Effective Clinical Governance implementation 
will: 
• Reduce patient complaints l 2 3 4 5 
• Increase patient satisfaction l 2 3 4 5 
• Increase efficiency l 2 3 4 5 
• Reduce the use of inetTective treatments l 2 3 4 5 
• Improve clinical outcomes l 2 3 4 5 
• Produce less unexplained variation in clinical l 2 3 4 5; 
practice 
• Reduce critical incidents and adverse events t 2 3 4 5 
• Reduce hospital acquired infection rates l 2 3 4 5 
293 
PART2. 
I We are interested ii'Fhow you evaluate the organisational effects of Clinical Governance. 
Note: By health professionals we mean all staff involved in direct patient care eg doctors, nurses and 
professions allied to medicine. 
Indicate the extent to which you 'agree' or 'disagree' with each of the statements listed below, by 
circling the response on the scale provided which most closely corresponds with your views. 
I Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Undecided 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
I regard clinical governance as: 
• a fad whose time will pass 1 2 3 4 
• a good idea whose potential cannot be realised because the resources 1 2 3 4 
required for its implementation are not available 
• a mechanism for promoting further unjustified intrusions by 1 2 3 4 
management into clinical domains 
. generating structures through which multidisciplinary clinical teams 1 2 3 4 
(eg. an orthopaedic unit or a renal unit) can systematise, monitor and 
improve care for specitied treatments (eg. hip replacements) 
• generating structures which (by using external discipline and 1 2 3 4 
surveillance) will encourage a culture ofblamc within clinical settings 
. generating structures which will enable health professionals to bring 1 2 3 4 
clinical quality and outcomes issues into their negotiations with health 
policy authorities. 
Are there any comments that you would like to make about Clinical Governance? 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
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Autonomy 
We are interested in your perception of how certain expectations can affect your professional 
autonom . 
For each of the statements listed below, indicate its effect on your autonomy by circling the response on 
the scale provided which most closely corresponds with your views. 
I Will significantly extend my autonomy 
2 Will extend my autonomy 
3 Have no effect on my autonomy 
4 Will threaten my autonomy 
5 Will significantly threaten my autonomy 
An expectation that I: 
• routinely participate with my peers from my profession in reviews of 
my individual clinical work 
1 2 3 4 5 
• participate with all members of my multidisciplinary clinical team in 1 2 3 4 5 
planning, evaluating and improving the team's collective performance 
• undertake administrative/clerical work l 2 3 4 5 
• use care pathways specified by my clinical college or professional 1 2 3 4 5 
body 
• use care pathways developed collectively with local professional 1 2 3 4 5 
peers 
• consider the resource implications of the tests and treatments that I J 2 3 4 5 
order for individual patients 
• become involved in the day-to-day management of my clinical unit or l 2 3 4 5 
servtce. 
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Clinical Practice 
There are three parts to this question. Please answer all three parts. 
PART l. 
I We are interested in your views about factors which may produce variations in clinical practice I 
For each of the factors listed below, indicate its importance as an explanation of variation in clinical 
practice by circling the response on the scale provided which most closely corresponds with your views. 
I An extremely important factor 
2 A very important factor 
3 A moderately important factor 
4 A slightly important factor 
5 Not important at all 
Variations in clinical practice arc caused by: 
• shortcomings in the clinical education of medical, nursing and 
other clinical staff 
• the indeterminacy of clinical signs and symptoms exhibited 
by many patients 
• the failure of clinical colleges and/or professional bodies to 
develop and disseminate integrated care pathways 
• shortcomings in local peer review structures and processes 
• the inability of my profession's knowledge-base to encompass 
the complexity of the situations with which we have to deal 
• the failure of individual health professionals to keep up-to-date 
with recent advances in their field 
• shortcomings in clinical information systems 
• the relative isolation of health professionals from each other 
which impedes knowledge sharing. 
l 2 3 4 5 
l 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
l 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
l 2 3 4 5 
l 2 3 4 5 
In the spaces provided, indicate your assessment of the importance of clinical practice variation as an 
issue requiring attention. (tick one box only) 
Extremely Very Moderately 
0 0 0 
Slightly 
0 
Not at all 
0 
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PART 2. 
I We are interested in your views ofi, a range of factors which can affect your clinical practice. 
For each of the matters listed below nominate a percentage which represents your best guess of its 
prevalence in your clinical work. 
In approximately what percentage of patients: 
• do you expect to encounter clinical signs and symptoms which are "outside % 
the norm"? 
• do you expect to encounter clinical signs and symptoms which arc "not % 
explainable"? 
• do you expect treatment outcomes which are outside what you would regard % 
as being "nonnal"? 
o do you expect treatment outcomes which are outside what you would regard % 
as being "explainable"? 
• can you demonstrate a cause-effect relationship between the intervention % 
performed and its expected clinical outcomes? 
• is there general agreement within your clinical specialty about the techniques % 
and regimens that should be used in treatment? 
• do you and your professional/clinical colleagues agree about the techniques % 
and regimens that should be used in treatment? 
• do you feel free to vary the techniques and regimens that you use from those % 
that are used by your professional/clinical colleagues? 
• can you predict the amount of resources (for example, nursing time, imaging, % 
pathology, pharmacy) that you require to produce a desired clinical outcome? 
• are you doubtful about your capacity to produce a good clinical outcome? % 
297 
PART 3. 
We are interested in your experience with different methods of monitoring and managing 
clinical work. 
For each of the matters listed below, rate your experience in implementing them by circling the response 
on the scale provided which most closely corresponds with your views. 
1 As extensive (ie I am an expert) 
2 As proficient (ie I am competent) 
3 As moderate (ie I have some experience but there are gaps) 
4 As slight ( ie I have some grasp of what this is about) 
5 As non existent (ie I have no idea what you are referring to) 
I rate my experience of: 
• clinical effectiveness review l 2 3 4 5 
o clinical audit l 2 3 4 5 
• quality improvement l 2 3 4 5 
• casem1x l 2 3 4 5 
• review of resource utilisation in clinical practice l 2 3 4 5 
• clinical risk management L 2 3 4 5 
• care pathway development and implementation l 2 3 4 5 
• analysis of clinical practice variation •• 2 3 4 5 
• encouraging change in clinical practice. l 2 3 4 5 
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Resource Allocation 
We are interested in your views about resource allocation. 
Indicate the extent to which you 'agree' or 'disagree' with each of the statements listed below, by circling 
the response on the scale provided which most closely corresponds with your views. 
I Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Undecided 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
• Resource allocation decisions should be based solely on the needs of l 2 3 4 5 
individual patients, as detennined by the health professionals immediately 
involved. 
• Resources should not be allocated to a new clinical procedure/ 1 2 3 4 5 
treatment/service until its efficacy has been demonstrated through clinical 
trials. 
• All clinical decisions are resource decisions. l 2 3 4 5 
• In today's economic climate, cost and efficiency concerns have to take l 2 3 4 5 
precedence over concerns about equity and access. 
• Clinical and/or health interventions should be open to economic l 2 3 4 5 
assessment. 
• Resource issues have no place in clinical decision making. l 2 3 4 5 
• Continually increasing the financial accountability of health professionals l 2 3 4 5 
will cause them to compromise their responsibilities to individual patients. 
Are there any comments that you would like to make about resource allocation? 
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Accountabinity 
We are interested in your perceptions of the scope and limits of your accountability 
For each of the accountability arrangements listed below indicate the extent to which it falls within your 
perception of your accountability by circling the response on the scale provided which most closely 
corresponds with your view. 
Is very important in how I perceive my accountability 
2 Is important in how I perceive my accountability 
3 Is slightly important in how I perceive my accountability 
4 Is irrelevant to how I perceive my accountability 
5 Contradicts with how I perceive my accountability 
An expectation that I: 
• answer to myself for the way that I have acted in the interest of 1 2 3 4 5 
each of my patients 
• participate with all staff in my clinical team in evaluating and 1 2 3 4 5 
improving the team's collective performance 
• answer to management for the resource implications of my 1 2 3 4 5 
clinical practices 
• answer to myself for the way that I have balanced the needs of 1 2 3 4 5 
individual patients with those of all other patients, particularly 
with respect to resource usage 
• collectively review my clinical work with my professional/ 1 2 3 4 5 
clinical peers using evaluation criteria we have defined 
• have my clinical work routinely reviewed by senior members of 1 2 3 4 5 
my clinical specialty using evaluation criteria defined by them 
• be open to public scrutiny and provide justification for my 1 2 3 4 5 
clinical practices and resulting clinical outcomes 
• answer to my patients for my clinical practices and resulting 1 2 3 4 5 
clinical outcomes. 
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Setting Standards for Clinical 
Care 
We are interested in your views about how standards should be set for clinical care. 
Indicate the extent to which you 'agree' or 'disagree' with each of the statements listed below, by 
circling the response on the scale provided which most closely corresponds with your views. 
Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Undecided 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
Clinical standards should be based on: 
• a health professional's view of what works for her or him 2 3 4 5 
• locally accepted practice patterns within a clinical unit or 1 2 3 4 5 
service 
• documented and evaluated practice patterns across a number of I 2 3 4. 5 
clinical units or health care agencies 
• the latest developments in the relevant literature 1 2 3 4 5 
• protocols set by clinical colleges and/or professional bodies 1 2 3 4' 5 
• what is acceptable to patients 1 2 3 4 5 
• what is feasible within existing resources. l 2 3 4 5 
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Views on Managing 
Clinical Units 
We are interested in your perception of the strategies that are appropriate for improving a 
clinicafunit's or service's overall erformance. 
Indicate the extent to which you 'agree' or 'disagree' with each of the statements listed below, by 
circling the response on the scale provided which most closely con·esponds with your views. 
I Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Undecided 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
To improve a unit/service's overall performance, the person 
in charge should: 
• reinforce the expert authority of medical clinicians 1 2 3 4 5 
• emphasise the financial dimensions of their unit or service's l 2 3 4 5 
performance 
o establish systems which will closely monitor the work 1 2 3 4 5 
performance of each health professional working in their 
unit/service 
o get more resources for their unit or service from the 1 2 3 4 5 
corporate level of the NHS Trust 
o establish structures and routines which encourage statT, l 2 3 4 5 
collectively, to evaluate and improve their work practices 
• devote significant time and resources to team building and l 2 3 4 5 
staff development. 
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Organisational Assessment 
There are three parts to this section. Please complete all three parts. 
PART l. 
We are interested in the organisational characteristics that you believe are exhibited by your NHS 
Trust.· 
We explore these characteristics via five dimensions set out below. Each dimension contains four 
descriptions of how an NHS Tmst could be managed. 
For each dimension, distribute a total of 100 points among the four nominated alternatives depending 
on how similar you think each description is to your experience in your NHS Tmst. 
You may use any combination adding up to 100, for example, ( 20, 30, 50, 0 or I 0, 40, 20, 30). Note: I 00 
= 'totally descriptive' and 0 = 'not descriptive at all'. 
(A). Management Style: 
• Managers treat staff as their equals and include them in decision 
making processes. 
• Managers encourage staff to meet organisational goals and objectives 
and help them be productive. 
• Managers treat staff as subordinates but also try to develop a sense of 
loyalty and group spirit. 
• Managers ensure that staff comply with the Tmst's mles. 
(8). Direction & Co-ordination: 
• Individual staff are given a lot of freedom to determine their own 
activities. 
• Staff are clearly told what the Trust's goals and objectives are and then 
allowed a fair degree of freedom in deciding how they can meet these. 
• Managers have developed their staff into strong work teams which 
they control in a decentralised way. 
• Most staff, including managers. have little choice over what they do or 
how they do their jobs. 
(Points) 
100 
(Points) 
~ > • ', •• ' ' ' < '. 
~ ----
100 
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(Points) 
(C). Affiliation to the NHS Trust: 
• Staff personally believe in and support the Trust's overall purpose or " [ 
miSSIOn. 
• Staff value being part of a Tntst that emphasises personal 
achievement. 
• Staff feel a sense of belonging and loyalty to their particular work 
group and immediate manager. 
• Staff share the view that rules have to be followed whether they 
personally like them or not. 
(D). How people relate and deal with conflict: 
• People put a strong emphasis on getting on with one another and 
resolving disputes in ways that preserve their relationship. 
• People value getting on with one another but competition is also 
encouraged in order to increase performance. 
• People are expected to support their immediate manager and the 
members of their particular work group when disputes arise. 
• People tend to rely on rules and policies for resolving disputes if they 
occur. 
(E). The reward system emphasises: 
o Providing people with a sense of satisfaction and involvement in their 
work. 
o Rewarding people for their individual achievement and initiative. 
• Rewarding groups and units that achieve the objectives they have been 
set. 
o Rewarding people who hold important, high-ranking jobs. 
100 
(Points) 
[ 
[ 
100 
"(Points) 
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PART2. 
We are interested in your perceptions of your NHS Trust's organisational goals. 
In the spaces provided, rank the statements below from I to 8 in terms of your perception of their 
importance as goals of this Trust. 
Place the numeral "I" next to the statement that you think is most important. Then place the numeral 
"2" next to the statement that you think is next most important and so on through to "8" for the 
statement that you think is least important. 
In ranking the factors, do not use the same rank more than once. 
In rank order, I believe the goals that are 
currently being pursued in this Trust are: 
• staffwelfare 
• organisational stability 
• equal access for all patients from the local 
community 
• financial viability 
• reputation for service innovation and 
industry leader 
• service quality 
• improved productivity 
• teaching and research reputation. 
(Rank) 
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-------------------
PART 3. 
We are interested in the generatfeelings you hold about the NHS Trust 
in which ou are located. ··• 
Indicate the extent to which you 'agree' or 'disagree' with each of the statements listed below, by 
circling the response on the scale provided which most closely corresponds with your views. 
I Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Undecided 
4 Disagree 
5 Strongly disagree 
o What the Trust stands for is important to me. 
• I "talk up" the Trust to my friends as a great organisation to work for. 
o If the values ofthis Trust were any different from what they arc, I would 
not be as committed to this organisation. 
• How hard I work for the Trust is directly linked to how much I am 
rewarded. 
o In order for me to get rewarded around here, it is necessary to express the 
right attitude. 
• Since working at the Trust, my personal values and those of the Trust have 
become more similar. 
• My private views about the Trust are different from those I express publicly. 
• The reason I prefer this Trust to others is because of what it stands for, that 
is, its values. 
• Unless I'm rewarded for it in some way, I see no reason to expend extra 
effort on behalf of the Trust. 
• I am proud to tell others that I am part of this Trust. 
• I feel a sense of"ownership" for this Trust rather than being just an 
employee. 
• Right now, staying with this Trust is a matter of necessity. 
• Too much in my life would be disrupted if I decided I wanted to leave my 
Trust now. 
I '2 3 4 ··5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3' 4 5 
l 2 3 4' 5 
1 2 3 ,4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
t 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
l 2 :3: 4 5 
1 2 3 4 ,5 
' 
1 2 3 '4 5 
1 .2 3, 4;c5 
-- ., -. 
" 
-~· 
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What Would You Change? 
We are interested in any changes which you believe will enhance your clinical performance and 
experience of work. 
In the space provided below list changes in funding, organising and/or managing which you believe will 
significantly improve: 
Your Clinical Performance 
Your Experience of Work 
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Role of Primary Care Trusts 
We are interested in your perceptions of the role ofPri111ary Care Trusts in improving the 
erformance of our local health econom /communi . 
In the spaces provided, indicate the extent to which you believe that Primary Care Trusts have a role in 
bringing about changes to improve the perfonnance of the local health economy/community. 
(tick one box only) 
Strongly agree Agree Slighty Agree No Role Don't Know 
0 0 0 0 0 
If you have indicated that the Primary Care Trust has a role in bringing about change, nominate strategies 
you believe it should pursue. 
In the space below, list the factors that you believe will facilitate or hinder the Primary Care Trusts' capacity 
to fulfill these strategies. 
Facilitatingfactors: 
Hinderingfactors: 
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The Local Health 
Economy/Community 
We are interested in any further thoughts you have on how services might be improved. 
In the spaces provided below, specify any changes you believe need to be made in the focus, funding 
and/or management of Acute Trusts, General Practice and Social services to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of your local health economy/community. 
Acute Care Trusts 
General Practices 
Social Services 
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I 
We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for taking the time 
and effort to complete this questionnaire 
Feel free to use this space to comment on 
any issues raised in the survey 
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Appendix Two 
Interview Questions 
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I am interested in understanding the factors that influence the management strategies and work 
practices that NHS organisations are adopting in response to the government's drive for NHS reform. 
Trust CHT 
NTH 
Your Occupation/Position 
CEO 
Gender 
Age 
Executive Medical Director 
Divisional Medical Director 
Executive Allied Health Director 
Divisional Allied Health Director 
Executive Director of Nursing 
Divisional Director of Nursing 
Finance Director 
Performance Director 
Clingov Director 
OD Director 
Personnel Director 
Operations Director 
HR Director 
IMT Director 
Pathways Coordinator 
Clinical Audit Manager 
Male 
Female 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
40-59 
60+ 
Percentage of Time Spent on 
Direct Patient Care 
Administration/Management 
Teaching (excluding patient education) 
Research 
Length of Time in Current Role: 
Less than 1 year 
1-4 years 
5-9 years 
10-19 years 
More than 20 years 
u 
u 
u 
[I 
[I 
D 
IJ 
u 
u 
iJ 
IJ 
iJ 
IJ 
u 
IJ 
I] 
I] 
lJ 
lj 
iJ 
[] 
lJ 
Ll 
D 
iJ 
[I 
_'% 
% 
___ % 
% 
100% 
iJ 
iJ 
iJ 
iJ 
iJ 
Division .......................... . 
Division .......................... . 
Division .......................... . 
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Highest Professional 
Qualification: 
Fellowship of College 
Membership of College 
Other (please specify): 
Highest Academic Qualification: 
Postgraduate Degree 
Postgraduate Diploma 
Undergraduate Degree 
Diploma 
Certificate 
None 
Highest Qualification in 
Management: 
Postgraduate Degree 
Postgraduate Diploma 
Undergraduate Degree 
Dip lorn<~ 
Certificilte 
In-house Short Course 
None 
Career Progression 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Do you intend to upgrade your qualifications? 
Yes, clinic<~l qualifications 
Yes, mangemnt qualifications 
No 
Do you have an agreed job description? 
Yes 
No 
Do you have a performance agreement? 
Yes 
No 
If yes to either, please provide a copy. 
D 
LJ 
LJ 
D 
D 
D 
u 
u 
u 
Ll 
LJ 
D 
[I 
u 
u 
D 
u 
u 
D 
D 
u 
D 
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Reform Strategies 
1. What do you think are the trust's current top three priorities? 
1. ........................................................................................................ . 
2 ........................................................................................................ . 
3 ........................................................................................................ . 
2. What do you think should be the trust's order of priorities? 
1. ........................................................................................................ . 
2 ........................................................................................................ . 
3 ........................................................................................................ . 
3 a) Can you detail any of the trust's specific initiatives for meeting these priorities? 
3b). Can you detail any of the trust's specific initiatives for improving efficiency? 
3c) Can you detail any of the trust's initiatives for improving clinical effectiveness? 
3d) Can you detail any of the trust's specific initiatives for service redesign? 
4. What would you regard as the prime drivers for the adoption of these specific initiatives? 
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5. What factors have/are facilitated the implementation of these initiatives? 
6. What barriers to change where encountered when attempting to implement the initiatives 
you named above? 
7. What, if anything, do you think could be done to meet the trust's priorities, that is not being 
done? 
9. Why do you think this/these are not being done? 
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10. NHS reforms are designed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of care and the wider 
NHS. Policies directed at these goals encompass a variety of elements. On a scale of 1-5, how 
do you rate your unit's ability to meet the requirements on each of these policies? 
1 = Not well prepared at all 
2 =Plans developed but strategy initiatives yet to be implemented 
3 =Implementation of initiatives underway but stmggling to progress 
4 =Implementation of strategy proceeding according to expectation 
5 = All plans implemented and working well 
6=NA 
7=DK 
0 Linking funding to activity (PbR) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Linking clinical practice and resource use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Introduction of patient choice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased patient and public involvement in 
organisational decision-making 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased transparency of work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased accountability for managers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Use of performance targets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Evidenced based practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Staff role redesign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Multidisciplinarity in delivery of care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Service redesign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Shifting the balance of power towards primary care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased collaboration across health economy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased competition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Practice based commissioning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 IT Improvement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. On a scale of 1-5 (one being 'not well prepared at all' and five being' all plans implemented 
and working well'), how do you rate your trust's ability to meet the requirements on each of 
these policies? 
1 = Not well prepared at all 
2 =Plans developed but strategy initiatives yet to be implemented 
3 =Implementation of initiatives underway but stmggling to progress 
4 =Implementation of strategy proceeding according to expectation 
5 = All plans implemented and working well 
6=NA 
7=DK 
0 Linking funding to activity (PbR) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Linking clinical practice and resource use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Introduction of patient choice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased patient and public involvement in 
organisational decision-making 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased transparency of work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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0 Increased accountability for managers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Use of performance targets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Evidenced based practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Staff role redesign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Multidisciplinarity in delivery of care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Service redesign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Shifting the balance of power towards primary care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased collaboration across health economy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased competition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Practice based commissioning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 IT Improvement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Your Role 
12. What do you regard as your primary responsibilities in your current role? 
1. . ..................................................................... . 
2 ...................................................................... . 
3. 
4. ······································································ 
5 ...................................................................... . 
13. On a scale of one to five, how much of your time is spent on the following activities? 
1 =None 
2 =Very little 
3 = Some of my time 
4 =A moderate amount of time 
5 =Most of my time 
6=NA 
7=DK 
0 'Putting out fires' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Preventing fires 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Dealing with 'burns victims' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Consciously responding to central policy directives 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Working in a multidisciplinary capacity 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Maintaining organisational stability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Relating to collaborating care providers external to the 
trust 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Dealing with minutiae and mundane matters 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Reviewing clinical systems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Addressing clinical issues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Developing, maintaining or reviewing internal 
non-clinical management systems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Addressing competitive concerns 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Reflecting on the bigger picture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Dealing with financial concerns 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Achieving things you regard as core to your role 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Achieving you regard as core to the trust's goals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Receiving encouragement and support from others 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. What are the three things you would most like to achieve in this position? 
Personally .................................................................................................................................. . 
Professionally ............................................................................................................................ . 
Organisationally ....................................................................................................................... . 
318 
15. What is the one barrier, that if removed or changed, would make your job easier? 
Personal. ................................................................................................................................................ . 
Professional. .............................................................................................................................. . 
Organisational ......................................................................................................................... . 
In the wider NHS context ...................................................................................................... . 
16. How you determine what you think is expected of you in undertaking your role and in 
making decisions? 
17. What personal attributes do you think are most respected and/or admired in this trust? 
18. Do you think you tend to see things differently from others with whom you work? In what 
ways? 
The Role of Clinical Work 
19. What does the term 'managing clinical work' mean to you? 
20. Can you give an example of your unit's success in managing clinical work? 
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21. Would you say this kind of success is reasonably rare or a common occurrence? 
Rare D Occasional D Becoming frequent D Common occurrence D 
22. Can you describe a colleague who was very helpful in achieving the success?: 
a) What did they do? 
b) What is their official role? 
c) What appears/ed to motivate this person? 
d) What personal characteristic most enabled them to assist achieve this success? 
e) What factors at the team level aided this person/the success? 
e) What factors at the unit level aided this person/the success? 
f) What factors at divisional level aided this person/the success? 
g) What factors at senior management level aided this person/the success? 
23. Can you outline some strategies that your unit could adopt to better manage clinical work? 
24. Can you outline some strategies that the trust could adopt to better manage clinical work? 
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25. What impedes your unit in pursuing these strategies? 
26. What impedes the trust in pursuing these strategies? 
(Obtain first responses then ask about:) 
a) Internal dynamics 
b) External contextual impediments 
c) Historically based impediments 
Summary Items 
27. What are the trust's strongest facilitating factors for successfully meeting its goals? 
1. . .......................................................................................................................... . 
2 ............................................................................................................................ . 
3. 
4 ............................................................................................................................ . 
5. 
28. What are the trust's strongest impediments to meeting its goals? 
1. . .......................................................................................................................... . 
2. . .......................................................................................................................... . 
3 ............................................................................................................................ . 
4 ............................................................................................................................ . 
5. 
29. On a scale of 1-5, to what extent would you say that staff in this trust are driven by: 
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1 = Almost never 
2 =A little 
3 =Moderately 
4 =Quite strongly 
5 =Very strongly 
6 = Don't Know 
a) A need to meet rules, regulations and targets 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b) A commitment to meet an ideal 1 2 3 4 5 6 
c) 'Obvious' and/or unacknowledged assumptions 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d) Financial and status rewards 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e) Their personal and professional values 1 2 3 4 5 6 
f) What they think is expected of them 1 2 3 4 5 6 
29. On a scale of 1-5, to what extent would you say that, when making decisions at work, you 
are influenced by: 
1 =Almost never 
2 =A little 
3 =Moderately 
4 =Quite strongly 
5 =Very strongly 
6 =Don't Know 
a) A need to meet rules, regulations and targets 1 2 3 4 5 6 
b) A commitment to meet an ideal 1 2 3 4 5 6 
c) 'Obvious' and/or unacknowledged assumptions 1 2 3 4 5 6 
d) Financial and status rewards 1 2 3 4 5 6 
e) My personal and professional values 1 2 3 4 5 6 
f) What I think is expected of me 1 2 3 4 5 6 
31. If your nephew or niece was to start with for this Trust tomorrow, what advice would you 
give the1n to help them get ahead? ....................................................................................................... . 
32. Complete this sentence: "I work for this trust because ................................................... . 
Thank you for your time. 
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10. On a scale of 1-5, how do you rate your unit's ability to meet the requirements on each of 
these policies? 
1 =not well prepared at all 
2 =planning begun but strategy initiatives yet to be implemented 
3 =implementation of initiatives underway 
4 =implementation of strategy nearing completion 
5 = all plans implemented and working well 
6=NA 
7=DK 
0 Linking funding to activity (PbR) l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Linking clinical practice and resource use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Introduction of patient choice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Increased patient and public involvement in organisational 
decision-making 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Increased transparency of work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Increased accountability for managers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Use of performance targets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Evidenced based practice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Staff role redesign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Multidisciplinarity in delivery of care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Service redesign 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Shifting the balance of power towards primary care 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased collaboration across health economy l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Increased competition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 Practice based commissioning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 IT Improvement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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